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Do events in the natural gas market cause repercussions in the crude oil market? In light
of the enormous impact that price movements in the two largest U.S. energy markets have
on the economy, it is important to understand not just the individual markets but also how
they relate to one another. On this front, the literature presents a puzzle: while economic
theory suggests that the oil and gas markets are interlinked through a bi-directional causal
relationship, empirical research has concluded that the oil market affects the gas market but
not vice versa. The first chapter of this dissertation improves on the previous studies in two
ways: by using high-frequency, intraday oil and gas futures prices and by analyzing the effect
of specific news announcements from the weekly oil and gas inventory reports. The results
dispel the notion of one-way causality and provide support for the theory. The reaction of
the futures volatility and returns is asymmetric, although this asymmetry does not follow the
“good news” vs. “bad news” pattern from stock and bond markets; the response depends on
whether the shock is driven by oil or gas inventory gluts or shortages. The two-way causality
holds not only for the nearby futures contract but also for contracts of longer maturities.
These findings underscore the importance of analyzing financial markets in a multi-market
context.
The second chapter of this dissertation asks whether volatility and trading volume evolve
in a unidirectional or bidirectional, contemporaneous or lagged relationship in the crude oil
and natural gas futures markets. This question is important because it affects trading and
government regulation but previous studies have come to conflicting conclusions. Their main
shortcoming is the low frequency of data used in the analysis. This chapter improves on the
previous studies in three ways: by using high-frequency, intraday oil and gas futures prices
and volume, by including trading not only during the day but also during the night, and by
analyzing not only the nearby futures contract but also contracts with longer maturities. For
the nearby contract, Granger-causality tests show that past values of volume help explain
volatility which agrees with the Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis. Past values of
volatility have explanatory power for volume only when absolute return is used as the volatil-
ity measure; when the conditional variance from GARCH models is used as the volatility
measure, the causality in this direction disappears. These results change when low-frequency
daily data is applied. It is also shown that the volatility-volume relationship differs for con-
tracts with longer maturities. These findings are relevant for regulations, such as trader
position limits recently adopted by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trade Commission.
The third chapter of this dissertation investigates whether the production structure of
firms affects international optimal portfolios, risk-sharing, and response of terms of trade
(TOT) to shocks. The answer to this question would enhance our understanding of the
home equity bias, yet it has not been addressed in the theoretical literature. This chapter
studies the question in a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
endogenous portfolio allocation. It shows that the optimal portfolio includes more home
equity as the production structure changes from exporter-only, i.e., firms operating in their
home countries and serving foreign markets by exports, to multi-national-company-extreme
(MNC), i.e., firms hiring labor in both countries and producing locally in both countries.
This shift occurs because changing the firms’ production structure eliminates exposure to
technology differences and allows the home household to accomplish the same diversification
with less foreign equity. The production structure also has implications for the effect of
technology shocks on the TOT. Under the exporter-only setup, a shock to technology causes
a standard TOT deterioration, whereas under the MNC-extreme setup, a shock to technology
leads to a TOT improvement. By producing testable predictions, this chapter underscores the
need to take firms’ production structure into account when analyzing international optimal
portfolios, risk sharing, and response of the TOT to technology shocks. This is especially
important since empirical research has generated conflicting results.
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CHAPTER 1
GAS DOES AFFECT OIL:
EVIDENCE FROM INTRADAY PRICES AND
INVENTORY ANNOUNCEMENTS
1 Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between crude oil (referred to as “oil”) and natural gas
(referred to as “gas”). It investigates whether there is two-way causality as suggested by
economic theory or one-way causality as evidenced by previous empirical studies.
Price movements in markets for these two largest U.S. energy sources exert an enormous
influence on the economy.1 For example, Elder and Serletis (2010) show that oil price
volatility has a negative effect on investment, durables consumption and aggregate output,
and exacerbates the response of the economy to a negative oil price shock while dampening
the response to a positive oil price shock. In addition, trading in the oil and gas futures
markets has increased as shown by Figure 1, ranking the oil and gas futures as the first
and the second largest energy futures, and the first and the ninth largest commodity futures
by volume in 2008, respectively.2 In light of this enormous impact of oil and gas on the
macroeconomy as well as the financial markets, it is important to understand not just the
markets for the individual commodities but also how they relate to one another.
On this front, the literature presents a puzzle. Economic theory suggests the existence
1In 2009, oil and gas accounted for 37% and 25% of the energy use in the U.S. See the EIA Annual Energy
Review 2009, Table 1.3.
2Futures Industry Magazine Annual Volume Survey: 2008 A Wild Ride.
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Figure 1: Number of futures trades by month
Notes: This figure shows the number of nearby futures trades executed on NYMEX by month.
Source: Tick Data, Inc.
of two-way causality between oil and gas markets for several reasons.3 From the demand
perspective, oil and gas are substitutes because a portion of both the power generation and
industrial sectors has the ability to switch between gas and products refined from crude oil
as the production input. Therefore, an increasing oil price resulting from rising demand
will increase the price of gas as some firms in these sectors switch from oil to gas. The
relative price of oil and gas also influences decisions to build new facilities designed to
consume a certain type of fuel. From the supply perspective, an increasing oil price resulting
from increasing demand may lead to increased drilling and production of gas to substitute
away from the more expensive oil, causing an increase in gas supply with a subsequent
decrease in gas price. The gas price may also fall because gas is frequently found in the same
underground reservoirs as oil, so an increasing oil demand satisfied by a higher production
of oil may result in a higher production of gas, reducing the gas price. At the same time,
however, the increasing oil price may intensify competition for resources, such as drilling rigs,
3Villar and Joutz (2006) provide a summary of the economic theory.
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production facilities, and engineering and operations staff used in exploration and production
of both oil and gas, causing an increase in the gas price. In addition, the linkages between oil
and gas prices should have strengthened because of the development of liquified natural gas
technology (LNG), which allows the transportation of gas throughout the world and creates
a world market for gas, a process that has accelerated since the 1990s.
However, the empirical research reviewed in Section 2 has concluded that the causality
runs only in one direction: the oil market affects the gas market but not vice versa. Two
explanations are usually stated. First, the oil market is larger than the gas market. Second,
the oil market is global with prices determined by world supply and demand whereas the gas
market is local with prices determined by local supply and demand. The first explanation
does not seem satisfying since gas is almost as important an energy source as oil for the U.S.
The second explanation also does not seem to hold because oil and gas are partial substitutes
in the power generation and industrial sectors and the LNG technology has connected the
local gas markets.
Since the conflict between theoretical and empirical research represents a puzzle with
unsatisfying explanations, this paper investigates the contradiction. It improves on the
previous studies in two ways. First, it uses high-frequency, intraday New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) oil and gas futures prices, in contrast to observations taken at a lower
frequency, such as the daily, weekly or monthly data used by the previous papers, that do
not capture price interdependencies accurately. Second, it analyzes the effect of specific
news announcements from the weekly oil and gas inventory reports published by the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy instead of conducting
a general analysis of the relationship between the oil and gas prices using, for example,
3
Granger causality tests as the previous studies. Even though these inventory reports are the
most watched weekly indicators in the oil and gas markets, their effects have not been fully
analyzed.4
Three results follow from this analysis. First, the notion of one-way causality is dispelled,
providing support for the bi-directional causality indicated by the theory for the first time.
Gas inventory announcements affect oil futures volatility and return, and oil inventory an-
nouncements affect gas futures volatility and return. These cross-commodity effects turn out
to be substantial. The effect of gas inventory announcements on oil price volatility is more
than twice as strong as the effect of oil inventory announcements on gas price volatility,
highlighting the importance of spillovers from the gas market to the oil market.
Second, the model allows for different reactions of price volatility and return to inventory
gluts and shortages.5 However, in contrast to the “good news” vs. “bad news” pattern found
in stock and bond markets, the response differs by commodity and type of the shock. A
glut has a larger impact than a shortage for the effect of oil inventory announcements on
oil price volatility. In contrast, a glut has a slightly smaller impact than a shortage for the
effect of gas inventory announcements on oil price volatility, which is also the case for the
effect of gas inventory announcements on gas price volatility. Finally, a glut has the same
effect as a shortage for the effect of oil inventory announcements on gas price volatility. This
highlights the importance of analyzing the data in detail since a general analysis is unable
4For example, the Financial Times noted as of September 21, 2011: “The U.S. is the world’s largest oil
consumer and its weekly petroleum status reports are closely watched.”
5Except for Gregoire and Boucher (2008), who analyze the effect of gas inventory announcements on
gas price using daily data, previous papers have not analyzed the asymmetry between inventory gluts and
shortages.
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to uncover these differences.
Third, in contrast to previous studies that analyzed only the nearby futures contract
for the following month, this paper includes contracts with all maturities to investigate how
current news announcements affect financial instruments at various points in the future. The
two-way causality indicated by the cross-commodity effect holds not only for the nearby con-
tract but also for the following seven months’ contracts. The asymmetry effect also persists
across these maturities. The results described above are, therefore, robust to the maturity
structure. In general, the coefficients decrease as the length of the contract increases, sup-
porting the Samuelson (1965) theorem that futures contracts become more volatile as their
expiration date approaches.
In addition to our validating the economic theories on the two largest U.S. energy markets,
identifying precise linkages between these markets is important for several other reasons.
Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of volatility spillovers between the oil
market and financial markets, e.g., stock markets and exchange rate markets, a topic of
interest to regulators and policy-makers.6 To fully understand these spillovers, it is important
to realize that the oil volatility partially originates in another energy market, i.e., the gas
market.
Also, as documented by Buyuksahin, Haigh, Harris, Overdahl and Robe (2008) and
Basu and Gavin (2011), the recent dramatic rise in oil and gas futures trading evidenced
by Figure 1 is mainly due to an increasing number of financial institutions participating in
commodity derivatives such as oil and gas futures. According to Buyuksahin et al (2008),
6See, for example, Kilian and Park (2009), Cifarelli and Paladino (2010), and Hammoudeh, Yuan and
McAleer (2010).
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the share of traditional commercial traders, such as oil and gas exploration, production, and
refining companies who use the futures for commercial hedging decreased from 83% in 2000
to 55% in 2008. At the same time, according to Basu and Gavin (2011), non-commercial
financial traders, such as investment banks, mutual funds, pension funds, university endow-
ment funds and hedge funds, increased their investments in commodity derivatives, in an
attempt to diversify their stock market risk and chase higher yield, higher risk investments.
Since financial institutions played a key role in the recent economic crisis by investing in
complex financial products such as derivatives, and had to be bailed out by the taxpayers,
it is imperative to understand the markets in which they have an increasing exposure.7
Finally, this paper contributes to the discussion of whether oil prices are exogenous or
endogenous to the macroeconomy. While earlier papers, e.g., Hamilton (1985), attribute
oil price changes to exogenous events, such as political instability producing disruptions
in oil supply, more recent studies, e.g., Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004) and Kilian (2009),
have challenged this view by showing that oil price changes can endogenously follow from
demand changes.8 This paper provides another piece of evidence that oil prices evolve in a bi-
directional causal relationship instead of being exogenous. This improved understanding of
the linkages between the oil and gas markets may provide insight into modeling dependencies
of the macroeconomy on the energy markets. Krichene (2007) develops a model for analyzing
7Trading in oil and gas options based on oil and gas futures has also been on the rise, with financial
institutions again becoming more dominant market players. Since the correct pricing of options relies on
the ability to reliably estimate volatility of the underlying asset, i.e., that of the futures contract, it is again
critical to understand how the volatility is partially driven by spillovers from another market.
8Hamilton (2008) and Kilian (2008) provide literature reviews of the relationship between oil prices and
the macroeconomy.
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the oil and gas markets with a role for monetary policy. However, in his simultaneous
equations, the gas demand and supply are affected by oil but the oil demand and supply
are not affected by gas. Such a misspecification may lead to misguided policies. These
considerations underscore the importance of analyzing energy (and financial) markets in a
multi-market context.
2 Literature Review
Although theory suggests a two-way relationship between the oil and gas markets, the empir-
ical research by Pindyck (2004), Villar and Joutz (2006), Asche, Osmundsen and Sandsmark
(2007), Brown and Yucel (2007) building on an earlier paper by Brown (2005), and Hartley,
Medlock and Rosthal (2008) concluded that the causality runs only in one direction: the oil
market affects the gas market but not vice versa.9 Onour (2009) also noted that the gas
price is affected by the oil price, especially at low oil prices (below $40 per barrel), but did
not investigate the sensitivity of oil to gas. See Table 9 in Appendix A for an overview of
the data used in these papers.10
9Pindyck (2004) conducted Granger causality tests using the conditional volatility from GARCH models.
When estimating the GARCH model with daily data, he concluded that the oil market affected the gas
market but not the other way around which he said was the expected result. When estimating the GARCH
model with weekly data, he obtained the opposite result but disregarded it, arguing that correlations between
the oil and gas volatilities are low in the weekly model.
10Several other papers have studied the relationship between oil and gas markets without analyzing causal-
ity. Yucel and Guo (1994) showed that oil, gas and coal prices were cointegrated from 1974 through 1990
although only oil and coal prices were cointegrated from 1947 through 1974. Panagiotidis and Rutledge
(2007) also found a cointegrating relationship between oil and gas prices, while Serletis and Rangel-Ruiz
7
While the above papers claim that the gas market does not affect the oil market, this
study uncovers evidence of such a relationship. It differs from the previous empirical papers
in two respects. First, it takes advantage of NYMEX intraday oil and gas futures prices, i.e.,
prices at a higher frequency than the daily, weekly or monthly prices used by the previous
papers. Second, in contrast to the previous papers that conduct a general analysis of the
relationship between the oil and gas prices using, for example, Granger causality tests, this
paper analyzes the effect of specific news announcements: the weekly oil and gas inventory
reports published by the EIA.
Four papers have analyzed the effect of inventory announcements on intraday energy
prices. Linn and Zhu (2004) studied the effect of gas inventory announcements on intraday
gas futures price return and volatility from 1999 through 2002 and concluded that volatility
increased after inventory announcements. However, they included only the actual inventory
level. This is an issue because the efficient market theory states that only the unanticipated
component of news announcements matters because the anticipated component has been
built into price forecasts by rational economic agents. Therefore, the correct methodology
(2004) reported that the oil and gas relationship had weakened and Bachmeier and Griffin (2006) concluded
that the oil, gas and coal markets were only very weakly integrated. Wang, Wu and Yang (2008) showed
that the correlation between oil and gas prices did not exhibit long-memory, implying a weak relationship
in the long run. Marzo and Zagaglia (2008) noted that the correlation between the oil and gas prices has
been rising since 2000 although this correlation was low on average over two thirds of the sample period.
See Table 10 in Appendix A for an overview of the data used in these papers. Also, related papers studied
relationships between other commodities. Serletis and Herbert (1999) focused on daily gas, fuel oil, and
power prices from 1996 through 1997, while Ohana (2010) analyzed daily spot gas and heating oil futures
prices from 2000 through 2009.
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for analyzing the impact of news announcements on prices requires that market expectations
be subtracted from the actual value to arrive at the unanticipated component.
Gay, Simkins and Turac (2009) investigated whether investors learned about analyst
accuracy using gas inventory announcements and gas futures prices from 1997 through 2005.
Focusing only on futures return and disregarding price volatility, they concluded that the oil
futures return reacted to analyst forecasts.
Bjursell, Gentle and Wang (2009) considered, among other things, the effect of oil inven-
tory announcements on oil intraday volatility and the effect of gas inventory announcements
on gas intraday volatility. Instead of subtracting the market expectations from the actual
values to arrive at the unexpected component, they estimated the “surprise” based on his-
torical inventory levels. They concluded that this ”surprise” increased volatility in gas and
heating oil prices.
Chang, Daouk and Wang (2009) investigated whether investors learn about analyst ac-
curacy using oil inventory announcements and oil futures prices from 2003 through 2005.
Focusing only on price return and disregarding price volatility, they concluded that the oil
price return rises (falls) when analysts forecast a decrease (increase) in supplies.11
None of these four papers on the effect of inventory announcements focused on the cross-
commodity effect, i.e., the effect of gas inventory announcements on the oil price and the
effect of oil inventory announcements on the gas price. Also, these papers did not distinguish
11Three of the above papers on the causal relationships between the oil and gas markets allowed inventory
to play a limited role. Villar and Joutz (2006), Brown and Yucel (2007), and Hartley, Medlock and Rosthal
(2008) included the gas inventory but ignored the oil inventory. More importantly, they included only the
actual inventory, i.e., they failed to subtract market expectations of the inventory.
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between positive and negative surprises, which prevented them from discussing asymmetries
between effects of inventory shortages and gluts. Finally, they focused only on the nearby
futures contract, ignoring the effect on contracts with longer maturities.12
3 Data
3.1 Oil and Gas Futures Prices
Oil and gas futures contracts are traded on two main exchanges: the NYMEX in Chicago
and the InterContinental Exchange (ICE) in London. This paper focuses on the NYMEX
futures data because NYMEX is more liquid than ICE.13 This proprietary data is provided
by Tick Data, Inc., a company that specializes in intraday time series data for equities,
futures and options.14 The data are transaction data, i.e., not bid-ask quotes.
12Seven papers have analyzed the effect of other news announcements on oil prices. Ghura (1990) focused
on the impact of five U.S. macroeconomic announcements, exchange rates and interest rates on price returns
of oil and nineteen other commodities using daily prices from 1985 through 1989. Kilian and Vega (2008)
conducted a more comprehensive study by analyzing the impact of thirty U.S. macroeconomic announcements
on price returns of oil and gasoline using daily data from 1983 through 2008. Roache and Rossi (2009)
analyzed the impact of thirteen U.S. and European announcements on price returns and volatilities of oil
and eleven other commodities using daily data from 1997 through 2009. Guidi, Russell and Tarbert (2006),
Schmidbauer and Rosch (2009), and Lin and Tamvakis (2010) studied the effect of OPEC decisions while
Leinert (2010) considered the effect of unanticipated discoveries of giant oil fields. Three papers analyzed the
effect of other announcements on gas prices: Ates and Wang (2007), Mu (2007), and Gregoire and Boucher
(2008).
13See Downey (2009) for description of the oil market.
14See www.tickdata.com.
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Light Sweet Crude Oil futures started trading on NYMEX under the symbol CL on
March 30, 1987. Currently, the trading day takes place on Mondays through Fridays from
9:00 a.m. till 2:30 p.m. Eastern Time.15 The standardized contract is for 1,000 barrels
with the price quoted in U.S. dollars per barrel. Futures contracts with different maturities
are available. The shortest maturity, called the nearby contract, is for the following month.
The longest maturity is nine years. Trading ceases on the third business day prior to the
twenty-fifth calendar day of the month preceding the delivery. At expiration, oil has to be
physically delivered to Cushing, OK.16 Figure 2 presents the oil nearby contract price from
2003 to 2010.
Figure 2: Crude oil futures price
Notes: This figure shows the price of the NYMEX crude oil nearby futures contract per barrel in U.S. dollars.
Source: Tick Data, Inc.
15Until January 31, 2007, the trading day started at 10:00 a.m. Night trading is not analyzed in this paper
since the day and night trading sessions may differ from the information arrival standpoint.
16See website of CME Group that owns NYMEX: www.cmegroup.com.
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Natural gas futures started trading on NYMEX under the symbol NG on January 4,
1993. The trading hours are identical to those for oil. The standardized contract is for
10,000 million British thermal units (mmBTU) with the price quoted in U.S. dollars per
mmBTU. Maturities from one month to twelve years are available. Trading ceases three
business days prior to the first day of the delivery month. At expiration, gas has to be
physically delivered to Henry Hub, LA. Figure 3 presents the gas nearby contract price from
2003 to 2010.
Figure 3: Natural gas futures price
Notes: This figure shows the price of the NYMEX natural gas nearby futures contract per million British thermal units in U.S. dollars.
Source: Tick Data, Inc.
Very few market participants choose to make physical delivery at contract expiration.
Instead, they roll over their positions into a new contract. Two methodologies are used in this
paper to create a continuous record of the futures contract prices. In the first methodology,
the current contract is used until the expiration date. However, as market participants begin
rolling over their positions on the preceding days, trading may be thin during the last days
12
before the contract expiration date, causing unusual price movements. Therefore, the second
methodology switches to the next contract as soon as its daily contract volume exceeds the
current contract volume. The results do not materially differ between the two methods.
Therefore, only results using the expiration date method are reported.17
3.2 Weekly Petroleum Status Report
The data on the U.S. oil inventory come from the Weekly Petroleum Status Report published
by the EIA. This report is prepared by the EIA based on companies submitting weekly forms
stating their current oil inventory, as mandated by law.18 The first report was published on
August 20, 1982. The report is released weekly on Wednesday at 10:30 am for the week
ending on the previous Friday. If Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday fall on a public holiday,
the report is released on the following Thursday at 11:00 am.19 See Appendix B for a
discussion of the adjustment to holidays. Only commercial inventory is considered in this
paper, i.e., the Strategic Petroleum Reserves held by the U.S. government are excluded. The
data are in thousands of barrels.
17Another method chooses a particular date, e.g., the 15th calendar day of each month to switch from the
nearby contract to the second nearby contract in an attempt to model the market participants’ behavior.
This approach is not used in this paper because it is arbitrary.
18See www.eia.doe.gov.
19These holiday weeks are skewing the intraday pattern graphs in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1. The regressions
are correct because the data show the inventory reports on the days and intervals when they are actually
released. As a robustness check, however, these weeks are eliminated from the data. The results do not
change materially. The results reported in this paper include the holiday weeks.
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3.3 Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report
The data on the gas inventory in the the U.S. Lower 48 states come from the Weekly Natural
Gas Report published by the EIA based on companies submitting weekly forms stating their
current gas inventory, as mandated by law.20 The first report was published on December
31, 1993. The report is released weekly on Thursday at 10:30 am for the week ending on
the previous Friday unless Thursday falls on a public holiday. There are twelve such holiday
weeks in the sample period. It is assumed that the report was released at 10:30 am on
the following Friday during these holiday weeks.21 See Appendix B for a discussion of the
adjustment to holidays. The data are in billions of cubic feet.
3.4 Expectations of the Weekly Petroleum Status Report
Bloomberg conducts a weekly survey of approximately twenty industry experts asking them
what they expect the oil inventory excluding the Strategic Petroleum Reserves to be once
released by the EIA, and publishes the minimum, maximum, mean and median values of
the expert forecasts (in thousands of barrels). This paper uses the median forecast.22 The
20See www.eia.doe.gov.
21The American Gas Association (AGA) published this report prior to the end of April of 2002. The
AGA released the report on Wednesdays after NYMEX market closing time from December 31, 1993 until
February 25, 2000 and between 2:00 pm and 2:15 pm from March 3, 2000 until April 26, 2002. The EIA took
over on May 3, 2002. However, as this study is limited to the period from June 13, 2003 until September
24, 2010, it is not affected by the change of the release day from Wednesday to Thursday.
22The data can be found on the Bloomberg terminal under the code ECO with “North America” under
Region, “U.S.” under Country, and “10) Energy/Commodities” under Type. The list of economists surveyed,
including the date of the survey, can be obtained by typing in “12”.
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survey is published on Monday or Tuesday, i.e., prior to the actual values being released by
the EIA. The first survey was conducted on June 13, 2003.23 As explained in Section 4, the
“surprise” is calculated as the difference between the EIA inventory announcement and the
Bloomberg survey forecast.
3.5 Expectations of the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report
Bloomberg conducts a weekly survey of approximately twenty-five industry experts asking
them what they expect the gas inventory to be once released by the EIA (in billions of cubic
feet), using the same methodology as for oil. The first survey was conducted on May 3, 2002.
4 Methodology
Deciding on the length of the intraday time interval involves choosing between noise due
to the data microstructure and loss of information. Using the volatility signature plot that
shows the scaled realized volatility, i.e., daily average of squared returns, against time in-
tervals in multiples of one minute as outlined by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys
(2000), the 10-minute interval is chosen as the appropriate length. See Appendix C for
volatility signature plots for oil and gas prices.24 For example, the first 10-minute interval
23Note that Bloomberg asks the experts by how much they expect the inventory to change compared with
the previous week. Therefore, to arrive at the expected inventory, it is necessary to add the previous week’s
actual inventory and the experts’ expectation of the change in inventory.
24See Dacorogna, Gencay, Muller, Olsen and Pictet (2001) for a discussion of scaling factors. Also, note
that the realized volatility is used only to choose the appropriate interval. It is not used in the regressions.
The dependent variable in the volatility regressions is defined as the absolute return.
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contains trades from 9:00:00 till 9:09:59.25 There are 27 and 33 intervals within a trading day
depending on whether the market opens at 10 a.m. or 9 a.m. The days when the NYMEX
market closes earlier, usually due to an upcoming holiday, are eliminated to prevent skewing
intraday patterns.26 Missing prices are set equal to the previous prices.27 The resulting
sample period contains 54,884 10-minute intervals on 1,826 days from June 13, 2003 until
September 24, 2010, a period of 380 weeks.
Let Pj be the price at the end of 10-minute interval j. Since both oil and gas price series
are non-stationary, the return, i.e., the difference between the log price at the end of interval
j and the log price at the end of interval j-1, Rj ≡ ln(Pj)− ln(Pj−1), is used. The resulting
return series is stationary as gauged by an augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
This paper analyzes the effect of announcements on price returns as well as volatility,
defined as the absolute value of the returns, |Rj|, following, for example, Ding, Granger and
Engle (1993), Ederington and Lee (1993), Gwilym, McMillan and Speight (1999), McKenzie
(1999), Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000), and Ederington and Guan (2005). See Figures 4
and 5 for oil and gas absolute price returns, respectively.
The methodology for analyzing the effect of news announcements on prices assumes
efficient markets, implying that only the unanticipated component of news announcements
matters because the anticipated component has been built into market participants’ price
forecasts. The unexpected component is the difference between the actual value, Akj, and
25As a robustness check, the analysis is repeated using 15-minute and 30-minute intervals. The results do
not change materially.
26There are only 20 such days within the sample period.
27There are very few such missing observations (0.20% and 0.45% of all observations for the oil and gas
nearby contracts, respectively).
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Figure 4: Crude oil futures price volatility
Notes: This figure shows the price volatility of the NYMEX crude oil nearby futures contract defined as absolute return.
Source: Tick Data, Inc.
Figure 5: Natural gas futures price volatility
Notes: This figure shows the price volatility of the NYMEX natural gas nearby futures contract defined as absolute return.
Source: Tick Data, Inc.
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the expected value, Ekj, where k ∈ {O,G} stands for oil and gas announcements. Since this
difference is in thousands of barrels and billions of cubic feet for oil and gas, respectively,
it is divided by the actual value and then multiplied by 100. The resulting “surprise”,
Skj ≡ Akj−EkjAkj × 100, can then be interpreted as a percentage deviation of the expectations
from the actual values.28 Statistics for the oil inventory surprise, SO, and the gas inventory
surprise, SG, are summarized in Table 1. Since the mean values of these variables are
close to zero, the Bloomberg survey can be considered unbiased, i.e., the analysts do not
systematically overforecast or underforecast.
Table 1: Summary statistics for oil and gas inventory surprise variables
Min Max Mean Standard Deviation
Oil inventory surprise, SO -2.85% 2.82% -.02% .94%
Gas inventory surprise, SG -1.55% 2.93% .05% .46%
A positive surprise, Skj > 0, i.e., Akj > Ekj, means that the actual inventory, when
announced by the EIA, is higher than what the analysts expected. In other words, the ana-
lysts underforecast the actual inventory resulting in an inventory glut. A negative surprise,
Skj < 0, i.e., Akj < Ekj, means that the actual inventory, when announced by the EIA, is
28Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) implement another methodology for standardizing announcement
units. They divide the difference between the actual and expected values by its sample standard deviation
σk and interpret the coefficient as the change in oil price return for one standard deviation change in the
surprise. In this paper, dividing by the actual value is preferred to allow for interpreting the surprise as a
percentage deviation of the expectation from the actual value.
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lower than what the analysts expected. In other words, the analysts overforecast the actual
inventory, resulting in an inventory shortage.
To allow for the possibility of asymmetric reaction of the price return and volatility to
shortages and gluts, indicators, I(Skj > 0), are created for oil and gas that take on value
of 1 if Skj > 0 and 0 otherwise. These indicators are then multiplied by the surprise, i.e.,
Skj × I(Skj > 0). This allows interpreting the coefficient on the surprise, Skj, as the effect of
a shortage. The sum of the coefficients on Skj and Skj × I(Skj > 0) can then be interpreted
as the effect of a glut.
The effect of the announcements is analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion. Several control variables are included in the regressions in addition to the above surprise
variables. As suggested by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), lags of surprise
and dependent variable are added to allow for autocorrelation.29
A beginning-of-day dummy is included to account for unusual price movements at the
beginning of the day and to account for the change in the beginning of the trading day
from 10:00 to 9:00 on February 1, 2007. This dummy takes on the value of 1 during the first
interval of the day and 0 in all other intervals. An end-of-day dummy is included in the same
way to account for unusual price movements at the end of the day. These time-of-the-day
effects have been identified in many financial markets, for example by Becker, Finnerty and
Kopecky (1993), Gwilym, McMillan and Speight (1999), Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000),
and Linn and Zhu (2004).30 A first-trading-day dummy is included that takes on the value
2933 lags are used since a trading day includes 33 10-minute intervals. In an alternative specification, the
model is modified to include lagged cross-commodity terms, i.e., the oil price volatility (return) equations
include gas price volatility (return) lags. The results do not change.
30Alternative specifications are run where the beginning-of-day (end-of-day) dummy took on the value of
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of 1 in all intervals on the day after a non-trading day, i.e., after a weekend or a holiday, to
allow for effects due to the market being closed for an extended period of time. A trader
composition variable, defined as the ratio of non-commercial financial traders volume to the
traditional commercial traders volume, is added to account for a change in the composition
of firms trading oil futures, as documented by Buyuksahin et al (2008). These authors
show that the proportion of non-commercial financial traders has been on the rise and the
proportion of traditional commercial traders has declined. The three-month Treasury bill
rate is included because Pindyck (2004) shows that this interest rate helps explain the oil
return because it affects the cost of holding inventory.
Trading volume is added to account for various unobservable sources of volatility. One
unit of volume represents 1,000 executed contracts. Disagreement exists on whether con-
temporaneous or lagged volume should be used. Foster (1995) concluded that oil volatility
and volume are contemporaneously correlated and driven by the same factors, assumed to
be information. He showed that lagged volume explains current volatility which means that
lagged volume rather than contemporaneous volume should be used as a control variable
to avoid endogeneity issues. Kocagil and Shachmurove (1998) corroborated this by provid-
ing evidence of two-way Granger causality between oil volatility and volume. Fujihara and
Mougoue (1997) argued that volume is a significant explanatory variable for oil volatility
even though factors other than volume affect the persistence of volatility. In contrast, Gi-
rard, Sinha and Biswas (2008) concluded that volume not only leads oil and gas volatility
but is exogenous to it, which implies that it can be used for forecasting volatility and as a
proxy for the flow of information, suggesting contemporaneous volume can be included in
1 for the first (last) two and three intervals. The results do not change.
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the regressions. For gas, Herbert (1995) concluded that lagged volume influences current
price volatility but lagged price volatility has much less of an influence on current volume.
Since the previous papers disagree on whether contemporaneous or lagged volume should be
used as a control variable in the volatility regression, both specifications are implemented.
The results are very similar. The lagged volume specification is reported in this paper.31
Control variables for gasoline inventory, distillate fuel oil (referred to as “distillate”)
inventory and refinery utilization are added because these data are included in the Weekly
Petroleum Storage Report.32 Since these data are released at the same time as the oil
inventory data, their announcements could possibly skew the results. There are no other
weekly announcements made by any U.S. government agency which coincide with the oil
and gas inventory announcements.33
For the futures return, the regression is:
Rj = α+ ΣIi=1βiRj−i + Σ
K
k=1Σ
L
l=0γklSk,j−l + Σ
K
k=1Σ
L
l=0δklSk,j−l × I(Sk,j−l > 0) + ΣMm=1θm{Zm}+ εj , (1)
where {k} includes oil, gas, gasoline, distillate and refinery utilization, i and l stand for
31In an alternative method of accounting for various unobservable sources of volatility, the Chicago Board
Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) is included as a measure of the stock market volatility and investor
sentiment in general. The results do not change.
32Distillate includes diesel fuels used in on-highway engines, e.g., automobiles and trucks, and off-highway
engines, e.g., railroad locomotives and agricultural machinery, as well as fuel oils used for heating and power
generation. Refinery utilization is defined as the ratio of gross inputs used in the atmospheric oil distillation
units to the operable capacity of the units. For more detail, see Definitions of Petroleum Products and Other
Terms on www.eia.doe.gov.
33The Weekly Petroleum Storage Report includes other data, e.g., propane inventory and jet fuel inventory.
However, Bloomberg does not conduct surveys for these commodities. Therefore, they cannot be included
in the regression. It is unlikely they would have a major effect on the results of this paper.
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lags of returns and surprises, respectively, and {Zm} includes dummies for the beginning-of-
day, end-of-day and the first-trading-day, and controls for trader composition, three-month
Treasury bill rate, and lagged volume.
Similarly, for the futures volatility, the regression is:
|Rj | = α+ΣIi=1βi|Rj−i|+ΣKk=1ΣLl=0γklSk,j−l+ΣKk=1ΣLl=0δklSk,j−l×I(Sk,j−l > 0)+ΣMm=1θm{Zm}+εj . (2)
Newey-West standard errors are used to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion in the error term εj.
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Since the oil and gas prices exhibit time-varying volatility depicted in Figures 4 and 5,
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models lend themselves
as tools for analyzing the data in addition to the OLS. Four specifications are presented.
First, the GARCH(1,1) model that includes one ARCH term and one GARCH term with
the Gaussian distribution of errors is used as a benchmark:
Rj = α+ ΣIi=1βiRj−i + Σ
K
k=1Σ
L
l=0γklSk,j−l + Σ
K
k=1Σ
L
l=0δklSk,j−l × I(Sk,j−l > 0) + ΣMm=1θm{Zm}+ εj , (3)
h2j = ν + φh
2
j−1 + ζεj−1, (4)
where equation (3) is the mean equation, equation (4) is the conditional variance equation,
and the distribution of the error conditional on an information set at time j, Ψj, is assumed
to be εj|Ψj ∼ N [0, h2j ].
Second, a GARCH(1,1) model with the t distribution is implemented to account for
the distribution’s heavy tails. Third, a GARCH-in-mean(1,1) model with the Gaussian
distribution that lets the expected value of the return depend on its conditional variance is
34Note that the above regressions do not suffer from endogeneity due to a two-way relationship between oil
prices and oil inventory because the inventory variable on the right-hand side is not the actual inventory; it
is the unanticipated component of the inventory changes. As such, it is not a decision variable of the market
participants.
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used. The mean equation then becomes:
Rj = α+ΣIi=1βiRj−i+Σ
K
k=1Σ
L
l=0γklSk,j−l+Σ
K
k=1Σ
L
l=0δklSk,j−l×I(Sk,j−l > 0)+ΣMm=1θm{Zm}+ψh2j+εj . (5)
Finally, an EGARCH(1,1) model with the Gaussian distribution that allows for an asym-
metric reaction to positive and negative innovations is implemented with the conditional
variance equation:
log(h2j ) = ν + φ log(h
2
j−1) + ω
∣∣∣∣∣ εj−1√hj−1
∣∣∣∣∣+ ρ εj−1√hj−1 , (6)
where the term ρ εj−1√
hj−1
captures the asymmetry because positive innovations εj > 0 are
allowed to have different effects on the conditional variance than negative innovations εj < 0.
The above regressions are run for the futures nearby contract as well as the contracts of
longer maturities to investigate how current news announcements affect financial instruments
at various points in the future.
5 Results
5.1 Oil Price Volatility
5.1.1 Intraday Pattern Graphs
Figure 6 shows the intraday pattern of oil price volatility.35 In panel a), absolute returns for
each 10-minute interval are averaged across all days in the data sample. In addition to a U-
35The intraday pattern graphs do not display the first interval to avoid skewing the graphs by the overnight
gap as the first interval is affected by not only by the first ten minutes of the trading day but also the period
since the market closed on the previous day.
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shaped pattern due to the market opening and closing, one feature stands out.36 The 10:40
a.m. interval shows a spike in volatility. Panels b), c) and d) display the intraday pattern
of volatility by day. In panel b), the absolute returns for each interval are averaged only for
Mondays. While the U-shaped pattern is still visible, the 10:40 a.m. spike disappears. The
graphs for Tuesdays and Fridays, not shown in this paper, look similar. Panel c) shows the
intraday volatility pattern for Wednesdays, i.e., the day when the Weekly Petroleum Storage
Report is released at 10:30 a.m. As documented by Bjursell, Gentle and Wang (2009), the
10:40 a.m. spike is due to this oil inventory news announcement. However, panel d) for
Thursdays shows a similar pattern with a smaller magnitude. This paper hypothesizes that
the 10:40 a.m. spike is due to the release of the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report at 10:30
a.m. This cross-commodity effect, suggesting that the gas market influences the oil market,
has not been observed in previous research.37
5.1.2 Cross-Commodity Effect
Table 2 shows regression results for the price volatility of the oil nearby futures contract.
Specification (1) includes the oil inventory variables as well as control variables that have
been used in other papers to explain the oil price volatility, as described in Section 4.38
36The fact that the data sample includes the period from June 13, 2003 till January 31, 2007 when the
market opened at 10 a.m. as well as the period from February 1, 2007 till September 24, 2010 when the
market opened at 9 a.m. creates a “double-U” because the volatility is higher after 9 a.m. and after 10 a.m.
37The smaller spike on Thursdays in the 11:10 a.m. interval is due to the Weekly Petroleum Storage
Report being released on Thursdays at 11:00 a.m. if Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday fall on a holiday, as
discussed in Section 3.2.
38The first-trading-day dummy, refinery utilization variables, and lags of inventory surprises are not sig-
nificant, so the specification reported in this paper excludes them.
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Figure 6: Intraday pattern of oil price volatility
Notes: This figure shows the intraday pattern of the NYMEX crude oil nearby contract futures price volatility. The volatility is defined as the absolute
return. The first interval is not displayed to avoid skewing the graphs by the overnight gap. Source: Tick Data, Inc.
The oil glut variable stands for the situation in which Skj > 0, i.e., Akj > Ekj, and the oil
shortage variable stands for the situation in which Skj < 0, i.e., Akj < Ekj. The coefficient
of -.00425 on the oil shortage means that the analysts overforecasting the actual inventory
by 1% leads to an .00425 increase in volatility.39 The coefficient of +.00626 on the oil glut
means that the analysts underforecasting the actual inventory by 1% leads to an .00626
increase in volatility. These coefficients are substantial given the intraday absolute returns
39The change is an increase even though the coefficient has a negative sign because shortage stands for
Skj < 0, so the coefficient is multiplied by a negative number.
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shown in Figure 6.
Specification (2) adds the gas inventory variables. The oil inventory variables are unaf-
fected which means that the gas inventory variables provide additional explanatory power.
The coefficients of -.00205 and +.00191 on the gas shortage and the gas glut are about one-
half and one-third the size of their oil counterparts, respectively, indicating the gas inventory
announcements have a sizeable effect on the oil price volatility. This influence of the gas
market on the oil market has not been documented before.
Specification (3) adds control variables for the gasoline and distillate inventory. Even
though adding these variables decreases the oil shortage and oil glut coefficients, the gas
shortage and gas glut coefficients are unaffected, confirming the cross-commodity effect.
In fact, the gas inventory variables become more important relative to the oil inventory
variables. The gas shortage coefficient becomes almost as large as the oil shortage coefficient
and the gas glut coefficient becomes about half the size of the oil glut coefficient. This
cross-commodity effect provides support for the theories on spillovers between the oil and
gas markets described in the Introduction.
5.1.3 Joint Model of Oil and Gas Price Volatility and the Asymmetry Effect
To put the effect of gas inventory announcements on the oil price volatility in perspective, the
effect of oil inventory announcements on the gas price volatility is analyzed for comparison.
Since errors may be correlated across the oil and gas regressions, a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) is estimated.40 Table 3 displays the results for the oil and gas inventory
variables. Again, the coefficients are sizeable given the intraday absolute returns shown in
40The SUR results do not materially differ from running regressions separately for oil and gas.
26
Table 2: Price volatility regressions for oil nearby contract
(1) (2) (3)
Oil shortage ***-.00425 ***-.00426 ***-.00231
S < 0 (.00051) (.00051) (.00066)
Oil glut ***.00626 ***.00627 ***.00433
S > 0 (.00074) (.00074) (.00077)
Gas shortage **-.00205 ***-.00209
S < 0 (.00075) (.00075)
Gas glut ***.00191 ***.00194
S > 0 (.00052) (.00053)
Gasoline shortage **-.00107
S < 0 (.00048)
Gasoline glut ***.00212
S > 0 (.00068)
Distillate shortage **-.00139
S < 0 (.00062)
Distillate glut *.00093
S > 0 (.00051)
Beg-of-day dummy ***.00795 ***.00796 ***.00797
(.00026) (.00026) (.00026)
End-of-day dummy ***.00098 ***.00099 ***.00100
(.00008) (.00008) (.00008)
Trader composition ***-.00010 ***-.00010 ***-.00010
(.00003) (.00003) (.00003)
T-bill rate ***-.00008 ***-.00008 ***-0.00008
(.00001) (.00001) (0.00001)
Volume 1st lag ***.00006 ***.00006 ***.00006
(.00001) (.00001) .00001
|Rj | 1st lag ***.07220 ***.07248 ***0.07239
(.01127) (.01129) (.01130)
R2 0.27 0.28 0.28
RMSE 0.00318 0.00317 0.00317
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations
is 54,850 in all specifications. The control variables that are not significant are excluded from the specification reported in this paper. Only the first lags
of volume and absolute return are reported to save space.
Figure 6.
The effect of both gas gluts and gas shortages on the oil price volatility is more than
twice as strong as the effect of oil gluts and oil shortages on the gas price volatility. This
underscores the cross-commodity effect and highlights the importance of the gas market
spillovers for the oil market.
In addition to the cross-commodity effect, the joint model results in Table 3 offer an
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Table 3: SUR model for oil and gas price volatility
Oil price volatility Gas price volatility
Oil shortage ***-.00232 **-.00089
S < 0 (.00030) (.00042)
Oil glut ***.00434 **.00089
S > 0 (.00030) (.00043)
Gas shortage ***-.00217 ***-.02432
S < 0 (.00061) (.00087)
Gas glut ***.00200 ***.02110
S > 0 (.00044) (.00064)
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of
observations is 54,850. Only the oil and gas inventory variables are reported to save space.
interesting picture of asymmetries. Numerous studies have shown that in stock and bond
markets, an unexpected price decrease, i.e., “bad news”, is associated with a higher volatility
than an unexpected price increase, i.e., “good news” (e.g., Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle
(1993)). In the oil and gas markets, the evidence is mixed. The finding from the stock and
bond markets was corroborated by Susmel and Thompson (1997) using monthly gas data
from 1975 through 1994 and Wang, Wu and Yang (2008) using intraday gas data from 1995
through 1999. However, Wang, Wu and Yang (2008) did not find any asymmetries in oil.
Switzer and El-Khoury (2007) came to the opposite conclusion using daily oil data from
1986 through 2005, showing that positive price shocks lead to higher volatility than negative
price shocks. This was also the case in Gregoire and Boucher (2008), who used daily gas
data from 2005 through 2007, and Kuper and van Soest (2006), who used monthly oil data
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from 1970 through 2002.41
In our findings, price decreases are associated with inventory gluts and price increases
are associated with inventory shortages in accordance with laws of demand and supply as
shown in Table 6. The relative response of volatility to the price decreases, i.e., inventory
gluts, and price increases, i.e., inventory shortages, differs by commodity. A glut has a larger
impact than a shortage for the effect of oil inventory announcements on oil price volatility.
In contrast, a glut has a slightly smaller impact than a shortage for the effect of gas inventory
announcements on oil price volatility, which is also the case for the effect of gas inventory
announcements on gas price volatility. Finally, a glut has the same effect as a shortage for
the effect of oil inventory announcements on gas price volatility. This shows the asymmetry
depends on the source of the shock and highlights the importance of analyzing the data in
detail since general statements may miss the fine differences.
5.1.4 Effect across Futures Contract Maturities
To investigate how current news announcements affect financial instruments at various points
in the future, the specification (3) is run for the nearby contract, denoted as Contract 1 and
the following seven months’ contracts for oil and gas. Since errors may be correlated across
the regressions for the different maturities, SUR is applied.42
41Note that with the exception of Gregoire and Boucher (2008), these papers on asymmetries did not
consider inventories.
42This leads to the slight differences between results for the nearby contract reported in Table 2 that uses
OLS and Table 4 that uses SUR. Also, since contracts with longer maturities are traded less frequently, these
contracts have more missing observations than the nearby contract. Oil contracts 2 through 8 have 0.42%,
6.79%, 25.69%, 46.43%, 60.76%, 71.30% and 77.54% missing observations, respectively. Gas contracts 2
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Table 4 displays the results for the oil and gas inventory variables. See Appendix D for
the other regressors. The two-way causality indicated by the cross-commodity effect holds
across the maturity structure as the oil and gas inventory variables remain significant for
the longer maturities. The asymmetry effect also persists across the maturities. The results
described above are, therefore, robust to the maturity structure. In general, the coefficients
decrease as the length of the contract increases, supporting the Samuelson (1965) theorem,
which states that futures contracts become more volatile as their expiration date approaches.
5.1.5 Pre-Announcement and Post-Announcement Effects
The oil and gas inventory announcements affect the oil price volatility even prior to the
announcement.43 The volatility is lower than usual for approximately 70 minutes before
the oil announcements and 30 minutes before the gas announcements. After the announce-
ment, the volatility remains higher than usual for approximately 60 minutes following the
oil announcements and 20 minutes following the gas announcements. This suggests that the
market participants decrease their trading activity while waiting for the inventory report
announcements and increase their trading activity once the reports are released.
The oil futures market appears to be approximately as efficient as the gas futures market
through 8 have 1.19%, 5.83%, 11.83%, 17.97%, 24.81%, 33.24% and 40.07% missing observations, respectively.
As in the nearby contract, the missing observations are set equal to the previous observation. However, since
the number of missing observations varies across the contracts, an unbalanced SUR is applied as a robustness
check. The results do not change. Contracts with maturities longer than eight months do not have significant
coefficients on the inventory variables, so they are not reported.
43The pre-announcement and post-announcement analysis is performed using dummies for the intervals
before and after the announcements.
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Table 4: Price volatility of contracts with longer maturities
Panel a): Oil contracts
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6 Contract 7 Contract 8
Oil shortage ***-.00223 ***-.00197 ***-.00185 **-.00067 ***-.00124 *-.00057 -.00005 -.00048
S < 0 (.00030) (.00026) (.00026) (.00028) (.00030) (.00031) (.00031) (.00031)
Oil glut ***.00428 ***.00352 ***.00334 ***.00208 ***.00224 ***.00083 ***.00116 .00043
S > 0 (.00031) (.00027) (.00027) (.00029) (.00031) (.00031) (.00032) (.00032)
Gas shortage ***-.00233 ***-.00243 **-.00136 *-.00095 ***-.00178 *-.00105 -4.35e-06 -.00021
S < 0 (.00062) (.00054) (.00054) (.00058) (.00063) (.00063) (.00065) (.00064)
Gas glut ***.00241 ***.00223 ***.00206 ***.00135 ***.00247 ***.00139 ***.00167 .00011
S > 0 (.00045) (.00040) (.00039) (.00042) (.00046) (.00046) (.00047) (.00047)
Panel b): Gas contracts
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6 Contract 7 Contract 8
Oil shortage **-.00096 **-.00080 ***-.00116 ***-.00105 **-.00070 -.00053 -.00030 -.00001
S < 0 (.00043) (.00041) (.00038) (.00035) (.00035) (.00033) (.00034) (.00032)
Oil glut **.00100 .00063 **.00086 .00035 .00043 *.00061 .00038 ***.00104
S > 0 (.00044) (.00041) (.00038) (.00036) (.00036) (.00034) (.00035) (.00033)
Gas shortage ***-.02486 ***-.02315 ***-.02062 ***-.01168 ***-.01141 ***-.01015 ***-.00752 ***-.00724
S < 0 (.00088) (.00083) (.00077) (.00072) (.00073) (.00069) (.00070) (.00067)
Gas glut ***.02120 ***.02059 ***.01782 ***.01515 ***.01220 ***.01194 ***.00827 ***.00766
S > 0 (.00064) (.00061) (.00056) (.00052) (.00053) (.00050) (.00051) (.00049)
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations
is 54,598. Only the oil and gas inventory variables are reported to save space. See Appendix D for the other regressors.
in absorbing the inventory news announcements since the gas futures volatility remains
higher than usual for approximately 40 minutes after the oil announcements and 30 minutes
after the gas announcements.
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5.2 Oil Price Return
This section presents the effect of inventory announcements on the oil futures return. While
the effect on the price volatility is significant both statistically and economically, the eco-
nomic significance of the effect on the oil price return is small as evidenced by the low R2 in
Table 5, although the statistical significance remains.
5.2.1 Intraday Pattern Graphs
Figure 7 displays the intraday pattern for the oil futures return. Except for a slight drop in
the oil price return during the 10:40 a.m. interval on Wednesday, no clear pattern can be
discerned around the oil and gas inventory announcement times. In contrast to the oil price
volatility that is increased by both shortages and gluts, the oil price return rises as a result of
shortages while dropping as a result of gluts. Since the intraday patterns combine both these
increases and decreases, no obvious pattern can be seen. The regression results, however,
show that both oil and gas inventory announcements do affect the oil futures return.
5.2.2 Cross-Commodity Effect
Table 5 shows the same three specifications as Table 2. An oil glut decreases the oil price re-
turn while the oil shortage increases it, in accordance with the laws of demand and supply. A
gas glut decreases the oil price return, suggesting the two commodities are substitutes. How-
ever, a gas shortage has no effect on the oil price return, indicating that the substitutability
does not hold for gas shortages.
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Figure 7: Intraday pattern of oil price return
Notes: This figure shows the intraday pattern of the NYMEX crude oil nearby contract futures price return. The return is defined as the difference
between log prices of two subsequent intervals. The first interval is not displayed to avoid skewing the graphs by the overnight gap. Source: Tick Data,
Inc.
5.2.3 Joint Model of Oil and Gas Price Return and the Asymmetry Effect
Again, to put the effect of gas inventory announcements on the oil price return in perspective,
the effect of oil inventory announcements on the gas price return is analyzed, using SUR.
As Table 6 shows, the effect of a gas glut on the oil price return is as strong as the
effect of an oil glut on the gas price return, highlighting the importance of the gas market
for the oil market and providing support for the theories on linkages between the oil and
gas markets described in the Introduction. However, while the effect of an oil shortage on
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Table 5: Price return regressions for oil nearby contract
(1) (2) (3)
Oil shortage ***-.00302 ***-.00301 ***-.00409
S < 0 (.00069) (.00069) (.00070)
Oil glut ***-.00589 ***-.00589 ***-.00553
S > 0 (.00085) (.00085) (.00079)
Gas shortage -.00013 -.00013
S < 0 (.00117) (.00117)
Gas glut ***-.00306 ***-.00306
S > 0 (.00074) .00074
Gasoline shortage ***-.00170
S < 0 (.00059)
Gasoline glut ***-.00419
S > 0 (.00075)
Distillate shortage ***-.00351
S < 0 (.00063)
Distillate glut ***-.00208
S > 0 (.00060)
Ref util shortage ***.00049
S < 0 (.00016)
Ref util glut .00048
S > 0 (.00050)
End-of-day dummy **.00031 **.00031 **.00031
(.00013) (.00013) (.00013)
Rj 1st lag *-.01484 *-.01481 *-.01500
(.00846) (.00846) (.00846)
R2 0.006 0.007 0.014
RMSE 0.00462 0.00462 0.00461
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations
is 54,850 in all specifications. The control variables that are not significant are excluded from the specification reported in this paper. Only the first lag
of return is reported to save space.
the gas price return is significant, the effect of a gas shortage on the oil price return is not,
indicating a lack of two-way causality in the gas shortage situations.44
Table 6 also reveals that gluts (i.e., an unexpected excess supply) have a larger impact
than shortages (i.e., an unexpected excess demand) on oil and gas price returns.
44When the regression is run without distinguishing between gas gluts and shortages, the gas inventory
surprise variable has a significant coefficient of -.00195, confounding the asymmetric effect. This shows the
importance of distinguishing between the inventory gluts and shortages.
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Table 6: SUR model for oil and gas price returns
Oil price return Gas price return
Oil shortage ***-.00407 **-.00117
S < 0 (.00043) (.00060)
Oil glut ***-.00554 ***-.00325
S > 0 (.00044) (.00061)
Gas shortage -.00013 ***-.01887
S < 0 (.00088) (.00122)
Gas glut ***-.00306 ***-.02224
S > 0 (.00064) (.00089)
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of
observations is 54,850. Only the oil and gas inventory variables are reported to save space.
5.2.4 Effect across Futures Contracts Maturities
Table 7 displays specification (3) for the oil and gas nearby contracts as well as the following
seven months of contracts. Only the oil and gas inventory variables are reported to save
space. See Appendix E for the other regressors.
The cross-commodity effect as well as the asymmetry effect hold across the maturity
structure since the oil glut, oil surplus and gas glut variables remain significant for the longer
maturities. In general, the coefficients decrease as the length of the contract increases, again
providing support for the Samuelson (1965) theorem.
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Table 7: Price return of contracts with longer maturities
Panel a): Oil contracts
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6 Contract 7 Contract 8
Oil shortage ***-.00425 ***-.00396 ***-.00388 ***-.00250 ***-.00245 ***-.00240 ***-.00132 ***-.00108
S < 0 (.00043) (.00039) (.00037) (.00037) (.00036) (.00034) (.00034) (.00033)
Oil glut ***-.00564 ***-.00508 ***-.00435 ***-.00363 ***-.00286 ***-.00177 ***-.00138 ***-.00092
S > 0 (.00044) (.00040) (.00039) (.00038) (.00037) (.00035) (.00035) (.00034)
Gas shortage .00034 .00085 -.00023 .00037 .00108 -.00029 -.00018 .00103
S < 0 (.00088) (.00080) (.00077) (.00075) (.00073) (.00070) (.00069) (.00067)
Gas glut ***-.00299 ***-.00286 ***-.00291 ***-.00167 ***-.00237 **-.00103 ***-.00249 -.00047
S < 0 (.00064) (.00058) (.00056) (.00055) (.00053) (.00051) (.00050) (.00049)
Panel b): Gas contracts
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6 Contract 7 Contract 8
Oil shortage **-.00122 ***-.00162 ***-.00153 ***-.00168 ***-.00160 ***-.00126 -.00063 -.00061
S < 0 (.00060) (.00056) (.00051) (.00047) (.00045) (.00041) (.00040) (.00037)
Oil glut ***-.00342 ***-.00260 ***-.00240 ***-.00171 ***-.00143 ***-.00164 ***-.00132 ***-.00154
S > 0 (.00062) (.00058) (.00053) (.00048) (.00046) (.00042) (.00041) (.00039)
Gas shortage ***-.01853 ***-.01702 ***-.01637 ***-.00977 ***-.00899 ***-.00997 ***-.00732 ***-.00718
S < 0 (.00122) (.00115) (.00105) (.00096) (.00092) (.00084) (.00082) (.00077)
Gas glut ***-.02269 ***-.02210 ***-.01878 ***-.00159 ***-.01290 ***-.01322 ***-.00930 ***-.00819
S < 0 (.00089) (.00084) (.00077) (.00070) (.00067) (.00062) (.00060) (.00056)
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations
is 54,682. Only the oil and gas inventory variables are reported to save space. See Appendix E for the other regressors.
5.2.5 GARCH Models
In addition to OLS regression, the four GARCH models described in Section 4 are imple-
mented: GARCH(1,1) with a Gaussian distribution of errors, GARCH(1,1) with a t dis-
tribution, GARCH-in-mean(1,1) with a Gaussian distribution and EGARCH(1,1) with a
Gaussian distribution. Conclusions regarding the cross-commodity, asymmetry and matu-
rity structure effects do not change, although some control variables that are not significant
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in the OLS regression are significant in the GARCH models. See Table 8 for results.
Table 8: GARCH models
(1)OLS (2)GARCH(1,1) (3)GARCH(1,1)t (4)GARCH(1,1)-M (5)EGARCH
Oil shortage ***-.00408 ***-.00366 ***-.00341 ***-.00362 ***-.00329
S < 0 (.00070) (.00020) (.00024) (.00020) (.00020)
Oil glut ***-.00555 ***-.00573 ***-.00421 ***-.00574 ***-.00468
S > 0 (.00079) (.00017) (.00024) (.00017) (.00022)
Gas shortage -.00015 -.00036 *-.00082 -.00036 .00080
S < 0 (.00117) (.00055) (.00049) (.00055) (.00053)
Gas glut ***-.00307 ***-.00213 ***-.00207 ***-.00213 ***-.00234
S > 0 .00074 (-.00031) (.00039) (.00031) (.00044)
Gasoline shortage ***-.00170 ***-.00218 ***-.00192 ***-.00214 ***-.00205
S < 0 (.00059) (.00016) (.00023) (.00016) (.00021)
Gasoline glut ***-.00419 ***-.00440 ***-.00329 ***-.00440 ***-.00355
S > 0 (.00075) (.00017) (.00025) (.00017) (.00023)
Distillate shortage ***-.00350 ***-.00340 ***-.00346 ***-.00342 ***-.00289
S < 0 (.00063) (.00013) (.00022) (.00014) (.00018)
Distillate glut ***-.00208 ***-.00167 ***-.00214 ***-.00167 ***-.00160
S > 0 (.00060) (.00014) (.00022) (.00014) (.00020)
Ref.utiliz.shortage ***.00049 ***.00038 ***.00045 ***.00038 ***.00027
S < 0 (.00016) (.00008) (.00012) (.00009) (.00011)
Ref.utiliz.glut .00048 ***.00036 *.00033 ***.00037 ***.00028
S > 0 (.00050) (.00011) (.00017) (.00011) (.00013)
Beg-of-day dummy -.00009 ***-.00037 **.00015 ***-.00039 ***-.00021
(.00039) (.00004) (.00006) (.00004) (.00003)
End-of-day dummy **.00031 ***-.00475 ***.00037 ***-.00475 ***.00052
(.00013) (.00002) (.00006) (.00002) (.00007)
1st trading day dummy -.00002 *-.00004 .00003 *-.00004
(.00005) (.00002) (.00003) (.00002)
Trader composition -.00001 -.00004 *-.00007 -.00002
(.00006) (.00003) (.00004) (.00003)
T-bill rate 2.60e-06 ***.00002 **-.00002 ***.00002 ***-.00004
(.00001) (-7.06e-06) (7.57e-06) (7.14e-06) (2.12e-06)
Volume 1st lag -4.46e-06 *-5.99e-06 4.29e-07 **-7.75e-06
(.00001) (3.56e-06) (4.09e-06) (3.58e-06)
Rj 1st lag *-.01499 ***-.04904 ***-.04800 ***-.04999
(.00851) (.00308) (.00309) (.00311)
arch ***.56878 ***.00415 ***.56878 ***-.01060
(.00382) (.00026) (.00391) (.00018)
garch ***.42869 ***.99499 ***.42822 ***.99976
(.00226) (.00030) (.00230) (.00003)
archm σ2 ***1.37579
(.24542)
earch-a ***.01807
(.00016)
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Columns 1 through 6
report OLS, GARCH(1,1) with Gaussian distribution of errors, GARCH(1,1) with t-distribution, GARCH-in-mean(1,1) with Gaussian distribution and
EGARCH(1,1) with Gaussian distribution. Lagged inventory surprise terms are not significant in any specification, so they are not reported. Only the
first lags of volume and absolute return are reported to save space. The t-distribution shows 3.2 degrees of freedom. Specification (5) is run without
the first trading day, trader composition, lagged volume and lagged return to ensure convergence. The OLS results differ slightly from those reported in
Table 5 because the specification in Table 10 includes additional control variables to allow comparison to the GARCH models.
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5.3 Robustness Checks
Robustness checks are performed to ensure that the above results are maintained conditional
on the time period, stages of the business cycle, oil and gas price returns, oil and gas price
volatility, and oil, gas, gasoline and distillate inventory. Details of these robustness checks
are available upon request.
5.3.1 Structural Breaks
Since the oil and gas markets were subject to numerous shocks and developments during
the sample period, such as the increase in futures trading, the introduction of LNG tech-
nology, the development of the shale gas fields, and the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon
drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico followed by a moratorium on U.S. off-shore drilling, the
analysis is performed with dummies for individual years to ensure stability across time. The
analysis is repeated with dummies for individual months. In addition, a structural break
test is performed following Hansen (2001). The results are unaffected, which means that
the conclusions of this paper hold despite these considerable shocks and developments in the
energy markets.
5.3.2 Business Cycle
The sample period includes the most severe recession since the Great Depression. Therefore,
the sample is split into booms and recession using the National Bureau of Economic Research
dating that identified the recession as beginning in December 2007 and ending in June 2009.
The results are unaffected, which means that the results exhibit stability across the business
cycle. Since the world economy may be entering a second dip, the sample was split into
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periods before and after December 2007. Again, the results were unaffected. This stands in
contrast to Hess, Huang and Niessen (2008), who found that the effect of macroeconomic
news announcements on the commodity index futures was dependent on recessions and
booms.
5.3.3 Oil and Gas Price Returns
To check that the results are maintained conditional on the oil and gas price returns, dummies
taking on the value of 1 for oil and gas prices below their mean and 0 otherwise are created.
The oil dummy is significant for the oil price volatility with the coefficient of 0.00027 but it
does not affect the coefficients on the other variables. The gas dummy is not significant for
the oil price volatility. Neither dummy is significant for the oil price return.
5.3.4 Oil and Gas Price Volatility
To check that the results are maintained conditional on the oil and gas price volatility
graphed in Figures 4 and 5, ratios of the absolute value of the daily return to the absolute
value of average daily return for that day of the week are calculated for oil and gas. The
oil ratio is significant for the oil price volatility with a coefficient of 0.00030 but it does not
affect the coefficients on the other variables. The gas ratio is not significant for the oil price
volatility. The oil ratio is not significant for the oil price return. The gas ratio is significant
for the oil price return with a coefficient of 0.00004 but it does not affect coefficients on the
other variables.
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5.3.5 Oil and Gas Inventory
To check that the results are maintained conditional on the oil inventory graphed in Figure 8,
a dummy taking on the value of 1 for oil inventory below its mean and 0 otherwise is created.
This dummy is significant for the oil price volatility with the coefficient of 0.00067. The oil
shortage and glut coefficients decrease slightly (by less than 10%) but the gas shortage and
glut coefficients are unaffected. The dummy is significant for the oil price return with the
coefficient of 0.00093 but it does not affect coefficients on the other variables.
Figure 8: Oil inventory
Source: Weekly Petroleum Status Report published by the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy
To check that the results are maintained conditional on the gas inventory graphed in
Figure 9, a dummy taking on the value of 1 for gas inventory below its mean and 0 otherwise
is created. This dummy is not significant in the oil price volatility regression. It is significant
with the coefficient of 0.00109 in the oil price return regression without affecting the oil
shortage, oil glut and gas shortage coefficients. The gas glut coefficient increases by 33%,
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indicating a higher sensitivity of the oil price return to the gas inventory when the gas
inventory is low.
Figure 9: Gas inventory
Source: Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report published by the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy
Since the gas inventory is highly seasonal, building up in the summer and drawing down
in the winter, a dummy taking on the value of 1 during the build-up periods is created. This
dummy is significant with the coefficient of -.00008 in the oil price volatility regression but it
does not affect coefficients on the other variables. It is not significant in the oil price return
regression.
As another check of seasonality, a dummy is added taking on the value of 1 in the winter
(defined as the beginning of October until the end of March) and 0 in the summer (defined
as the beginning of April until the end of September). This dummy is significant in the oil
price volatility regression with the coefficient of .00003 but it does not affect the coefficients
on the other variables. This dummy is not significant in the oil price return regression.
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5.3.6 Gasoline and Distillate Inventory
To check that the results are maintained conditional on the gasoline inventory, a dummy
taking on the value of 1 for the gas inventory below its mean and 0 otherwise is created.
The dummy is significant in the oil price volatility regression with the coefficient of -.00065
but it does not affect coefficients on the other variables. It is not significant in the oil price
return regression. Similar results hold for the distillate inventory.
6 Conclusions
The previous empirical research on the relationship between crude oil and natural gas markets
has concluded the oil market affects the gas market but not vice versa despite economic theory
indicating there should be a two-way causality. This paper contributes to solving this puzzle.
There are three main results. First, the bi-directional causality suggested by the theory
is confirmed for the first time. These cross-commodity effects turn out to be sizeable. The
effect of gas inventory announcements on oil price volatility is more than twice as strong as
the effect of oil inventory announcements on gas price volatility, highlighting the importance
of spillovers from the gas market to the oil market.
Second, the model allows for different reactions of the price volatility and return to
inventory gluts and shortages. In contrast to the “good news” vs. “bad news” pattern found
in stock and bond markets, the response differs by commodity and type of the shock, which
highlights the importance of analyzing the data in detail since general statements may miss
the fine differences.
Third, in contrast to previous studies that analyzed only the nearby futures contract, this
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paper includes contracts with all maturities to investigate how current news announcements
affect financial instruments at various points in the future. The two way-causality as well as
the asymmetry effect hold not only for the nearby contract but also for the following seven
months’ contracts. The results described above are, therefore, robust to the maturity struc-
ture. In general, the coefficients decrease as the length of the contract increases, supporting
the Samuelson (1965) theorem.
The differences in results between the previous studies and this paper can be attributed
to two improvements in analyzing the linkages between the oil and gas markets. First, this
study takes advantage of intraday oil and gas prices, i.e., prices at a higher frequency than
the daily, weekly or monthly prices used in the previous papers. Second, in contrast to
the previous papers that conduct a general analysis of the relationship using, for example,
Granger causality tests, this paper analyzes the effect of specific news announcements: the
weekly oil and gas inventory reports published by the EIA. While a general analysis using
low-frequency data may indicate that the causality runs only from oil to gas, a more careful
examination of the high-frequency data focusing on a specific type of a shock, i.e., the
inventory news announcements, shows that the causality between the two markets is bi-
directional.
Two promising research ideas follow from this paper. First, the asymmetric effects
are quite intriguing and call for more research. Second, the pre-announcement and post-
announcement effects suggest that market participants decrease their trading activity while
waiting for the inventory report announcement and increase their trading activity once the
reports are released. This merits a closer look at the relationship between volatility and
trading volume. While this relationship in the oil and gas markets has been studied using
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daily data, an intraday analysis could reveal new facts about how information arrives in the
markets. Instead of focusing only on trading during the day, the night trading period could
be included to allow for a comparison between these two periods that may differ from the
information arrival standpoint. This analysis should again cover futures of all maturities
since the different maturities may behave very differently in terms of information arrival.
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Appendix B: Holidays
The sample period from June 13, 2003 till September 24, 2010 includes 380 weeks. Several
scenarios occurred because of holidays:
• 314 weeks: The oil inventory report was released on Wednesday at 10:30 am and
NYMEX was open on Wednesday. The gas inventory report was released on Thursday
at 10:30 am and NYMEX was open on Thursday. This is the normal scenario.
• 50 weeks: The gas inventory report was released on Thursday at 10:30 am and
NYMEX was open on Thursday. The oil inventory report was delayed from 10:30
am on Wednesday until 11 am on Thursday because Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday
was a public holiday. These Thursdays are: 09/04/03, 10/16/03, 11/13/03, 01/22/04,
02/19/04, 06/03/04, 07/08/04, 09/09/04, 10/14/04, 02/24/05, 06/02/05, 07/07/05,
09/08/05, 10/13/05, 12/29/05, 01/05/06, 01/19/06, 02/23/06, 06/01/06, 07/06/06,
09/07/06, 10/12/06, 12/28/06, 01/04/07, 01/18/07, 02/22/07, 05/31/07, 07/05/07,
09/06/07, 10/11/07, 11/15/07, 12/27/07, 01/03/08, 01/24/08, 02/21/08, 05/29/08,
09/04/08, 10/16/08, 11/13/08, 01/22/09, 02/19/09, 05/28/09, 09/10/09, 10/15/09,
11/12/09, 01/21/10, 02/18/10, 06/03/10, 07/08/10 and 09/09/10. These weeks are
not an issue because the data show the oil inventory reports on the day and interval
when they were actually released.
• 1 week: The oil inventory report was delayed until 11 am on Friday because of a snow
emergency. The Wednesday affected was 02/10/10. Again, this is not an issue because
the data show the oil inventory report on the day and interval when it was released.
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It is not clear when the gas inventory report was released. This paper assumes it was
released on Thursday at 10:30 am. NYMEX was open on all days.
• 3 weeks: The oil inventory report was released on Wednesday at 10:30 am and
NYMEX was open on Wednesday. The gas inventory report was released on Thurs-
days. However, NYMEX was closed on Thursday. Since NYMEX was also closed on
the following Friday, the gas inventory report did not affect the market until Monday.
The Thursdays affected were 07/03/03, 12/23/04 and 12/30/04. The gas inventory
data for these three days is eliminated when the intraday file is merged with the gas
inventory file because the intraday file does not contain these days. The effect on the
market stays in the data because the effect is felt on the following Monday, which is
contained in the intraday file. Since this occurs only in three out of 380 weeks, it does
not have a material effect on the results.
• 4 weeks: The oil inventory report was released on Wednesday at 10:30 am and
NYMEX was open on Wednesday. The gas inventory report was not released on
Thursdays because Thursday was a public holiday. It is not clear when the gas inven-
tory report was released, so this paper assumes the release took place at 10:30 am on
the following Friday. The Thursdays affected were 11/11/04, 11/23/06, 11/22/07 and
11/27/08. NYMEX was open on all days.
• 5 weeks: The oil inventory report was released on Wednesday at 10:30 am and
NYMEX was open on Wednesday. The gas inventory report was not released on
Thursdays because Thursday was a public holiday. It is not clear when the gas in-
ventory report was released, so this paper assumes the release took place at 10:30 am
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on the following Friday. Since NYMEX was closed on both Thursday and Friday, the
release probably affected the market on Monday. The gas inventory data for these five
days is eliminated when the intraday file is merged with the gas inventory file because
the intraday file does not contain these days. The effect on the market stays in the
data because the effect is felt on the following Monday, contained in the intraday file.
Since this occurs in only five out of 380 weeks, the effect on results is immaterial.
• 3 weeks: The oil inventory report was released on Wednesday at 10:30 am but
NYMEX was closed on Wednesday. The Wednesdays affected are: 12/24/03, 12/31/03
and 11/23/05. The gas inventory report was not released on Thursdays because Thurs-
day was a public holiday. It is not clear when the gas inventory report was released,
so this paper assumes the release took place at 10:30 am on the following Friday. The
Thursdays affected are 12/25/03, 01/01/04 and 11/24/05. NYMEX was closed on
Thursday.
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Appendix C: Volatility Signature Plots
Figure 10: Volatility signature plot for oil price
Figure 11: Volatility signature plot for gas price
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Appendix D: Price Volatility of Contracts with Longer Maturities
Panel a): Oil contracts
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6 Contract 7
Oil shortage ***-.00223 ***-.00197 ***-.00185 **-.00067 ***-.00124 *-.00057 -.00005
S < 0 (.00030) (.00026) (.00026) (.00028) (.00030) (.00031) (.00031)
Oil glut ***.00428 ***.00352 ***.00334 ***.00208 ***.00224 ***.00083 ***.00116
S > 0 (.00031) (.00027) (.00027) (.00029) (.00031) (.00031) (.00032)
Gas shortage ***-.00233 ***-.00243 **-.00136 *-.00095 ***-.00178 *-.00105 -4.35e-06
S < 0 (.00062) (.00054) (.00054) (.00058) (.00063) (.00063) (.00065)
Gas glut ***.00241 ***.00223 ***.00206 ***.00135 ***.00247 ***.00139 ***.00167
S > 0 (.00045) (.00040) (.00039) (.00042) (.00046) (.00046) (.00047)
Gasoline shortage ***-.00099 ***-.00104 ***-.00070 ***-.00148 ***-.00111 ***-.00138 -.00016
S < 0 (.00028) (.00025) (.00025) .00026 (.00029) (.00030) (.00030)
Gasoline glut ***.00206 ***.00205 ***.00224 ***.00120 ***.00120 ***.00252 ***.00142
S > 0 (.00030) (.00026) (.00025) (.00027) (.00030) (.00047) (.00031)
Distillate shortage ***-.00140 ***-.00158 ***-.00131 ***-.00084 -.00006 .00015 -.00015
S < 0 (.00026) (.00023) (.00023) (.00025) (.00027) (.00027) (.00028)
Distillate glut ***.00101 ***.00102 ***.00056 ***.00091 -.00025 *.00045 **.00054
S > 0 (.00024) (.00021) (.00021) (.00023) (.00024) (.00025) (.00025)
Beg-of-day dummy ***.00877 ***.00811 ***.00767 ***.00699 ***.00475 ***.00370 ***.00205
(.00008) (.00007) (.00007) (.00007) (.00008) (.00008) (.00008)
End-of-day dummy ***.00136 ***.00130 ***.00155 ***.00150 ***.00127 ***.00100 ***.00078
(.00008) (.00007) (.00007) (.00007) (.00008) (.00008) (.00008)
Trader composition ***-.00029 ***-.00024 ***-.00023 .00011 -.00003 -.00002 -.00004
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
T-bill rate ***-0.00024 ***-.00023 ***-.00021 ***-.00019 ***-.00017 ***-.00015 ***-.00013
(9.82e-06) (8.60e-06) (8.53e-06) (9.17e-06) (9.93e-06) (9.98e-06) (.00001)
Volume 1st lag *6.50e-06 2.15e-06 -.00005 ***.00035 ***.00048 ***.00070 ***.00130
(3.64e-06) (6.50e-06) (.00004) (.00011) (.00015) (.00015) (.00023)
|Rj | 1st lag ***0.01658 ***-.01132 ***-.01568 ***-.01375 ***-.01249 .00602 .00127
(.00270) (.00243) (.00268) (.00323) (.00379) (.00395) (.00413)
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Panel b): Gas contracts
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6 Contract 7
Oil shortage **-.00096 **-.00080 ***-.00116 ***-.00105 **-.00070 -.00053 -.00030
S < 0 (.00043) (.00041) (.00038) (.00035) (.00035) (.00033) (.00034)
Oil glut **.00100 .00063 **.00086 .00035 .00043 *.00061 .00038
S > 0 (.00044) (.00041) (.00038) (.00036) (.00036) (.00034) (.00035)
Gas shortage ***-.02486 ***-.02315 ***-.02062 ***-.01168 ***-.01141 ***-.01015 ***-.00752
S < 0 (.00088) (.00083) (.00077) (.00072) (.00073) (.00069) (.00070)
Gas glut ***.02120 ***.02059 ***.01782 ***.01515 ***.01220 ***.01194 ***.00827
S > 0 (.00064) (.00061) (.00056) (.00052) (.00053) (.00050) (.00051)
Gasoline shortage -.00042 -.00049 -4.92e-08 -.00021 -.00039 -.00024 -.00029
S < 0 (.00040) (.00038) (1.69e-07) (.00033) (.00033) (.00032) (.00032)
Gasoline glut .00044 .00033 .00031 .00015 *.00064 .00031 .00028
S > 0 (.00042) (.00040) (.00041) (.00034) (.00035) (.00033) (.00033)
Distillate shortage ***-.00104 -.00099 **-.00065 **-.00069 -.00047 **-.00073 -.00019
S < 0 (.00038) (.00036) (.00033) (.00031) (.00031) (.00029) (.00030)
Distillate glut **.00086 ***.00101 **.00065 **.00069 *.00050 ***.00083 .00002
S > 0 (.00034) (.00033) (.00030) (.00028) (.00028) (.00027) (.00027)
Beg-of-day dummy ***.01286 ***.01218 ***.01121 ***.01019 ***.00868 ***.00707 ***.00575
(.00011) (.00010) (.00010) (.00009) (.00009) (.00009) (.00009)
End-of-day dummy ***.00102 ***.00097 ***.00114 ***.00099 ***.00093 ***.00080 ***.00082
(.00011) (.00010) (.00010) (.00009) (.00009) (.00009) (.00009)
Trader composition -.00003 *-.00006 -.00001 .00003 ***-.00008 ***.00008 ***.00010
(.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003)
T-bill rate -1.00e-06 -.00001 **-.00002 ***-.00003 -.00001 ***-.00004 **-.00002
(.00014) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001)
Volume 1st lag *5.22e-06 **-.00009 ***-.00034 .00016 *.00036 ***.00073 **.00070
(.00001) (.00003) (.00012) (.00017) (.00021) (.00028) (.00031)
|Rj | 1st lag ***0.01141 ***-.02173 ***-.02790 ***-.03666 ***-.04523 ***-.03379 ***-.03087
(.00272) (.00251) (.00265) (.00282) (.00309) (.00333) (.00355)
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
The number of observations is 54,598. Only the first lags of volume and absolute return are reported to save space.
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Appendix E: Price Return of Contracts with Longer Maturities
Panel a): Oil contracts
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6 Contract 7
Oil shortage ***-.00425 ***-.00396 ***-.00388 ***-.00250 ***-.00245 ***-.00240 ***-.00132
S < 0 (.00043) (.00039) (.00037) (.00037) (.00036) (.00034) (.00034)
Oil glut ***-.00564 ***-.00508 ***-.00435 ***-.00363 ***-.00286 ***-.00177 ***-.00138
S > 0 (.00044) (.00040) (.00039) (.00038) (.00037) (.00035) (.00035)
Gas shortage .00034 .00085 -.00023 .00037 .00108 -.00029 -.00018
S < 0 (.00088) (.00080) (.00077) (.00075) (.00073) (.00070) (.00069)
Gas glut ***-.00299 ***-.00286 ***-.00291 ***-.00167 ***-.00237 **-.00103 ***-.00249
S < 0 (.00064) (.00058) (.00056) (.00055) (.00053) (.00051) (.00050)
Gasoline shortage ***-.00177 ***-.00185 ***-.00146 ***-.00120 ***-.00121 ***-.00127 **-.00067
S < 0 (.00041) (.00037) (.00036) (.00035) (.00034) (.00033) (.00032)
Gasoline glut ***-.00420 ***-.00399 ***-.00401 ***-.00242 ***-.00304 ***-.00173 ***-.00179
S > 0 (.00043) (.00039) (.00037) (.00036) (.00030) (.00034) (.00033)
Distillate shortage ***-.00333 ***-.00318 ***-.00249 ***-.00238 ***-.00212 ***-.00081 *-.00059
S < 0 (.00040) (.00036) (.00035) (.00034) (.00033) (.00032) (.00031)
Distillate glut ***-.00222 ***-.00208 ***-.00173 ***-.00135 -.00038 **-.00070 ***-.00091
S < 0 (.00037) (.00033) (.00032) (.00031) .00030 (.00029) (.00029)
Ref util shortage ***-.00045 **-.00035 *.00024 *-.00022 **.00029 .00019 *-.00023
S < 0 (.00015) (.00014) (.00013) (.00013) (.00013) (.00012) (.00012)
Ref util glut .00047 .00041 .00026 -.00026 -.00013 -.00012 ***.00025
S < 0 (.00030) (.00027) (.00026) (.00025) (.00025) (.00024) (.00023)
End-of-day dummy **.00034 ***.00043 ***.00050 ***.00046 ***.00045 ***.00037 .00009
(.00011) (.00010) (.00010) (.00010) (.00009) (.00009) (.00009)
Rj 1st lag ***-.25723 ***-.28124 ***-.26616 ***-.19238 ***-.11405 ***-.06849 ***-.04759
(.00251) (.00229) (.00248) (.00301) (.00358) (.00380) (.00404)
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Panel b): Gas contracts
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6 Contract 7
Oil shortage **-.00122 ***-.00162 ***-.00153 ***-.00168 ***-.00160 ***-.00126 -.00063
S < 0 (.00060) (.00056) (.00051) (.00047) (.00045) (.00041) (.00040)
Oil glut ***-.00342 ***-.00260 ***-.00240 ***-.00171 ***-.00143 ***-.00164 ***-.00132
S > 0 (.00062) (.00058) (.00053) (.00048) (.00046) (.00042) (.00041)
Gas shortage ***-.01853 ***-.01702 ***-.01637 ***-.00977 ***-.00899 ***-.00997 ***-.00732
S < 0 (.00122) (.00115) (.00105) (.00096) (.00092) (.00084) (.00082)
Gas glut ***-.02269 ***-.02210 ***-.01878 ***-.00159 ***-.01290 ***-.01322 ***-.00930
S < 0 (.00089) (.00084) (.00077) (.00070) (.00067) (.00062) (.00060)
Gasoline shortage ***-.00187 ***-.00150 ***-.00139 ***-.00130 **-.00100 ***-.00121 *-.00066
S < 0 (.00057) (.00054) (.00049) (.00045) (.00043) (.00040) (.00038)
Gasoline glut ***-.00161 ***-.00162 ***-.00138 ***-.00154 ***-.00165 ***-.00134 **-.00093
S > 0 (.00059) (.00055) (.00051) (.00046) (.00044) (.00041) (.00040)
Distillate shortage ***-.00201 ***-.00182 ***-.00139 ***-.00112 ***-.00144 ***-.00109 ***-.00120
S < 0 (.00055) (.00052) (.00047) (.00043) (.00040) (.00038) (.00037)
Distillate glut ***-.00207 ***-.00193 ***-.00170 ***-.00144 ***-.00164 ***-.00137 -.00051
S < 0 (.00051) (.00048) (.00043) (.00040) (.00038) (.00035) (.00034)
Ref util shortage -.00029 -.00016 .00006 .00004 -3.83e-06 .00009 *-.00025
S < 0 (.00021) (.00020) (.00018) (.00017) (.00016) (.00015) (.00014)
Ref util glut **.00081 **.00086 **.00084 *-.00057 ***.00081 *.00050 .00028
S < 0 (.00041) (.00039) (.00035) (.00032) (.00024) (.00029) (.00028)
End-of-day dummy *.00025 ***.00037 ***.00045 **.00027 ***.00028 **.00024 *.00019
(.00015) (.00014) (.00013) (.00012) (.00011) (.00011) (.00010)
Rj 1st lag ***-.23732 ***-.24094 ***-.24090 ***-.23095 ***-.21414 ***-.17926 ***-.14071
(.00257) (.00241) (.00251) (.00268) (.00290) (.00312) (.00343)
Notes: ***, ** and * represent 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
The number of observations is 54,598. Only the first lag of return is reported to save space.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTRADAY
VOLATILITY AND VOLUME
IN OIL AND GAS FUTURES MARKETS
1 Introduction
Do volatility and trading volume evolve in a unidirectional or bidirectional, contemporaneous
or lagged relationship? This paper answers this question for the crude oil (“oil”) and natural
gas (“gas”) futures, the two largest energy futures markets.
This relationship is important because it affects trading and government regulation. In
October 2011, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) approved limits on
the size of positions in the futures and swaps for 28 commodities, including oil and gas, as
part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that regulates
financial markets.1 These position limits were proposed to address concerns that recent spikes
in volatility resulted from speculative traders suddenly flooding the commodities markets
with large volumes.2 See Figure 1 for oil and gas price volatility.
The new rule generated an intense debate among the public leading to 15,116 comments
as well as within the CFTC where it passed with a narrow 3-2 majority. The dissenters
highlighted insufficient evidence substantiating the regulation, a lack of costs and benefits
1Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173), Section
737.
2CFTC Final Regulations on Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, CFTC Q & A Position Limits for
Derivatives, and CFTC Position Limits for Futures and Swaps: Final Rule and Interim Final Rule.
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Figure 1: Crude oil and natural gas futures price volatility
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Notes: These figures show the price volatility of the NYMEX crude oil and natural gas nearby futures contracts defined as absolute return.
analysis, and possible adverse effects on liquidity of the markets. The Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
two financial industry groups, challenged the rule by filing a lawsuit in December 2011 that
was dismissed by a U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. in January 2012. The rules
are expected to come into effect in August 2012 after the CFTC finalizes the definition of
swaps and collects one year of open interest data. In the meantime, the discussion is raging
on, most recently with 19 senators filing a friend-of-the-court brief in support of the CFTC
in April 2012.3
Underlying the reasoning behind the CFTC regulation is the assumption that volume
drives volatility. However, in spite of the disagreements and the considerable effect the
CFTC regulation may have on the commodities markets, we know surprisingly little about
the volume-volatility relationship in the oil and gas futures markets as evidenced by the
review of the empirical research in Section 2. The main shortcoming of the previous studies
3Wutkowski and Alper (2012).
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has to do with the frequency of data used in the analysis. All previous papers used daily
or weekly data even though such a low frequency does not capture the volatility-volume
relationship accurately because it assumes that information arrives on the markets only
once a day or once a week.
This paper improves on the previous studies in three ways. First, it uses high-frequency,
intraday New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) oil and gas futures prices and volume.
This allows studying the volatility-volume relationship at a frequency at which information
really arrives on the market. Second, this paper includes trading not only during the day
but also during the night as opposed to previous studies that focus only on trading during
the day. Third, in contrast to previous studies that analyze primarily the nearby futures
contract for the following month, this paper includes contracts with all maturities. Analyzing
the entire maturity structure is important since the CFTC rule imposes different position
limits on the nearby month contract and the longer maturities contracts.
For the nearby oil and gas futures contracts, the results show that past values of vol-
ume help explain volatility. Past values of volatility have explanatory power for volume
only when absolute return is used as the volatility measure. When the conditional variance
from GARCH models is used as the volatility measure, this Granger-causality disappears.
Therefore, the absolute return model shows bidirectional Granger-causality whereas the con-
ditional variance model suggests only a uni-directional causality.
Although the two volatility measures give different answers for the direction from volatil-
ity to volume, they agree on lagged values of volume Granger-causing volatility. While
Granger causality does not imply true causality between the variables, this dynamic rela-
tionship suggests that volume may be driving volatility which is relevant for regulators and
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policy-makers.
To highlight the importance of analyzing the volatility-volume relationship using intraday
data rather than end-of-the-day data, the analysis is repeated with end-of-the-day data.
The results differ substantially. These differences show that relying on an analysis that
uses end-of-day data could lead to misguided policy and regulations. The complexity of the
volatility-volume relationship is highlighted by showing that the Granger-causality changes
for contracts with longer maturities.
In addition to providing guidance for regulators and policy-makers, studying the volatility-
volume relationship is important for several other reasons. First, it improves our understand-
ing of how information arrives on the market, one of the fundamental processes in economics.
Second, it shows whether markets are efficient: if past volume can be used to forecast volatil-
ity, markets are not efficient. Third, if volume predicts volatility, it can be used to design
trading strategies. Fourth, from a methodology standpoint, it shows whether contempora-
neous or lagged volume should be used in models, such as Halova (2011), to account for
unobservable sources of volatility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature,
Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 outlines the methodology, Section 5 presents the
results, and Section 6 summarizes the conclusions.
2 Literature Review
In spite of the importance of the volatility-volume relationship, previous research has come
to conflicting conclusions on the dynamics between these two variables. Fourteen studies
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have investigated the volatility-volume relationship in the oil and/or gas futures markets.
See Table 1 for an overview of the data used in these papers.4
Table 1: Studies on relationship between volatility and volume
Author Oil/Gas Period Frequency Contracts
Serletis (1992) O 1987-1990 Daily Contract-by-contract
Foster (1995) O 1984-1994 Daily 1
Herbert (1995) G 1990-1994 Daily 1
Fujihara & Mougoue (1997) O 1984-1993 Daily 1
Kocagil & Shachmurove (1998) O 1980-1995 Daily 1
Moosa & Korczak (1999) O 1985-1996 Daily 1, 3
Moosa & Silvapulle (2000) O 1985-1996 Daily 3, 6
Moosa et al (2003) O 1985-1996 Daily 3, 6
Bhar & Hamori (2005) O 1990-2000 Daily 1
Serletis & Shahmoradi (2006) G 1990-2002 Daily 1
Girard, Sinha & Biswas (2008) O&G 1992-2006 Daily 1
Ripple & Moosa(2009) O 1995-2005 Daily 1, Contract-by-contract
Buyuksahin & Harris (2011) O 2000-2009 Daily 1, All contracts combined
Bohl & Stephan (2012) O&G 1992-2010 Weekly All contracts combined
Notes: In the Contracts column, the number indicates the the futures contract analyzed. For example, 1 stands for the first month contract, i.e., nearby
contract. Contract-by-contract indicates that an individual contract is analyzed from inception to expiry (or for some shorter period) which is common
when studying the effect of maturity on futures prices.
Six of these studies concluded that past changes in volume help explain changes in volatil-
ity and past changes in volatility help explain changes in volume, indicating a bidirectional
relationship: Foster (1995), Herbert (1995), Kocagil and Shachmurove (1998), Moosa and
4In a related study, Girma and Mougoue (2002) investigate the relationship between volatility and volume
for petroleum futures spreads, i.e., various spreads between crude oil, heating oil and unleaded gasoline.
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Silvapulle (2000), Moosa, Silvapulle and Silvapulle (2003), and Girard, Sinha and Biswas
(2008). Two studies concluded that past changes in volatility help explain changes in vol-
ume but past changes in volume do not help explain changes in volatility, indicating a
unidirectional relationship from volatility to volume: Bhar and Hamori (2005), and Buyuk-
sahin and Harris (2011).5 One study indicated a unidirectional relationship from volume
to volatility: Serletis (1992). Two studies found effects from volume to volatility but did
not investigate feedbacks in the opposite direction: Ripple and Moosa (2009), and Bohl and
Stephan (2012).6
The main shortcoming of the previous studies has to do with the frequency of data used
in the analysis. All previous papers used daily or weekly data even though such a low fre-
quency does not capture the volatility-volume relationship accurately because it assumes
that information arrives on the markets only once a day or once a week. To our knowledge,
this paper is the first study to take advantage of high-frequency, intraday New York Mer-
cantile Exchange (NYMEX) oil and gas futures prices and volume.7 This allows studying
the volatility-volume relationship at a frequency at which information really arrives on the
market which is the relevant frequency for regulations such as the CFTC position limits.
5In contrast to the other studies, Buyuksahin and Harris (2011) use trader positions rather than trading
volume.
6The remaining three studies focused solely on the contemporaneous relationship between the two vari-
ables: Fujihara and Mougoue (1997), Moosa and Korczak (1999), and Serletis and Shahmoradi (2006).
7The only exception is an unpublished study by Chevalier and Sevi (2011) that suffers from several
methodological issues. Their contemporaneous ordinary least squares regression with volatility modeled as
a function of contemporaneous volume suffers from endogeneity, runs only in one direction and precludes
investigating intertemporal dynamics. In addition, the authors included only the nearby contract traded
during the day.
69
This study also adds to the literature on the intraday volume-volatility relationship in
other assets by, among others, Jain and Joh (1988) for the S&P500 stock index, Chan and
Chung (1993) for the Major Market Index (MMI) and the MMI futures contract, Gwilym,
McMillans and Speight (1999) for the FTSE-100 stock index, Short Sterling 3-month interest
rate futures contract and Long Gilt government bond futures contract, Xu and Wu (1999)
for 141 stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Darrat, Rahman and Zhong
(2003) for 30 stocks comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average, Huang and Masulis (2003)
for 100 stocks comprising the FTSE-100 stock index, McMillan and Speight (2004) for the
FTSE-100 futures contracts, Chen (2007) for live cattle, pork bellies, German mark and Swiss
franc futures, Darrat, Zhong and Cheng (2007) for 205 stocks traded on NYSE, Hatrick, So,
Chung and Deng (2010) for the HSBC stock, and Hussain (2011) for the German blue-chip
index DAX30.
3 Data
Oil and gas futures contracts are traded on two main exchanges: the NYMEX in Chicago
and the InterContinental Exchange (ICE) in London. This paper focuses on the NYMEX
futures data because NYMEX is more liquid than ICE.8 This proprietary data is provided by
Tick Data, Inc., a company that specializes in intraday time series data for equities, futures
and options.9 The data are transaction data, i.e., not bid-ask quotes.
Light Sweet Crude Oil futures started trading on NYMEX under the symbol CL on
March 30, 1987. The standardized contract is for 1,000 barrels with the price quoted in U.S.
8See Downey (2009) for description of the oil market.
9See www.tickdata.com.
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dollars per barrel. Natural gas futures started trading on NYMEX under the symbol NG
on January 4, 1993. The standardized contract is for 10,000 million British thermal units
(mmBTU) with the price quoted in U.S. dollars per mmBTU.10
The trading takes place on Sundays through Fridays from 6:00 p.m. until 5:15 p.m.
Eastern Time on the CME Globex and CME ClearPort electronic platforms and on Mondays
through Fridays from 9:00 a.m. until 2:30 p.m. in the open outcry session.11 The “day”
trading is defined as trading on Mondays through Fridays from 9:00 a.m. until 2:30 p.m.
Eastern Time. The “night” trading is defined as trading outside of this period.
The 10-minute interval is used following Halova (2011). For example, the 9:10 interval
contains trades from 9:00:00 until 9:09:59. The sample period is limited to August 1, 2008
through September 24, 2010 because comprehensive information on volume is not available
prior to this period. The sample period contains 77,051 10-minute intervals on 669 days.
Missing prices are set equal to the previous prices.12
Futures contracts with different maturities are available. The shortest maturity, called
the nearby contract, is for the following month. The longest maturity for oil and gas is nine
and twelve years, respectively.
10See website of CME Group that owns NYMEX: www.cmegroup.com.
11Only trades that took place on electronic platforms, i.e., Globex and ClearPort, are included. Trades
that occurred in the open outcry, i.e., in the pit, are excluded because volume data is not available for them.
These trades comprise a small portion of total trades, accounting for only 0.01% and 0.05% of all oil and
gas trades, respectively.
12There are no such missing observations for oil trades during the day. There are only 3 missing observa-
tions for gas trades during the day. There are 1,445 and 9,837 missing observations for oil and gas trades
during the night, respectively.
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For oil, trading ceases on the third business day prior to the twenty-fifth calendar day of
the month preceding the delivery. For gas, trading ceases three business days prior to the
first day of the delivery month. At expiration, oil and gas have to be physically delivered to
Cushing, OK and Henry Hub, LA, respectively.13 Very few market participants choose to
make physical delivery at contract expiration. Instead, they roll over their positions into a
new contract. Two methodologies are used in this paper to create a continuous file of the
futures contracts. In the first methodology, the current contract is used until the expiration
date. However, since market participants begin rolling over their positions on the preceding
days, trading may be thin during the last days before the contract expiration date, causing
unusual price movements. Therefore, the second methodology switches to the next contract
as soon as its daily contract volume exceeds the current contract volume. The results do
not materially differ between the two methods. Therefore, only results using the expiration
date method are reported. This contract is referred to as “nearby contract”.14
4 Methodology
4.1 Measures of Volatility
Let Pj be the price at the end of 10-minute interval j. Since both oil and gas price series are
non-stationary, the return, i.e., the difference between the log price at the end of interval j
13See website of CME Group that owns NYMEX: www.cmegroup.com.
14Another method chooses a particular date, e.g., the 15th calendar day of each month to switch from the
nearby contract to the second nearby contract in an attempt to model the market participants’ behavior.
This approach is not used because it is arbitrary.
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and the log price at the end of interval j-1, Rj ≡ ln(Pj) − ln(Pj−1), is used. The resulting
return series are stationary as gauged by both the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) DF-GLS test.
Two measures of price volatility are used. First, the volatility is defined as the absolute
value of price returns, |Rj|, following, for example, Kocagil and Shachmurove (1998), and
Moosa and Silvapulle (2000).15 This absolute return is stationary for both oil and gas.
Figure 2: Intraday pattern of crude oil and natural gas futures price volatility
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Notes: The individual bars represent absolute returns averaged across all days for each 10-minute interval.
Second, as the oil and gas prices exhibit time-varying volatility depicted not only in
Figure 1 but also in Figure 2 that displays the intraday volatility pattern, generalized au-
toregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models lend themselves as tools for
analyzing the data.16 A model with one ARCH term, one GARCH term and Gaussian error
15Absolute return has also been used as a measure of volatility in other contexts, such as, to analyze the
effect of news announcements on price volatility by, for example, Ding, Granger and Engle (1993), Ederington
and Lee (1993), Gwilym, McMillan and Speight (1999), McKenzie (1999), Bollersev, Cai and Song (2000),
and Ederington and Guan (2005).
16The volatility spikes correspond to the intervals at the beginning and at the end of the 9:00 am - 2:30 pm
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distribution that allows for an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative innovations is
implemented:
Rj = α+ βRj−1 + εj , (1)
h2j = ν + φε
2
j−1 + ρh
2
j−1 + ωεj−1, (2)
where equation (1) is the mean equation, equation (2) is the conditional variance equation,
and the distribution of the error conditional on an information set at time j, Ψj, is assumed
to be εj|Ψj ∼ N [0, h2j ]. The term ωεj−1 in equation (2) captures the asymmetry because
positive innovations εj > 0 are allowed to have different effects on the conditional variance
than negative innovations εj < 0. The conditional variance from this model is the second
measure of volatility.17
4.2 Measures of Volume
Two measures of volume are used for the analysis. First, the number of trades is used to
reflect the number of executed trades. Second, the number of contracts is used to reflect the
total volume traded because a trade may involve more than one contract. The number of
contracts per trade for oil ranges from 1 to 100 with a mean of 1.7. The number of contracts
per trade for gas ranges from 1 to 281 with a mean of 1.8.
trading session, the first interval after the 5:15 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. break, and the 10:40 a.m. interval that reflects
the effect of the weekly oil and gas inventory reports released by the Energy Information Administration of
the Department of Energy as described in Halova (2011).
17As a benchmark, the standard symmetric GARCH(1,1) model that includes only one ARCH term and
one GARCH term with the Gaussian distribution of errors is also used. The results do not differ from those
reported in Section 5 for the asymmetric GARCH.
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Both the number of trades and the number of contracts are stationary for oil as well as
gas. Both variables are divided by 1,000 to scale their values. See Figure 3 for the time
series of these volume measures.
Figure 3: Crude oil and natural gas futures volume
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Notes: This figure shows the number of trades and number of contracts in thousands for the NYMEX crude oil and natural gas nearby futures contracts.
4.3 Granger Causality Tests
A bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) represented by equations (3) and (4) is used to
model the dynamic relationship between volatility and volume. This model is run separately
for oil and gas using the above two measures of volatility and two measures of volume.
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V olatilityj = α1 +
I∑
i=1
βiV olatilityj−i +
I∑
i=1
γiV olumej−i +
139∑
k=1
δkDj,k + ε1,j (3)
V olumej = α2 +
I∑
i=1
βiV olumet−j +
I∑
i=1
γiV olatilityj−i +
139∑
k=1
δkDj,k + ε2,j , (4)
where Dj,k is a vector of dummies for each 10-minute interval to account for intraday sea-
sonality evidenced in Figure 2.18
For each specification, the optimal lag length I is determined by the Akaike’s informa-
tion criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) to account for
autocorrelation in the series.
A Granger causality test is then used to assess whether lagged values of volume have
explanatory power for volatility and whether lagged values of volatility have explanatory
power for volume. The null hypothesis in this Granger causality test is that volume does not
cause volatility, i.e., γ1 = ... = γI = 0 in Equation (3), and volatility does not cause volume,
i.e., γ0 = ... = γI = 0 in Equation (4). The alternative hypothesis is that γi 6= 0 for at least
one i.
5 Results
5.1 Absolute Return as Measure of Volatility
Table 2 reports results of the bivariate VAR with the absolute return measuring volatility
and the number of trades measuring volume. 21 lags corresponding to 210 minutes and 19
18In 24 hours, there are 144 intervals of 10 minutes. Since the market is closed during the intervals from
5:15 p.m. until 6 p.m. and one dummy is left out to avoid multicollinearity, there are 139 dummies.
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lags corresponding to 190 minutes are used as the optimal lag lengths per the SBIC criterion
for oil and gas, respectively.19
Table 2: Granger causality tests with absolute return as measure of volatility
Commodity Causality direction Lags Chi-square P-value Causality
Crude oil Volatility → Volume 21 228.18 0.000 Yes
Crude oil Volume → Volatility 21 443.64 0.000 Yes
Natural gas Volatility → Volume 19 148.42 0.000 Yes
Natural gas Volume → Volatility 19 345.50 0.000 Yes
The Chi-square and p-values show that lagged values of volume have explanatory power
for volatility and lagged values of volatility have explanatory power for volume. Therefore,
Granger causality runs in both directions as observed by Foster (1995), Herbert (1995),
Kocagil and Shachmurove (1998), Moosa and Silvapulle (2000), Moosa, Silvapulle and Sil-
vapulle (2003), and Girard, Biswas and Sinha (2008).
The bivariate VAR is then run with the number of contracts as the volume measure. The
results do not change, indicating robustness against different measures of volume.
19The AIC criterion indicates 79 and 41 lags as the optimum lag lengths for oil and gas, respectively. As
a robustness check, the VARs are also run with these longer lag lengths. However, since the results do not
differ, they are not reported. Also, the dummies for the 10-minute intervals are jointly significant indicating
intraday seasonality in all specifications. Both the AIC and SBIC optimal lengths are higher when the VAR
excludes the 10-minute interval dummies.
77
5.2 Conditional Variance as Measure of Volatility
Table 3 reports results for the asymmetric GARCH model. All ARCH terms are significant,
suggesting that the asymmetric GARCH model is appropriate for the intraday volatility
data. Although small in magnitude, the asymmetric term shows a negative sign for both
oil and gas, indicating that volatility of the commodity prices responds more strongly to
negative price changes.
Table 3: Asymmetric GARCH model
Commodity Variable Coefficient Standard error
Crude oil
1st lag of return -.00723** .00308
ARCH term .12719*** .00061
GARCH term .88222*** .00023
Asymmetric term -.00003*** 2.59e-06
Natural gas
1st lag of return -.00723** .00308
ARCH term .12719*** .00061
GARCH term .88222*** .00023
Asymmetric term -.00003*** 2.59e-06
Note: *** and ** represent 99% and 95% significance levels, respectively.
Table 4 shows results of the bivariate VAR with the conditional variance from the asym-
metric GARCH model measuring volatility and the number of trades measuring volume. 9
lags corresponding to 90 minutes and 11 lags corresponding to 110 minutes are used as the
optimal lag lengths per the SBIC criterion for oil and gas, respectively.20
20The AIC criterion indicates 22 and 24 lags as the optimum lag lengths for oil and gas, respectively. As
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Table 4: Granger causality tests with conditional variance as measure of volatility
Commodity Causality direction Lags Chi-square P-value Causality
Crude oil Volatility → Volume 9 10.10 0.343 No
Crude oil Volume → Volatility 9 87.21 0.000 Yes
Natural gas Volatility → Volume 11 13.74 0.247 No
Natural gas Volume → Volatility 11 966.55 0.000 Yes
The Chi-square and p-values show that lagged values of volume have explanatory power
for volatility but lagged values of volatility do not have explanatory power for volume which
agrees with Serletis (1992). Therefore, in contrast to the bivariate VAR where volatility
is measured by the absolute return, Granger causality is unidirectional when volatility is
measured by the conditional variance.
Although the two measures of volatility give different answers for the direction from
volatility to volume, they agree on lagged values of volume Granger-causing volatility. While
Granger causality does not imply true causality, this dynamic relationship suggests that
volume may be driving volatility which is of importance to regulators and policy-makers
considering position limits as a tool for controlling volatility.
The bivariate VAR is then run with the number of contracts as the measure of volume.
Again, the results do not change, indicating robustness against different volume measures.
a robustness check, the VARs are also run with these longer lag lengths. However, since the results do not
differ, they are not reported. Also, the dummies for the 10-minute intervals are jointly significant indicating
intraday seasonality in all specifications. Both the AIC and SBIC optimal lengths are higher when the VAR
excludes the 10-minute interval dummies.
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5.3 Comparison to Low-Frequency Data Results
To underscore the importance of analyzing the volatility-volume relationship using intraday
rather than end-of-the-day data, the same bivariate VARs are run with end-of-the-day data.
Table 5 reports results for the VAR that uses absolute return as the measure of volatility. In
comparison to the intraday analysis in Table 2 that showed a bidirectional relationship for
both commodities, gas now shows only a unidirectional relationship from volume to volatility.
Table 5: Granger causality tests with absolute return as measure of volatility
using end-of-day data
Commodity Causality direction Lags Chi-square P-value Causality
Crude oil Volatility → Volume 2 5.76 0.000 Yes
Crude oil Volume → Volatility 2 18.88 0.000 Yes
Natural gas Volatility → Volume 2 21.62 0.303 No
Natural gas Volume → Volatility 2 40.24 0.000 Yes
Similarly, Tables 4 and 6 allow comparing results between intraday and end-of-the-day
data for the bivariate VAR that uses asymmetric GARCH conditional variance as the measure
of volatility. Again, the results differ. For oil, the intraday data shows unidirectional causality
from volume to volatility whereas the end-of-the-day data indicates a unidirectional causality
in the opposite direction. For gas, the intraday data also shows unidirectional causality from
volume to volatility but the end-of-the-day data suggests bidirectional causality.
These differences show that relying on an analysis that uses end-of-day data could lead
to misguided policy and regulations.
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Table 6: Granger causality tests with conditional variance as measure of volatility
using end-of-day data
Commodity Causality direction Lags Chi-square P-value Causality
Crude oil Volatility → Volume 1 9.25 0.002 Yes
Crude oil Volume → Volatility 1 0.27 0.600 No
Natural gas Volatility → Volume 2 6.97 0.031 Yes
Natural gas Volume → Volatility 2 4.77 0.092 Yes
5.4 Longer Maturities
As Table 1 shows, the previous studies focused primarily on the nearby futures contract
for the following month. In contrast, this paper includes contracts of longer maturities.
Analyzing the entire maturity structure is important since the CFTC rule imposes different
position limits on the nearby month contract and the longer maturities contracts.
In Table 7, Contract 1 represents the nearby contract reported in Table 2. Contract 2
then stands for the second nearby contract, etc. This analysis reveals a complex relationship
between volatility and volume that changes with the length of the futures contracts.21
21This result may partially be due to contracts with longer maturities trading less frequently, causing
more missing observations than the nearby contract. Oil contracts 2 through 6 have 0.42%, 6.79%, 25.69%,
46.43% and 60.76% missing observations, respectively. Gas contracts 2 through 6 have 1.19%, 5.83%, 11.83%,
17.97% and 24.81% missing observations, respectively. As in the nearby contract, the missing observations
are set equal to the previous observation.
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Table 7: Granger causality tests with absolute return as measure of volatility
for longer maturities
Commodity Causality direction Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 Contract 6
Crude oil Volatility → Volume Yes Yes Yes No No No
Crude oil Volume → Volatility Yes Yes No No No No
Natural gas Volatility → Volume Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Natural gas Volume → Volatility Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
6 Conclusion
This paper studies whether volatility and trading volume evolve in a unidirectional or bidi-
rectional, contemporaneous or lagged relationship in the crude oil and natural gas futures
markets. Previous research has come to conflicting conclusions. The main shortcoming of
the previous studies has to do with the frequency of data used in the analysis. All previous
papers used daily or weekly data even though such a low frequency does not capture the
volatility-volume relationship accurately because it assumes that information arrives on the
markets only once a day or once a week. This paper overcomes this limitation by using
high-frequency, intraday data.
For the nearby oil and gas futures contracts, the results show that past values of vol-
ume help explain volatility. Past values of volatility have explanatory power for volume
only when absolute return is used as the volatility measure. When the conditional variance
from GARCH models is used as the volatility measure, this Granger-causality disappears.
Therefore, the absolute return model shows bidirectional Granger-causality whereas the con-
ditional variance model suggests only a uni-directional causality.
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Although the two volatility measures give different answers for the direction from volatil-
ity to volume, they agree on lagged values of volume Granger-causing volatility. While
Granger causality does not imply true causality between the variables, this dynamic rela-
tionship suggests that volume may be driving volatility. This is relevant since regulators
and policy-makers both in the U.S. and Europe are considering position limits as a tool for
controlling volatility.
To highlight the importance of analyzing the volatility-volume relationship using intraday
data, the analysis is repeated with end-of-the-day data and it is shown that results differ
substantially. The complexity of the volatility-volume relationship is highlighted by showing
that the Granger-causality changes for contracts with longer maturities.
In addition to providing guidance for regulators and policy-makers, analysis of the
volatility-volume relationship is important for several reasons. First, it improves our un-
derstanding of how information arrives on the market, one of the fundamental processes in
economics. There are two main theories on this subject. The Mixture of Distributions Hy-
pothesis (MDH) proposed by Clark (1973), and Epps and Epps (1976) states that volatility
and volume change simultaneously when new information arrives on the market. There-
fore, the relationship between volatility and volume is contemporaneous. Past values of
volume cannot be used to forecast current volatility and past values of volatility cannot be
used to forecast current volume. The Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH) by
Copeland (1976) states that traders receive information sequentially. In the initial equilib-
rium, all traders have the same information. As traders receive information, they execute
their trades, creating a series of intermediate equilibria. After all traders receive the infor-
mation, the final equilibrium is reached. As a result, lagged volume affects current volatility.
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Results from this paper support the SIAH for the oil and gas futures markets.
Second, the relationship between volatility and volume shows whether markets are effi-
cient: if past volume can be used to forecast volatility, markets are not efficient. Therefore,
the lagged volume having explanatory power for volatility indicates some market inefficiency,
at least at the 10-minute interval frequency.
Third, since volume predicts volatility, it can be used to design trading strategies. Fourth,
from a methodology standpoint, the results indicate that lagged volume can be used in models
such as Halova (2011) to control for unobservable sources of volatility.
In future research, two additional robustness checks will be performed. First, the Hansen
and Lunde (2006) estimator of intraday volatility will be implemented as another measure
of volatility. Second, as McMillan and Speight (2004) as well as Hussain (2011) point out,
GARCH models assume a geometric decay in the autocorrelation structure and may not ac-
count for intraday periodicity in data. Therefore, as a further robustness check, the GARCH
models will be run in two steps. In the first step, an ordinary least squares regression will
be run where the return, Rj, will be regressed only on the 10-minute interval dummies to
remove the intraday periodicity effect. In the second step, residuals from this deseasonalized
return regression will be used in the asymmetric GARCH mean equation. The conditional
volatility from this model will then become the volatility measure in the bivariate VAR.
The results from this paper offer three interesting extensions using the same data set.
First, since the information arrival process may differ between the day and night trading
sessions, an analysis will be completed to compare them. Second, since the Granger causal-
ity tests address only lagged relationships, the contemporaneous relationship will be studied
using a triangular system building on results from the bivariate VAR that showed a unidirec-
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tional causality from volume to volatility. In this system, the contemporaneous volatility will
be a function of lagged volatility and contemporaneous as well as lagged volume. However,
the contemporaneous volume will be a function only of lagged volume and volatility. Third,
the analysis will be repeated with intervals of other lengths, for example, 15 and 30 minutes.
This will serve not only as a robustness check but also as a market efficiency test. Explana-
tory power of lags of one variable for the other variable implies market inefficiency since
the markets have not absorbed all the available information. Applying the same analysis to
longer intervals will show how market efficiency varies with longer time horizons.
The results also lead to three applications to new data. First, once the CFTC position
limits come into effect, the sample period could be extended to compare the results before
and after the regulation implementation. Second, the CFTC collects daily data on trader
composition to distinguish between trader categories, such as oil and gas companies versus
speculators. This data could be incorporated into the existing analysis to see if the relation-
ship between volume and volatility differs on days when speculative trading is high. Finally,
the analysis could be extended to the other 26 agricultural, energy and metal commodities
affected by the regulation to provide a comprehensive analysis of the commodity futures
markets.
85
References
[1] Bhar, R. and Hamori, S. (2005): Causality in Variance and the Type of Traders in Crude
Oil Futures, Energy Economics, 27(3), 527-539.
[2] Bohl, M.T. and Stephan, P.M. (2012): Does Futures Speculation Destabilize Spot Prices?
New Evidence for Commodity Markets, Unpublished.
[3] Bollerslev, T., Cai, J. and Song, F.M. (2000): Intraday Periodicity, Long Memory Volatil-
ity, and Macroeconomic Announcement Effects in the US Treasury Bond Market, Journal
of Empirical Finance, 7(1), 37-55.
[4] Buyuksahin, B. and Harris, J.H. (2011): Do Speculators Drive Crude Oil Futures Prices?,
The Energy Journal, 32(2), 167-202.
[5] Chan, K. and Chung, Y.P. (1993): Intraday Relationships among Index Arbitrage, Spot
and Futures Price Volatility, and Spot Market Volume: A Transactions Data Test, Jour-
nal of Banking and Finance, 17(4), 663-687.
[6] Chen, H. (2007): Intraday Trading by Floor Traders and Customers in Futures Markets:
Whose Trades Drive the Volatility-Volume Relation?, Quarterly Journal of Business &
Economics, 46(4), 45-61.
[7] Chevalier, J. and Sevi, B. (2011): On the Volatility-Volume Relationship in Energy
Futures Markets Using Intraday Data, Universite de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Defense
Working Paper, No. 2011-16.
86
[8] Clark, P.K. (1973): A Subordinated Stochastic Process Model with Finite Variance for
Speculative Prices, Econometrica, 41(1), 135-156.
[9] CME Group website www.cmegroup.com (September 6, 2011).
[10] Commodity Futures Trading Commission Position Limits for Futures and Swaps: Final
Rule and Interim Final Rule (November 18, 2011), Federal Register, 76(223).
[11] Commodity Futures Trading Commission website www.cftc.org (October 18, 2011):
CFTC Final Regulations on Position Limits for Futures and Swaps.
[12] Commodity Futures Trading Commission website www.cftc.org (October 18, 2011):
CFTC Q & A Position Limits for Derivatives.
[13] Copeland, T.E. (1976): A Model of Asset Trading Under the Assumption of Sequential
Information Arrival, The Journal of Finance, 31(4), 1149-1168.
[14] Darrat, A.F., Rahman, S. and Zhong, M. (2003): Intraday Trading Volume and Return
Volatility of the DJIA Stocks: A Note, Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(10), 2035-2043.
[15] Darrat, A.F., Zhong, M. and Cheng, L.T.W. (2007): Intraday Volume and Volatility
Relations with and without Public News, Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(9), 2711-
2729.
[16] Ding, Z., Granger, C.W.J. and Engle, R.F. (1993): A Long Memory Property of Stock
Market Returns and a New Model, Journal of Empirical Finance, 1(1), 83-106.
[17] Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111-203, H.R.
4173).
87
[18] Downey, M. (2009): Oil 101, Wooden Table Press LLC.
[19] Ederington, L.H. and Guan, W. (2005): Forecasting Volatility, The Journal of Futures
Markets, 25(5), 465-490.
[20] Ederington, L.H. and Lee, J.H. (1993): How Markets Process Information: News Re-
leases and Volatility, The Journal of Finance, 48(4), 1161-1191.
[21] Elliott, G., Rothenberg, T.J. and Stock, J.H. (1996). Efficient Ttests for an Aautore-
gressive Unit Root, Econometrica, 64(4), 813-836.
[22] Epps, T.W. and Epps, M.L. (1976): The Stochastic Dependence of Security Price
Changes and Transaction Volumes: Implications for the Mixture-of-Distributions Hy-
pothesis, Econometrica, 44(2), 305-321.
[23] Foster, A.J. (1995): Volume-Volatility Relationships for Crude Oil Futures Markets,
The Journal of Futures Markets, 15(8), 929-951.
[24] Fujihara, R.A. and Mougoue M. (1997): Linear Dependence, Nonlinear Dependence
and Petroleum Futures Market Efficiency, The Journal of Futures Markets, 17(1), 75-99.
[25] Girard, E., Sinha, A.K. and Biswas, R. (2008): The Relationship between Information
Flow and Energy Futures Volatility, The Review of Futures Markets, 16(3), 271-300.
[26] Girma, P.B. and Mougoue, M. (2002): An Empirical Examination of the Relation be-
tween Futures Spreads Volatility, Volume, and Open Interest, The Journal of Futures
Markets, 22(11), 1083-1102.
88
[27] Gwilym, O.A., McMillan, D. and Speight, A. (1999): The Intraday Relationship be-
tween Volume and Volatility in LIFFE Futures Markets, Applied Financial Economics,
9(6), 593-604.
[28] Halova, M.W. (2011): Gas Does Affect Oil: Evidence from Intraday Prices and Inven-
tory Reports, To be published one day, hopefully.
[29] Hansen, P.R. and Lunde, A. (2006): Realized Variance and Market Microstructure
Noise, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 24(2), 127-161.
[30] Hatrick, K., So, M.K.P., Chung, S.W. and Deng R. (2010): Dynamic Relationship
among Intraday Realized Volatility, Volume and Number of Trades, Asia-Pacific Finan-
cial Markets, 18(3), 291-317.
[31] Herbert, J. (1995): Trading Volume, Maturity and Natural Gas Futures Price Volatility,
Energy Economics, 17(4), 293-299.
[32] Huang, R.D. and Masulis, R.W. (2003): Trading Activity and Stock Price Volatility:
Evidence from the London Stock Exchange, Journal of Empirical Finance, 10(3), 249-
269.
[33] Hussain, S.M. (2011): The Intraday Behaviour of Bid-Ask Spreads, Trading Volume
and Return Volatility: Evidence from DAX30, International Journal of Economics and
Finance, 3(1), 23-34.
[34] Jain, P.C. and Jon, G. (1988): The Dependence between Hourly Prices and Trading
Volume, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 23(3), 269-283.
89
[35] Kocagil, A.E. and Shachmurove Y. (1998): Return-Volume Dynamics in Futures Mar-
kets, The Journal of Futures Markets, 18(4), 399-426.
[36] McKenzie, M.D. (1999): Power Transformation and Forecasting the Magnitude of Ex-
change Rate Changes, International Journal of Forecasting, 15(1), 49-55.
[37] McMillan, D.G. and Speight, A.E.H. (2004): Intra-Day Periodicity, Temporal Aggre-
gation and Time-to-Maturity in FTSE-100 Index Futures Volatility, Applied Financial
Economics, 14(4), 253-263.
[38] Moosa, I. and Korczak, M. (1999): Is the Price-Volume Relationship Symmetric in the
Futures Markets?, Journal of Financial Studies, 7(1), 1-15.
[39] Moosa, I.A. and Silvapulle, P. (2000): The PriceVolume Relationship in the Crude
Oil Futures Market: Some Results Based on Linear and Nonlinear Causality Testing,
International Review of Economics and Finance, 9(1), 11-30.
[40] Moosa, I.A., Silvapulle, P. and Silvapulle, M. (2003): Testing for Temporal Asymmetry
in the Price-Volume Relationship, Bulletin of Economic Research, 55(4), 373-389.
[41] Ripple, R.D. and Moosa, I.A. (2009): The Effect of Maturity, Trading Volume, and Open
Interest on Crude Oil Futures Price Range-Based Volatility, Global Finance Journal, 20
(3), 209-219.
[42] Serletis, A. (1992): Maturity Effects in Energy Futures, Energy Economics, 14(2), 150-
157.
90
[43] Serletis, A. and Shahmoradi, A. (2006): Returns and Volatility in the NYMEX Henry
Hub Natural Gas Futures Market, OPEC Review, 30(3), 171-186.
[44] Tick Data website www.tickdata.com.
[45] Wutkowski, K. and Alper, A. (April 13, 2012): Senators Defend CFTC in Court over
Position Limits, www.reuters.com.
[46] Xu, X.E. and Wu, C. (1999): The Intraday Relation between Return Volatility, Trans-
actions and Volume, International Review of Economics and Finance, 8(4), 375-397.
91
CHAPTER 3
MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION, OPTIMAL
PORTFOLIOS AND HOME EQUITY BIAS
1 Introduction
Does the production structure of firms affect international optimal portfolios, risk-sharing,
and response of terms of trade (TOT) to shocks? The answer to this question would en-
hance our understanding of the empirically observed and much researched home equity bias,
i.e., a situation in which individuals hold a higher share of home assets in their portfolios
than diversification theory would suggest. If investing in shares of multi-national companies
(MNCs) provides international diversification, then the home equity bias may be lower than
it appears to be in the data.
Empirical research of the home equity bias has led to conflicting conclusions as the
literature review in the Appendix shows, creating a long-standing puzzle of whether investing
in shares of MNCs provides investors with international diversification. Since the effect
of firms’ production structure on optimal portfolios and risk sharing has not been studied
theoretically, this paper seeks to fill this gap to gain a theoretical understanding that produces
implications for empirical research.
This theoretical investigation uses a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model with endogenous portfolio allocation. The model is based on Ghironi, Lee,
and Rebucci (2009) (GLR). Households supply labor, consume, and hold equity shares in
home and foreign firms. Firms are monopolistically competitive, which is necessary to gen-
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erate profits and equity price dynamics. Asset markets are incomplete. In contrast to GLR,
in which firms operate in their home countries and serve the foreign markets by exporting,
i.e., exporter-only firms, firms in this model hire labor in both countries and produce locally
for sale in both countries, i.e., MNC-extreme firms.
The paper produces five results. First, it shows the optimal portfolios change as the firms’
production structure moves from exporter-only firms to MNC-extreme firms. The optimal
portfolios are driven by the relative profit of home and foreign firms. It is shown that the
relative profit of home and foreign firms equals the relative home and foreign GDP. As
the production structure moves from exporter-only firms towards MNC-extreme firms, the
home GDP becomes more affected by the foreign technology. At the same time, the foreign
GDP becomes more affected by the home technology. This means that technologies come
to play a smaller role in the relative GDP. Since changing the firms’ production structure
eliminates exposure to technology differences, the optimal portfolio of the home household
includes more home firm shares and fewer foreign firm shares since the home household can
accomplish the same diversification with less foreign equity. The MNC production structure
of firms thus provides one possible explanation for the empirically observed home equity
bias.
Second, the elasticity of labor supply magnifies the effect of the production structure on
the optimal portfolios. When the elasticity of labor supply decreases, the effect of production
structure on the optimal portfolios declines and disappears entirely when the labor supply
becomes perfectly inelastic. This extends the GLR result that the households select complete
markets portfolios that insure only against productivity shocks when the supply of labor is
perfectly inelastic. Shocks to government spending do not matter since government spending
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simply crowds out consumption and, therefore, does not affect production, firms’ profits, and
equity holdings. Since government spending has no impact on production under perfectly
inelastic labor supply, the firms’ production structure becomes irrelevant.
Third, the paper shows that the home optimal portfolio becomes indeterminate when the
production structure reaches the MNC-extreme because the home GDP is affected by the
foreign technology as much as by the home technology. Since this is true also for the foreign
GDP, the technologies cease to affect the relative GDP. Therefore, any one portfolio insures
against shocks as well as any other portfolio. The optimal portfolios become indeterminate.
This is similar to the Cole and Obstfeld (1991) result that optimal portfolios become inde-
terminate when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods equals one
because the TOT move one-for-one with relative productivity, i.e., risks are perfectly shared
even without asset trade. This paper maintains the Cole and Obstfeld result, but extends
it by showing that the MNC-extreme production structure results in indeterminate optimal
portfolios no matter what the elasticity of substitution is between home and foreign goods.
Fourth, the firms’ production structure also has implications for international risk shar-
ing. As the production structure changes from exporter-only firms towards MNC-extreme
firms, a positive shock to the technology differential leads to less risk sharing, i.e., the
consumption differential increases, whereas a positive shock to the government spending
differential leads to more risk sharing, i.e., the consumption differential decreases.
Fifth, changes in the firms’ production structure have implications for the effect of tech-
nology shocks on the TOT. With exporter-only firms, a positive shock to the technology
differential causes a deterioration of the home TOT as in the standard international macroe-
conomic model. With the MNC-extreme firms, however, a positive shock to the technology
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differential leads to an improvement of the home TOT. This paper, therefore, offers a new
explanation for why the home TOT appreciate in response to a technology differential shock,
a phenomenon observed in the data but contrary to the standard theory.
In summary, by producing testable predictions, this paper underscores the need to take
the firms’ production structure into account when analyzing international optimal portfolios,
risk sharing, and the response of the TOT to technology shocks in open-economy macro
models. This is especially important since the empirical research in these areas has so far
generated conflicting results.
2 Model
2.1 Households and Governments
As in GLR, there are two countries: home and foreign. Each country is populated by
infinitely lived, atomistic households. The world population equals the continuum [0, 1].
Home and foreign households comprise the intervals [0, a) and [a, 1], respectively.
The representative home household maximizes an expected intertemporal utility function
that depends on consumption Ct and labor Lt:
Et
∑∞
s=t β
s−t(C
1− 1σ
s
1− 1
σ
− χL
1+ 1ϕ
s
1+ 1
ϕ
),
where 1 > β > 0 and σ, χ, ϕ > 0. The labor market is competitive.
The foreign representative household faces the same maximization problem with foreign
variables denoted as C∗t and L
∗
t . Labor is immobile between countries.
Home consumption Ct consists of consumption of goods produced by both home and
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foreign firms denoted as CHt and CFt. CHt and CFt are aggregated by a CES aggregator:
Ct = [a
1
ωC
ω−1
ω
Ht + (1− a)
1
ωC
ω−1
ω
Ft ]
ω
ω−1 ,
where ω > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced by home and foreign
firms.
This consumption basket Ct has the same format as the GLR consumption basket, but
the interpretation differs. In GLR, CHt and CFt stand for the home household consumption
of goods produced by home firms in the home country and foreign firms in the foreign
country. In this model, CHt and CFt stand for the home household consumption of goods
produced by home and foreign firms in the home country. This interpretation corresponds to
the concept of the MNC-extreme firms producing in both markets, described in more detail
in Section 2.2.
The consumption sub-baskets CHt and CFt aggregate individuals goods produced by
home and foreign firms, respectively, using Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregators:
CHt = [(
1
a
)
1
θ
∫ a
o ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz]
θ
θ−1 and CFt = [(
1
1−a)
1
θ
∫ 1
a ct(z
∗)
θ−1
θ dz∗]
θ
θ−1 .
Price indices follow from the above consumption preferences. The CPI index is:
P = [aP 1−ωHt + (1− a)P 1−ωFt ]
1
1−ω .
Price indices for goods produced by home and foreign firms, respectively, are:
PHt = [
1
a
∫ a
o pt(z)
1−θdz]
1
1−θ and PFt = [
1
1−a
∫ 1
a pt(z
∗)1−θdz∗] 11−θ ,
where pt(z) and pt(z
∗) are the prices of the individual goods produced by home and foreign
firms, respectively.
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Prices and wages are denominated in currency but money is just a unit of account. In
the model, the economy is “Woodford cashless”. Nominal prices and wages are flexible, i.e.,
there are no financial frictions in the model.
In addition to supplying labor and consuming, home households hold shares in home
and foreign firms. Aggregate per capita holdings of home and foreign firms entering period
t+1 are denoted by xt+1 and x
∗
t+1, respectively. Similarly, foreign households’ aggregate per
capita holdings of home and foreign firms is denoted by x∗t+1 and x∗∗t+1, respectively.
Governments of each country consume the same consumption baskets as households.
Government spending Gt and G
∗
t is wasteful. Governments run balanced budgets, so that
government spending equals lump-sum taxation of household income.
Equilibrium versions of the budget constraints of home and foreign households are:
vtxt+1 + v
∗
t x
∗
t+1 + Ct +Gt = (vt + dt + dt∗)xt + (v
∗
t + d
∗
t + d
∗
∗t)x
∗
t + wtLt,
vtx∗t+1 + v∗t x
∗
∗t+1 + C
∗
t +G
∗
t = (vt + dt + d∗t)x∗t + (v
∗
t + d
∗
t + d
∗
∗t)x
∗
∗t + w
∗
tL
∗
t ,
where wt and w
∗
t are home and foreign real wages and vt and v
∗
t are prices of shares in home
and foreign firms. Reflecting the multi-national nature of production, dt and d∗t are profits
generated by home firms in the home and foreign countries, and d∗t and d
∗
∗t are the profits
generated by foreign firms in home and foreign countries. The profits are paid as dividends
to the households. All these variables are in units of the consumption basket.
Home households choose Ct, Lt, xt+1, and x
∗
t+1. The maximization problem results in:
L
1
ϕ
t =
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
,
C
− 1
σ
t = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1Rt+1},
Et{C−
1
σ
t+1Rt+1} = Et{C−
1
σ
t+1R
∗
t+1},
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where Rt+1 ≡ (vt+1 + dt+1 + d∗t+1)/vt is the gross return from holding home equity and
R∗t+1 ≡ (v∗t+1 + d∗t+1 + d∗∗t+1)/v∗t is the gross return from holding foreign equity. The first
equation gives the optimal labor supply. This is the total home labor supply, i.e., labor
supplied to both home and foreign firms in the home country. The second equation is the
Euler equation for home equity. The third equation says the households are indifferent
between holding home and foreign equity at an optimum. Similar equations hold for the
foreign households.
As shown in the Technical Appendix A.1, the budget constraints can be used to derive
the law of motion for net foreign assets1:
nfat+1 = R
D
t αt +Rtnfat + (1− a)(yDt − CDt −GDt ),
where RDt ≡ R∗t −Rt is the excess return on foreign equity and yDt ≡ yt− y∗t is the difference
between home and foreign GDP. Similarly, CDt ≡ Ct−C∗t and GDt ≡ Gt−G∗t . Portfolio αt is
defined as αt ≡ v∗t−1x∗t , i.e., a home household’s holdings of foreign firm shares multiplied by
the price of the foreign firms’ shares. This is the portfolio that will be solved in the steady
state in Section 3. Note that a higher αt represents more foreign equity and less home equity
while a lower αt represents less foreign equity and more home equity.
The above law of motion for net foreign assets is the starting point for the derivation of
the steady-state home optimal portfolio α outlined in detail in the Technical Appendix B
and summarized in Section 3. Note that the law of motion takes the same form as in GLR
but the definitions of Rt and R
∗
t , and hence R
D
t , differ from GLR.
Also, note that the optimal portfolio held by foreign households, α∗t , is defined by a
1The Technical Appendix is available upon request.
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market-clearing condition α∗t = − a1−aαt ≡ − a1−av∗t−1x∗t , as in GLR. This means that lower
αt, i.e., home households owning more home equity, translates into higher α
∗
t , i.e., foreign
households owning more foreign equity.
2.2 Firms
Firms are monopolistically competitive. Each firm produces a differentiated good z. Firms
comprise a continuum [0, 1], with home and foreign firms comprising z ∈ [0, a) and z∗ ∈ [a, 1].
In contrast to GLR, in which firms produce in their home countries and serve foreign
markets by exporting, firms in this model produce in both countries. They hire labor in
both markets and sell products locally in the market in which they produce.
The home firm z produces yt(z) for consumption in the home country using home labor
according to the production function yt(z) = ZtLt(z). The home firm also produces y
∗
t (z) for
consumption in the foreign country using foreign labor according to the production function
y∗t (z) = Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t L
∗
t (z) where Zt is aggregate home productivity and Z
∗
t is aggregate foreign
productivity. The foreign firm z∗ is similar. It produces y∗∗t(z
∗) for consumption in the
foreign country using foreign labor according to production function y∗∗t(z
∗) = Z∗t L
∗
∗t(z
∗). It
also produces y∗t(z∗) for consumption in the home country using home labor according to
the production function y∗t(z∗) = Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t L∗t(z∗). Table 1 summarizes this setup.
Note that firms produce subject to a “mix” of home and foreign technologies when oper-
ating outside their countries. This captures the fact that production of an MNC subsidiary
is likely to be affected by the productivity of the MNC parent company’s country as well as
the productivity of the local labor force.
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Table 1: Production Structure of Firms (General Setup)
Home Firm z Foreign Firm z∗
Home Country yt(z) = ZtLt(z) y∗t(z∗) = Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t L∗t(z∗)
Foreign Country y∗t (z) = Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t L
∗
t (z) y
∗
∗t(z
∗) = Z∗t L
∗
∗t(z
∗)
When γ = 0, the general specification reduces to the country-specific technology setup
that subjects the firms to the technologies of the countries in which they operate. Table 2
summarizes this setup.
Table 2: γ = 0 Country-Specific Technology
Home firm z Foreign firm z∗
Home country yt(z) = ZtLt(z) y∗t(z∗) = ZtL∗t(z∗)
Foreign country y∗t (z) = Z
∗
t L
∗
t (z) y
∗
∗t(z
∗) = Z∗t L
∗
∗t(z
∗)
When γ = 1, the general specification reduces to the firm-specific technology setup that
subjects the firms to the technologies of the countries from which the firms originate. Table 3
summarizes this setup.
As explained in more detail in Section 3, the country-specific technology setup in Table 2
is equivalent to the exporter-only firms in GLR since all production in the home country is
generated using the aggregate home productivity, Zt. This result is very useful because it
allows an exploration of how the optimal portfolios change as the production structure moves
from the exporter-only assumption in GLR to the MNC-extreme assumption by analyzing
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Table 3: γ = 0 Firm-Specific Technology
Home firm z Foreign firm z∗
Home country yt(z) = ZtLt(z) y∗t(z∗) = Z∗t L∗t(z
∗)
Foreign country y∗t (z) = ZtL
∗
t (z) y
∗
∗t(z
∗) = Z∗t L
∗
∗t(z
∗)
how the optimal portfolios change as the production structure moves from the country-
specific technology setup to the firm-specific technology setup.
Optimal price-setting implies that the prices set by firms are given by constant markups
over marginal costs. The home firm charges RPt =
θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
in the home country and RP ∗t =
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
in the foreign country and the foreign firm charges RP∗t = θθ−1
wt
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
in the home
country and RP ∗∗t =
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗t
in the foreign country as derived in the Technical Appendix A.2.1.
Note that the model assumes goods market segmentation, i.e., a firm can charge different
prices in different markets.
The optimal aggregate per capita labor demand in the home country, Ldt , consists of
labor demands of home firms and foreign firms in the home country. As Technical Appendix
A.2.2 shows, Ldt = y
W
t (
RP−ωt
Zt
+
RP−ω∗t
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
), where RPt and RP∗t are the prices charged in the
home country by home firms and foreign firms. Optimal aggregate per capita labor demand
in the foreign country, L∗dt , consists of the labor demands of home firms and foreign firms in
the foreign country. As Technical Appendix A.2.2 shows, L∗dt = y
W
t (
RP ∗−ωt
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
+
RP ∗−ω∗t
Z∗t
), where
RP ∗t and RP
∗
∗t are prices charged in the foreign country by home firms and foreign firms.
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2.3 Shocks
As in GLR, there are four shocks: Gt, G
∗
t , Zt and Z
∗
t . Since there are only two assets, i.e.,
shares of home firms and shares of foreign firms, this guarantees incomplete asset markets,
which is necessary to meaningfully discuss international portfolios and risk sharing.
2.4 Some Useful Properties
2.4.1 Relative GDP yt/y
∗
t
For the derivation of the home optimal portfolio α, it will be useful to have an expression
for the relative GDP, yt/y
∗
t . The home GDP yt consists of output produced by home and
foreign firms in the home country: yt = RPtZtLt + RP∗tZ
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t L∗t where relative prices
convert GDP into units of the consumption basket, i.e., the basket consisting of home and
foreign goods. As Technical Appendix A.3.1 shows, substituting the expressions for RPt and
RP∗t gives yt = θθ−1(wtLt + wtL∗t). Similarly, the foreign GDP y
∗
t consists of output pro-
duced by home and foreign firms in the foreign country: y∗t = RP
∗
t Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t L
∗
t +RP
∗
∗tZ
∗
t L
∗
∗t.
Substituting expressions for RP ∗t and RP
∗
∗t gives y
∗
t =
θ
θ−1(w
∗
tL
∗
t + w
∗
tL
∗
∗t). Therefore,
yt/y
∗
t = [wt(Lt+L∗t)]/[w
∗
t (L
∗
t +L
∗
∗t)]. After substituting expressions for wt, w
∗
t , (Lt+L∗t) and
(L∗t +L
∗
∗t), and imposing the labor market equilibrium, the following expression is obtained:
yt/y
∗
t = (
Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) (
Zω−1t +(Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t )
ω−1
Z∗ω−1t +(Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t )
ω−1 )
1+ϕ
ϕ+ω .
When γ = 0, i.e., in the country-specific technology setup, this expression reduces to
yt
y∗t
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) ( Zt
Z∗t
)
(ω−1)(ϕ+1)
ϕ+ω which is equivalent to the GLR result.
When γ = 1, i.e., in the firm-specific technology setup, this expression reduces to yt
y∗t
=
( Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) . Note that the technology terms drop out. As explained in more detail in Section
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3, these relative GDP expressions have implications for the optimal portfolios.
2.4.2 Constant Proportions of Income Distribution
For the derivation of the home optimal portfolio α, it will also be useful to take advantage of
the fact that income distribution is determined by constant proportions, which is a feature
of monopolistic competition models. Income consists of labor income and dividend income.
As derived above, home GDP yt equals
θ
θ−1(wtLt + wtL∗t). Therefore, the total home labor
income equals wtLt+wtL∗t = yt θ−1θ , which shows that the share of labor income in the home
GDP is a constant proportion θ−1
θ
. The profit of home firms, i.e., the profit generated by
home firms in home and foreign countries, equals dt+d∗t = yt−yt θ−1θ = yt 1θ , which shows that
the share of firm profits, i.e., the dividend income, in the home GDP is a constant proportion
1
θ
. A similar calculation can be performed for the foreign country to obtain d∗t + d
∗
∗t =
1
θ
y∗t.
It is then possible to write dt+d∗t
d∗t+d
∗
∗t
= yt
y∗t
. The home optimal portfolio depends on the relative
profit of the home firm and foreign firm, i.e., dt+d∗t
d∗t+d
∗
∗t
. Since dt+d∗t
d∗t+d
∗
∗t
= yt
y∗t
, the home optimal
portfolio depends on the relative GDP. The expression for the relative GDP yt/y
∗
t obtained
in Section 2.3.1. can then be used to derive the home optimal portfolio α.2
2Note that it is assumed that firms repatriate profits to their countries of origin for distribution to domestic
and foreign shareholders. Therefore, the home firms’ profits generated in the foreign country become a part
of the home country’s GDP while the foreign firms’ profits generated in the home country become a part of
the foreign country’s GDP. Relaxing this assumption on profit repatriation is discussed in Section 4 as one
of the future extensions of the model.
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3 Steady-State Optimal Portfolio α and Results
The portfolio denoted by αt is defined in Section 2.1 as αt ≡ v∗t−1x∗t , i.e., the home household
holdings of foreign firm shares multiplied by the price of the foreign firm shares. The optimal
portfolios are defined as portfolios optimally chosen to insure against shocks Zt, Z
∗
t , Gt and
G∗t . The steady-state home optimal portfolio is derived in Technical Appendix B following
the GLR method based on Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and Tille and van Wincoop
(2010) as:
α = β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
],
which compares to the GLR home optimal portfolio:
α = β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
].
As in GLR, φZ and φG denote the persistence of relative productivity and government
spending shocks defined as the percentage deviation from the steady state. σ2εZD and σ
2
εGD
are the relative variances of i.i.d, zero-mean, normal shocks to productivities Zt and Z
∗
t and
government spending Gt and G
∗
t . Shocks to productivities are assumed to be uncorrelated
with shocks to government spending. Also as in GLR, G is not only the level of government
spending but also the ratio of government spending to GDP because GDP is normalized to
1, which gives 1 = C +G and imposes 0 ≤ G < 1.
This section discusses implications of the firms’ production structure for the optimal
portfolios. The goal is to show how the optimal portfolios change as the production structure
moves from the GLR exporter-only firms to the MNC-extreme firms. To show this, it is first
shown that the country-specific technology setup leads to the same optimal portfolios as the
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GLR exporter-only setup. It is then possible to see how the optimal portfolios change as the
production structure moves from the GLR exporter-only firms to the MNC-extreme setup
by showing how the optimal portfolios change as the production structure moves from the
country-specific technology setup to the firm-specific technology setup.
3.1 Why Is GLR Equal to Country-Specific Technology Setup?
The portfolio αt is driven by the relative profit of home and foreign firms, i.e., the relative
dividends (dt+d∗t)/(d∗t +d
∗
∗t). Section 2.4.2 shows that the relative profit (dt+d∗t)/(d
∗
t +d
∗
∗t)
equals the relative GDP yt/y
∗
t . Section 2.4.1 shows the relative GDP yt/y
∗
t depends on the
relative wage wt/w
∗
t and the relative labor supply L
S
t /L
∗S
t . In GLR, the relative wage wt/w
∗
t
and the relative labor supply LSt /L
∗S
t expressions contain a relative technology term Zt/Z
∗
t
because home variables wt and L
S
t include only the home technology Zt whereas foreign
variables w∗t and L
S∗
t include only the foreign technology Z
∗
t .
When the country-specific technology is applied, i.e., γ = 0, that is still the case: the
home variables wt and L
S
t include only the home technology Zt whereas the foreign variables
w∗t and L
S∗
t include only the foreign technology Z
∗
t . Therefore, this setup is equivalent to
GLR, as shown in Technical Appendix C.
When the firm-specific technology is applied, i.e., γ = 1, that is no longer the case:
the home variables wt and L
S
t now include the home technology Zt as well as the foreign
technology Z∗t . Similarly, the foreign variables w
∗
t and L
S∗
t now include both technologies Zt
and Z∗t . Therefore, the technology terms cancel.
These results follow because the optimal portfolios are affected by relative values, i.e.,
105
the ratios of home and foreign variables.
3.2 Impact of Firms’ Production Structure on Steady-State Op-
timal Portfolio α and Equity Holdings x, x∗, x∗ and x∗∗
This section explains what happens as the production structure changes from the GLR
exporter-only firms towards the MNC-extreme firms by increasing γ from 0 towards 1. As
noted at the beginning of Section 3, the fact that the GLR exporter-only setup leads to
the same optimal portfolios as the country-specific technology setup is very useful because
changes in the optimal portfolios as the production structure moves from the GLR exporter-
only setup to the MNC-extreme setup can be analyzed by showing how the optimal portfolios
change as the production structure moves from the country-specific technology setup to the
firm-specific technology setup.
As γ increases, i.e., as the production structure moves toward the firm-specific technology,
the home GDP yt is affected more by the foreign technology Z
∗
t . At the same time, the
foreign GDP y∗t is affected more by the home technology Zt. This means that technologies
play a smaller role in the relative GDP yt/y
∗
t . Since changing the firms’ production structure
eliminates exposure to technology differences, the optimal portfolio of the home households
includes more home firm shares and fewer foreign firm shares as the home household can
accomplish the same diversification with less foreign equity.
This can be seen by examining the steady-state expression for the home optimal portfolio
α derived in Technical Appendix B and the derivative of α with respect to γ derived in
Technical Appendix D. Increasing γ from 0 towards 1 lowers α, which means that the home
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households’ holdings of the shares of the foreign firm decrease, i.e., the optimal portfolio of
the home households includes more home equity. The MNC production structure of firms
thus provides one possible explanation for the empirically observed home equity bias. Note
that the effect of increasing γ is not linear: changing γ has a larger impact on α at higher
values of γ, as shown in Figure 1.3
At the same time, the optimal portfolio of the foreign households includes more foreign
equity. This can be seen from the market-clearing condition α∗t = − a1−aαt ≡ − a1−av∗t−1x∗t
introduced in Section 2.1, which shows that lower αt, i.e., home households owning more
home equity, translates into higher α∗t , i.e., foreign households owning more foreign equity.
Technical Appendix E shows that these results hold also for steady-state equity holdings
x, x∗, x∗ and x∗∗. As γ increases from 0 towards 1, home households choose to hold more
home firm equity x and less foreign firm equity x∗ while foreign household choose to hold
more foreign firm equity x∗∗ and less home firm equity x∗.
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ϕ, magnifies the effect of γ on α. As shown in Tech-
nical Appendix D, when ϕ increases, ∂α
∂γ
becomes more negative, indicating home households
hold less foreign equity and more home equity. Conversely, a decrease in ϕ leads to a de-
crease in the effect of γ on α. When ϕ reaches 0, the effect of γ on α disappears, i.e., the
production structure of firms becomes irrelevant when the labor supply becomes perfectly
inelastic. This extends the GLR result that ϕ = 0 implies that the households select portfo-
3As Figure 1 shows, when γ increases to approximately 0.7, the home optimal portfolio α becomes
negative. Since the home optimal portfolio is defined as the home households’ holdings of foreign firm shares
multiplied by the price of the foreign firm shares, this can be interpreted as short-selling. However, the value
of α and, therefore, the short-selling scenario depend on other parameter values that are adopted from GLR.
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lios that insure only against productivity shocks. As GLR explain, under perfectly inelastic
labor supply, relative output is affected only by relative technology, i.e., it is not affected by
relative labor. Therefore, shocks to government spending do not matter because the gov-
ernment spending does not affect production and, hence, relative firm profits and relative
equity holdings. Since the government spending shocks have no impact on production, the
households choose complete markets portfolios that insure only against relative productivity
shocks. Therefore, the firms’ production structure, γ, plays no role in the optimal portfolios
when the labor supply is perfectly inelastic.4 When the labor supply becomes elastic, i.e.,
ϕ > 0, government spending shocks begin to affect relative production and, therefore, the
production structure, given by γ, comes into play. Note that the effect of ϕ on the derivatives
of x, x∗, x∗ and x∗∗ with respect of γ is analogous to the effect of ϕ on the derivative of α, as
shown in Technical Appendix E.
3.3 2 Cases when Optimal Portfolio Is Indeterminate:
This section discusses two cases in which the optimal portfolios are indeterminate. Although
the first result has been established in previous studies, the second result is new.
Case 1: Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, ω, equals 1:
In GLR, when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, ω, equals 1,
the relative GDP yt
y∗t
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) ( Zt
Z∗t
)
(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ω+ϕ reduces to yt = y
∗
t . This can be understood
by analyzing the TOT defined in GLR as the ratio of home country price RPHt to foreign
4The same result occurs when there is no government spending, i.e., G = 0 and G∗ = 0. In this case, the
households also choose complete markets portfolios that insure against relative productivity shocks.
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country price RP Ft :
TOTt ≡ RP
H
t
RPFt
=
θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
θ
θ−1
w∗
t
Z∗
t
=
wt
Zt
w∗
t
Z∗
t
=
C
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t
χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (YWt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1 )
− ωϕ+ω Z
ω−1
ϕ+ω
t
Zt
C
∗ ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t
χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (YW
t
)
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1 )
− ωϕ+ω Z
∗ ω−1ϕ+ω
t
Z∗
t
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
ϕ
σ(ω+ϕ) ( Zt
Z∗t
)−
1+ϕ
ω+ϕ .
If the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ϕ, equals 0, TOTt =
Zt
Z∗t
− 1
ω . ω = 1 then results in
TOTt =
Z∗t
Zt
. The TOT are a mechanism for transferring purchasing power and increasing
foreign consumption following a positive home productivity shock. Home output increases
which lowers the price of home goods. TOTt =
Z∗t
Zt
means that the TOT move one-for-one
with relative productivity. As GLR point out, this is the main mechanism for the Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) result that the TOT adjust in direct proportion to relative productivity, i.e.,
risks are perfectly shared between countries even without asset trade when ω = 1. Since the
TOT provide all the insurance against shocks, it does not matter what the portfolios look
like, i.e., the optimal portfolios are indeterminate.
This is still the case in the model with the MNC production structure because relative
GDP yt
y∗t
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) (
Zω−1t +(Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t )
ω−1
Z∗ω−1t +(Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t )
ω−1 )
1+ϕ
ϕ+ω also reduces to yt = y
∗
t when ω = 1. Again,
this can be understood by analyzing the TOT derived in the Technical Appendix F:5
TOTt =
RPt∗
RP ∗t
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
[Zω−1
t
+(Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
[Z∗ω−1
t
+(Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
When γ = 0, the TOT reduce to the above GLR expression. Hence, when ϕ = 0 and
ω = 1, TOTt =
Z∗t
Zt
which means that the TOT still move one-for-one with the productivity
differential. This serves as a check that the model works properly because the Cole and Ob-
stfeld (1991) result should not be lost by changing the assumptions on the firms’ production
5Note that these are “shadow TOT” because even γ = 0 is a “no trade” scenario since the model does
not feature any trade in goods. The shadow TOT are the relative price of goods produced by the MNCs
abroad, i.e., goods that would be delivered via exports in GLR.
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structure.
Case 2: Firm-specific technology production structure, i.e., γ = 1:
When γ reaches 1, i.e., when the technology becomes firm-specific, the home GDP yt is
affected by the foreign technology Z∗t as much as by the home technology Zt. Since this is
true also for the foreign GDP y∗t , the technologies cease to affect the relative GDP yt/y
∗
t .
Therefore, any one portfolio insures against shocks as well as any other portfolio. The
optimal portfolios become indeterminate.
Again, this can be understood by analyzing the TOT. As can be seen from the above
expression, γ = 1 and ϕ = 0 result in TOTt =
Zt
Z∗t
, i.e., the TOT again move one-for-
one with the productivity differential. Note that it is not necessary for the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods, ω, to equal 1. The firm-specific technology
production structure results in indeterminate optimal portfolios no matter what the elasticity
of substitution is between home and foreign goods.
3.4 Terms of Trade
Even though both γ = 0 and γ = 1 production structures result in the TOT moving one-for-
one with the productivity differential, the direction of the movement differs. γ = 0 leads to
TOTt =
Z∗t
Zt
as in GLR. Known as “immiserizing growth”, this is the standard result that an
increase in the home productivity leads a deterioration in the home TOT. γ = 1, however,
gives the opposite result: TOTt =
Zt
Z∗t
. An increase in the home productivity leads to an
improvement in the home TOT.
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This can be seen by examining the TOT that arise under perfectly inelastic labor supply,
ϕ = 0:
TOTt =
[Zω−1
t
+(Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ω
Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
[Z∗ω−1
t
+(Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ω
Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
,
which, under ω = 1 yields:
TOTt =
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
Z1−γt Z∗γ
.
When the production structure is country-specific, i.e., γ = 0, goods made by the foreign
firm in the home country are produced using the home technology, Zt, and goods made by
the home firm in the foreign country are produced using the foreign technology, Z∗t . When Zt
increases, goods made in the home country become more abundant and thus cheaper, causing
a deterioration in the home TOT. However, when the production structure is firm-specific,
i.e., γ = 1, goods made by the foreign firm in the home country are produced using the foreign
technology, Z∗t , and goods made by the home firm in the foreign country are produced using
the foreign technology, Zt. When Zt increases, goods made in the foreign country become
more abundant and thus cheaper, causing an improvement in the home TOT. Therefore,
the production structure parameter, γ, determines the effect of productivity changes on the
TOT.
Although the standard models, such as, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), indicate that
a positive home technology shocks leads to an improvement in the home TOT, the empirical
evidence is mixed. For example, Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008b) show that the home
TOT can worsen in response to a positive home technology shock. Acemoglu and Ventura
(2003) and Debaere and Lee (2004) offer evidence consistent with this finding. Several
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mechanisms have been proposed to account for this empirical evidence that contradicts the
standard theory. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) show that a positive home technology
shock can cause an appreciation of the home TOT if there is a high degree of home bias in
absorption, the long-run price elasticity of domestic tradeables is high, and the households
can only borrow and lend in international markets. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) allow for entry
of new producers and varieties and show that the home TOT will appreciate in response
to a positive home technology shock because the shock reduces both the marginal cost of
producing goods and the sunk entry cost of setting up new firms. Corsetti, Martin and
Pesenti (2007) present a model in which the home TOT deteriorate if the positive home
productivity shock decreases the marginal cost of producing goods but improve if the positive
home productivity shock decreases the cost of setting up new firms. The model in this paper
offers a new mechanism using the production structure of firms to explain the phenomenon
of the home TOT appreciating after a positive home technology shock.
3.5 Impulse Response Functions
The production structure of firms also affects responses to shocks, as shown by the impulse
response functions in Figures 2 through 7.6
3.5.1 Technology Shock
In GLR, a positive shock to the home technology that translates into a positive shock to the
technology differential, ZDt , increases home output. This depresses the price of goods made
in the home country, worsens the home TOT and lowers the home household purchasing
6Note that calibration of all parameters is identical to GLR.
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power. At the same time, the profit of the home firms increases relative to the foreign
firms, which increases the price of the home equity relative to foreign equity and, therefore,
decreases net foreign assets. Faced with a lower purchasing power and lower net foreign
assets, the home household increases its labor supply. This increases relative income and
consumption, leading to an increase in the consumption differential, CD.
As the production structure changes from exporter-only firms to MNC-extreme firms, a
positive shock to the home technology still causes an increase in the home output relative
to foreign output but not as much because a part of the production in the home country
is produced using the foreign technology, Z∗t . Therefore, the home TOT do not worsen as
much and the home household purchasing power does not decline as much. At the same
time, the profit of the home firms relative to the foreign firms does not increase as much,
which means the price of the home equity relative to the foreign equity does not increase as
much and, therefore, net foreign assets do not decrease as much. Consequently, the increases
in the home households’ labor supply, relative income, and consumption are mitigated. Since
the home TOT do not deteriorate as much, the foreign households do not benefit from the
shock as much because their purchasing power does not improve as much. Therefore, foreign
consumption, C∗t , does not increase as much. As a result, the consumption differential,
CD, increases more than in GLR, implying less risk sharing between the home and foreign
households.
3.5.2 Government Shock
As GLR explain, a positive shock to home government spending that translates into a pos-
itive shock to the government spending differential, GDt , crowds out the home consumption
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because of Ricardian behavior. As the expression for the TOT shows, a decrease in con-
sumption worsens the home TOT, which increases the demand for home output. As a result,
the profit of the home firms increases. Home equity becomes more attractive to the foreign
households than foreign equity is to the home households because of consumption smoothing.
This drives up the price of home equity relative to foreign equity, which lowers net foreign
assets. Since the home TOT deteriorate, foreign households enjoy a higher purchasing power
and increase their consumption. The consumption differential, CD, then decreases because
home consumption decreases and foreign consumption increases.
As the production structure changes from exporter-only firms to MNC-extreme firms, a
positive shock to home government spending still decreases home consumption. The home
TOT still worsen, but not as much. Therefore, the demand for the home output and the
resulting profit of the home firm do not increase as much, which means that the price of
home equity relative to foreign equity does not rise as much and net foreign assets do not
decline as much. Since the home TOT do not deteriorate as much, foreign households do not
benefit from the shock as much because their purchasing power does not improve as much.
Therefore, foreign consumption, C∗t , does not increase as much. As a result, the consumption
differential, CD, decreases less than in GLR, implying more risk sharing between the home
and foreign households.
4 Conclusions and Future Extensions
This paper studies the effect of the firms’ production structure on international optimal
portfolios, risk-sharing, and response of terms of trade to shocks. It is the first paper to
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formally investigate this question, filling a gap in the theoretical research and producing
implications for empirical research that has so far generated conflicting results. This paper
generates five main results.
First, using a two-country DSGE model with endogenous portfolio allocation, it shows
that the optimal portfolios change as the firms’ production structure moves from exporter-
only firms to MNC-extreme firms. The optimal portfolios are driven by the relative profit of
home and foreign firms. The home GDP becomes more affected by the foreign technology
and the foreign GDP becomes more affected by the home technology. Technologies play a
smaller role in the relative GDP and, therefore, in the relative profit of home and foreign
firms. Since changing the production structure of firms eliminates exposure to technology
differences, the optimal portfolio of the home household includes more home firm shares
and fewer foreign firm shares. Home households can accomplish the same diversification
with less foreign equity. The MNC production structure of firms thus provides one possible
explanation for the empirically observed home equity bias.
Second, the paper concludes the elasticity of labor supply magnifies the effect of the firms’
production structure on the optimal portfolios. When the elasticity of labor supply decreases,
the effect of the production structure on the optimal portfolios declines and disappears
entirely when the labor supply becomes perfectly inelastic. This extends the GLR result
that the households select complete markets portfolios that insure only against productivity
shocks when the labor supply is perfectly inelastic because shocks to government spending
do not matter. Government spending simply crowds out consumption and, therefore, does
not affect production, firms’ profits, and equity holdings. Since government spending has no
impact on production, the firms’ production structure becomes irrelevant.
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Third, the optimal portfolios become indeterminate when the firms’ production structure
reaches the MNC-extreme because the home GDP is affected by the foreign technology as
much as by the home technology. Since this is true also for the foreign GDP, the technologies
cease to affect the relative GDP. Therefore, any one portfolio insures against the shocks as
well as any other portfolio. The optimal portfolios become indeterminate. This is similar
to the Cole and Obstfeld (1991) result that optimal portfolios become indeterminate when
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods equals one because the TOT
move one-for-one with relative productivity, i.e., risks are perfectly shared even without asset
trade. The paper maintains the Cole and Obstfeld result, but extends it is by showing that
the MNC-extreme production structure results in indeterminate optimal portfolios no matter
what the elasticity of substitution is between home and foreign goods.
Fourth, the firms’ production structure also has implications for international risk shar-
ing. As the production structure changes from exporter-only firms to MNC-extreme firms, a
positive shock to the technology differential leads to less risk sharing, i.e., the consumption
differential increases, whereas a positive shock to the government spending differential leads
to more risk sharing, i.e., the consumption differential decreases.
Fifth, changes in the firms’ production structure have implications for the effect of tech-
nology shocks on the TOT. With exporter-only firms, a positive shock to the technology
differential causes a deterioration of the home TOT, which is the standard result in the in-
ternational macroeconomic theory. With MNC-extreme firms, however, a positive shock to
the technology differential leads to an improvement of the home TOT, offering an explana-
tion for why the home TOT appreciate in response to a shock to the technology differential,
a phenomenon observed in the data but contrary to the standard theory.
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In summary, the testable predictions of this paper underscore the need to take the firms’
production structure into account when analyzing international optimal portfolios, risk shar-
ing, and the response of the TOT to technology shocks in open-economy macro models. This
is especially important since the empirical research has so far generated conflicting results
in these areas.
To highlight the impact of the firms’ production structure, the model on purpose ab-
stracts from many other aspects of the economy. Several extensions should be made to
enhance our understanding of consequences of the production structure on international op-
timal portfolios, risk sharing, and TOT. First, to account for non-traded goods, a domestic
firm should be added that produces only in the domestic country for consumption in the
domestic market following, for example, Backus and Smith (1993). Second, trade should be
introduced, for example, by exploring a setup where a portion of the output, 1 − η, made
by the home firm to be sold abroad is produced in the home country and exported while
the other portion, η, is produced in the foreign country where the home firm operates as
an MNC. This could be achieved by modeling the foreign demand for the product made
by the home firm as C∗t (z) = ZtL
∗
t (z) + ηZtLt(z). Introducing trade would also allow the
usual definition of the TOT as the relative price of exports and imports, as opposed to the
“shadow TOT” defined as the ratio of the price of goods made by the foreign firm in the
home country to the price of goods made by the home firm in the foreign country. Third,
the model assumes all profits are repatriated to the firms’ country of origin. In reality, this is
not always the case as documented, for instance, by Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes (2009).
This assumption should be relaxed, for example, to explore the effect of unequal tax policies.
Lastly, an endogenous production structure, i.e., the firm’s decision to export or undertake
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foreign direct investment, should be incorporated following, for example, Contessi (2007).
This could be achieved by introducing trade costs.
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Figure 4: 
Net Foreign Assets Differential, Z Shock
-7.00
-6.00
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61
gamma=0
gamma=0.65
Figure 3: 
Equity Price Differential, Z Shock
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Figure 5: 
Consumption Differential, G Shock
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Appendix: Review of Empirical Research on the Role
of MNCs in Portfolio Home Bias
This Appendix reviews empirical research on the role of MNCs in portfolio home bias.7 The
following papers have concluded that the investors can diversify internationally by investing
in the MNCs instead of purchasing foreign equity.
Severn (1974) provides a very basic discussion of the topic. Hughes, Logue and Sweeney
7Other explanations of the home bias discussed in the literature include information asymmetries and
geographic proximity (Gehrig (1993), Brennan and Cao (1997), Kang and Stulz (1997), Huberman (1998),
Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Hasan and Simaan (2000), Benartzi (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001),
Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004), Amadi (2004), and Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005)), domestic
country risk including non-tradeable goods and trade costs (Eldor, Pines, and Schwartz (1988), Tesar (1993),
Baxter, Jermann and King (1998), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), and Coeurdacier (2009)), immobile human
capital (Bottazzi, Pesenti and van Wincoop (1996), Baxter and Jermann (1997), Coen (2001), Julliard
(2002), Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002), and Heathcote and Perri (2007)) and inflation (Adler and Dumas
(1983), and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994)), exchange rate volatility (Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Fidora,
Fratzscher and Thimann (2006), Benigno and Nistico (2009), and Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009)), home
consumption bias (Lewis (1999), Kollmann (2006), and van Wincoop and Warnock (2006)), transaction
costs (Black (1974), Stulz (1981), Tesar and Werner (1995), Rowland (1999), Glassman and Riddick (2001),
Warnock (2001), and Amadi and Bergin (2008)), corporate governance (Wei (2000), Dahlquist, Pinkowitz,
Stulz and Williamson (2003), and Gianetti and Koskinen (2003)), relative return optimism (Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2000), Kilka and Weber (2000), Jeske (2001), Strong and Xu (2003), Lutje and Menkhoff (2007),
and Seasholes and Zhu (2005)), differences in beliefs (Dumas, Lewis and Osambela (2009)), patriotism (Morse
and Shive (2011)), social identity (Fellner and Maciejovsky (2003)), and ”keeping up with the Joneses”
(Lauterbach and Reisman (2004)).
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(1975) use data from 1970 to 1973 for 46 US MNCs and 50 US domestic firms to compare
Treynor’s risk-adjusted returns on domestic and diversified portfolios. They conclude that
the MNCs have higher returns and lower unsystematic, systematic and total risk than the
domestic firms. Therefore, investors can diversify via the MNCs.
Agmon and Lessard (1977) use 217 US firms from 1959 to 1972 to analyze the relation-
ship between share price behavior and international involvement of the firm measured by
percentage of international sales. They find that firms with more international involvement
are more correlated with the rest-of-the-world index. The firms with less international in-
volvements are more correlated with the domestic market index. Therefore, diversification
offers diversification benefits.
Mikhail and Shawky (1979) use 30 US MNCs from 1968 to 1975 to compare returns, the
standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation of these firms and the S&P500 index.
They conclude that MNCs have higher returns and thus outperform the domestic market.
Logue (1982) uses the US stock market returns for 18 countries and 50 US MNCs from
1955 to 1975 to construct efficient frontiers. The optimal portfolio is the one with the highest
ratio of expected return to standard deviation. He compares the optimal portfolios of the
MNCs and the foreign market indices, and concludes that the MNCs outperform foreign
indices. Therefore, US investors are better off investing in MNCs than in foreign equity.
Errunza (1984) uses data for 14 developed and 15 emerging markets from 1976 to 1980
and concludes that emerging markets provide a diversification opportunity.
Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999) revisit the topic with data for 7 developed and 9 emerg-
ing markets from 1976 to 1993 to run mean-variance spanning tests, return correlations, and
Sharpe ratio tests, and conclude that international diversification can be achieved without
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investing in foreign equity.
Bekaert and Urias (1996) use data on 43 U.S. closed-end mutual funds and 37 U.K.
closed-end mutual funds from 1986 to 1993 and find benefits to diversifying into emerging
markets for the U.K. funds but not for the U.S. funds.
Cai and Warnock (2004) analyze US equity holdings in 1994 and 2000 and find that both
home and foreign investors prefer the MNCs. They then construct a measure of home bias
that accounts for foreign operations of the US firms and suggests that the US investors have
20% rather than the usually stated 13% exposure to foreign markets.
However, several papers disagree and conclude that investors cannot diversify interna-
tionally by investing in MNCs instead of purchasing foreign equity.
Jacquillat and Solnik (1978) use data from about 300 European and 100 US firms from
1966 to 1974 to compare the standard deviations of three portfolios: US domestic firm port-
folio, US MNCs portfolio, and equally weighted major national stock market portfolio. They
conclude that US MNCs provide some diversification benefits but cannot replace purchasing
foreign equity because MNCs are more influenced by the domestic markets than the foreign
markets.
Senchack and Beedles (1980) come to the same conclusion using data on 284 US firms
from 1963 to 1976.
Brewer (1981) uses the domestic CAPM of 151 US MNCs and 137 US domestic firms
from 1963 to 1975 to compare the risk-adjusted performance of shares in the MNCs and
domestic firms. He concludes that the two types of firms have similar results and, therefore,
MNCs do not offer diversification benefits.
Fatemi (1984) uses returns for 84 US MNCs and 52 US domestic firms from 1976 to
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1980 to perform several tests and concludes that the MNCs do not facilitate international
portfolio diversification because risk-adjusted returns are similar for the MNCs and domestic
firms.
Michel and Shaked (1986) use data for 58 US MNCs and 43 US domestic firms from 1973
to 1982 to calculate Jensen, Treynor, and Sharpe measures and compare the performance of
the two types of firms. They conclude that the domestic firms outperform the MNCs.
Morck and Yeung (1991) use 1978 data for 1,644 firms to examine the effect of multina-
tionality on the firm’s market value and conclude that MNCs cannot be used to diversify.
Mathur, Singh and Hanagan (2001) use Canadian data on 180 MNCs and 226 domestic
firms from 1992-1994 and 1997 to test whether multinationality affects firm performance and
conclude that the MNCs do not outperform the Canadian firms.
Rowland and Tesar (2004) use data for 411 MNCs from 7 countries from 1984 to 1995
to conduct mean-variance spanning tests and conclude that MNCs provide negligible diver-
sification in most countries.
Salehizadeh (2003) uses data on 48 MNCs from 1995 to 2001 to compare their returns
to the S&P index and concludes that the correlations do not justify diversifying by using
MNCs instead of foreign equity.
The latest and most comprehensive paper on the topic is Berrill and Kearney (2008).
They analyze 7 countries and provide an excellent summary of the previous research.8 Noting
that previous studies have inconsistently classified MNCs, they apply the Aggarwal, Berrill
and Kearney (2011) classification of MNCs and find that investors can diversify by investing
in MNCs.
8Their summary was used in this literature review.
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Technical Appendix
Appendix A: Model Details
This Appendix shows derivations for Section 2.
A.1 Households
Derivation of price indices:
min PHtCHt + PFtCFt subject to Ct = 1 where Ct = [a
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Note that these expressions are identical to GLR.
Household demand:
Demand for output produced by home firm z in home country is:
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Y dt (z) = (
pt(z)
PHt
)−θ(PHt
Pt
)−ωY Wt ≡ (RPt(z))−θ(RPt)θ−ωY Wt where
RPt(z) is the price of good z in units of world consumption basket,
RPt is the price of the home sub-basket of goods in units of world consumption basket and
Y Wt is aggregate world demand for the consumption basket.
This can be written as:
Y dt (z) = RP
−ω
t Y
W
t because RPt(z) = RPt at optimum.
Demand for output produced by foreign firm z∗ in home country: Y d∗t(z
∗) = RP−ω∗t Y Wt
Demand for output produced by home firm z in foreign country: Y ∗dt (z) = RP
∗−ω
t Y
W
t
Demand for output produced by foreign firm z∗ in foreign country: Y ∗d∗t (z
∗) = RP ∗−ω∗t Y Wt
Note that these expressions are identical to GLR.
FOCs:
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This Lagrangian is identical to the GLR Lagrangian with the exception of the additional
terms d∗t and d∗∗t.
With respect to Ct:
∂`
∂Ct
= (1− 1
σ
)
C
σ−1
σ −1
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+ λt(−1) = 0
C
− 1
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which is the same as in GLR.
With respect to Lt:
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which is the same as in GLR.
With respect to xt+1:
∂`
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C
− 1
σ
t vt = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1(vt+1 + dt+1 + d∗t+1)}
C
− 1
σ
t = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1
vt+1+dt+1+d∗t+1
vt
} ≡ βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1Rt+1}
where the definition of Rt+1 differs from GLR due to the additional term d∗t+1.
With respect to xt+1∗:
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where the definition of R∗t+1 differs from GLR due to the additional term d
∗
∗t+1.
NFA law of motion:
Start with household budget constraint:
vtxt+1 + v
∗
t x
∗
t+1 + Ct +Gt = (vt + dt + d∗t)xt + (v
∗
t + d
∗
t + d
∗
∗t)x
∗
t + wtLt
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a
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where nfat+1 is defined as nfat+1 ≡ v∗t x∗t+1 − 1−aa vtx∗t+1, i.e., home holdings of foreign
shares minus foreign holdings of home shares adjusted for population sizes of home and
foreign countries, i.e., a and 1− a as in GLR.
vtxt+1 + nfat+1 +
1−a
a
vtx∗t+1 + Ct +Gt = Rtvt−1xt +R∗t v
∗
t−1x
∗
t + wtLt
nfat+1 = −vtxt+1 − 1−aa vtx∗t+1 +Rtvt−1xt +R∗t v∗t−1x∗t + wtLt − Ct −Gt
nfat+1 = −vt(xt+1 + 1−aa x∗t+1) +Rtvt−1xt +R∗t v∗t−1x∗t + wtLt − Ct −Gt
nfat+1 = −vt +Rtvt−1xt +R∗t v∗t−1x∗t + wtLt − Ct −Gt
where market clearing condition axt+1 + (1 − a)x∗t+1 = a was used to obtain xt+1 = 1 −
1−a
a
x∗t+1 as in GLR.
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Define excess return from holding foreign equity RDt = R
∗
t −Rt and portfolio holding
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was used which is identical to GLR except the definitions of Rt and R
∗
t , and hence R
D
t , differ
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as explained above.
Similar derivations can be done to obtain NFA law of motion for the foreign household:
nfa∗t+1 = R
D
t α
∗
t +Rtnfa
∗
t + y
∗
t − C∗t −G∗t
Subtracting the home and foreign NFA laws of motions and using the superscript D to de-
note the difference between home and foreign variables gives:
nfat+1 − nfa∗t+1 = RDt αt +Rtnfat + yt − Ct −Gt −RDt α∗t −Rtnfa∗t − (y∗t − C∗t −G∗t )
nfat+1 − (− a1−a)nfat+1 = RDt αt − (− a1−a)RDt αt +Rtnfat − (− a1−a)Rtnfat + yDt −CDt −GDt
nfat+1
1
1−a = R
D
t αt
1
1−a +Rtnfat
1
1−a + y
D
t − CDt −GDt
nfat+1 = R
D
t αt +Rtnfat + (1− a)(yDt − CDt −GDt )
where market clearing conditions nfa∗t+1 = − a1−anfat+1 and α∗t = − a1−av∗t−1x∗t = − a1−aαt
were used as in GLR.
A.2 Firms
A.2.1 Derivation of prices:
Derivation of price of good produced by home firm z:
min wtLt(z) + w
∗
tL
∗
t (z)−mct(ZtLt(z) + Zγt Z∗1−γt L∗t (z)− Yt(z))
∂`
∂Lt(z)
= wt −mctZt = 0
wt
Zt
= mct = RPt
θ−1
θ
RPt =
θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
which is the price charged in home country. This is identical to GLR.
∂`
∂L∗t (z)
= w∗t −mctZγt Z∗1−γt = 0
w∗t
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
= mct = RP
∗
t
θ−1
θ
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RP ∗t =
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
which is the price charged in foreign country. This differs from GLR.
Derivation of price of good produced by foreign firm z∗:
min wtL∗t(z∗) + w∗tL
∗
∗t(z
∗)−mc∗t(Z1−γt Z∗γt L∗t(z∗) + Z∗t L∗∗t(z∗)− Y ∗t (z∗))
∂`
∂L∗t(z∗) = wt −mc∗tZ
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t = 0
wt
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
= mc∗t = RP∗t θ−1θ
RP∗t = θθ−1
wt
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
which is the price charged in home country. This differs from GLR.
∂`
∂L∗∗t(z∗)
= w∗t −mc∗tZ∗t = 0
w∗t
Z∗t
= mc∗t = RP ∗∗t
θ−1
θ
RP ∗∗t =
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗t
which is the price charged in foreign country. This is identical to GLR.
A.2.2 Derivation of optimum labor demands:
Note that indexation of labor by z and z∗ showing whether the labor is hired by home firm
z or foreign firm z∗ is dropped to simplify the notation.
Derivation of optimal labor demand by home firm z in home country:
Production function is given as Y st = ZtLt
Demand for output was derived from household optimization as: Y dt = RP
−ω
t Y
W
t .
Since Y st = Y
d
t , it is possible to write ZtLt = RP
−ω
t Y
W
t .
From this, Lt =
RP−ωt Y
W
t
Zt
follows. This is identical to GLR.
Derivation of optimal labor demand by foreign firm z∗ in home country:
Production function is given as Y s∗t = Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t L∗t
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Demand for output was derived from household optimization as: Y d∗t = RP
−ω
∗t Y Wt
Since Y s∗t = Y
d
∗t, we can write Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t L∗t = RP
−ω
∗t Y Wt .
From this, L∗t =
RP−ω∗t Y
W
t
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
follows. This differs from GLR.
Derivation of total optimal labor demand in home country:
Ldt = Lt + L∗t =
RP−ωt Y
W
t
Zt
+
RP−ω∗t Y
W
t
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
= Y Wt (
RP−ωt
Zt
+
RP−ω∗t
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
) which differs from GLR.
This expression contains Y Wt , i.e., aggregate world demand for the consumption basket.
Aggregate per capita world demand for the consumption basket can be defined as yWt ≡
aCt + (1− a)C∗t + aGt + (1− a)G∗t . The aggregate per capita labor demand in home country
can then be written as Ldt = y
W
t (
RP−ωt
Zt
+
RP−ω∗t
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
) which differs from GLR.
Derivation of optimal labor demand by home firm z in foreign country:
Production function is given as Y ∗st = Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t L
∗
t
Demand for output was derived from household optimization as: Y ∗dt = RP
∗−ω
t Y
W
t
Since Y ∗st = Y
∗d
t , it is possible to write Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t L
∗
t = RP
∗−ω
t Y
W
t .
From this, L∗t =
RP ∗−ωt Y
W
t
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
follows. This differs from GLR.
Derivation of optimal labor demand by foreign firm z∗ in foreign country:
Production function is given as Y ∗s∗t = Z
∗
t L
∗
∗t
Demand for output was derived from household optimization as: Y ∗d∗t = RP
∗−ω
∗t Y Wt
Since Y ∗s∗t = Y
∗d
∗t , it is possible to write Z
∗
t L
∗
∗t = RP
∗−ω
∗t Y Wt .
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From this, L∗∗t =
RP ∗−ω∗t Y
W
t
Z∗t
follows. This is identical to GLR.
Derivation of total optimal labor demand in foreign country:
L∗dt = L
∗
t + L
∗
∗t =
RP ∗−ωt Y
W
t
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
+
RP ∗−ω∗t Y
W
t
Z∗t
= Y Wt (
RP ∗−ωt
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
+
RP ∗−ω∗t
Z∗t
) which differs from GLR.
Aggregate per capita labor demand in foreign country is: L∗dt = y
W
t (
RP ∗−ωt
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
+
RP ∗−ω∗t
Z∗t
) which
differs from GLR.
A.3 Some Useful Properties
A.3.1 To get yt
y∗t
:
Derivation of home GDP yt, i.e., output produced by home and foreign firms in
the home country:
yt = RPtZtLt +RP∗tZ
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t L∗t =
θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
ZtLt +
θ
θ−1
wt
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t L∗t =
θ
θ−1(wtLt +wtL∗t)
Derivation of foreign GDP y∗t , i.e., output produced by home and foreign firms
in the foreign country:
y∗t = RP
∗
t Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t L
∗
t +RP
∗
∗tZ
∗
t L
∗
∗t =
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t L
∗
t +
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗t
Z∗t L
∗
∗t =
= θ
θ−1(w
∗
tL
∗
t + w
∗
tL
∗
∗t)
Note that the relative prices convert GDP into units of consumption basket, i.e., basket
consisting of home and foreign goods.
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Expression for yt
y∗t
:
yt
y∗t
=
RPtZtLt+RP∗tZ1−γt Z
∗γ
t L∗t
RP ∗t Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t L
∗
t+RP
∗
∗tZ
∗
t L
∗
∗t
=
θ
θ−1 (wtLt+wtL∗t)
θ
θ−1 (w
∗
tL
∗
t+w
∗
tL
∗
∗t)
= wt(Lt+L∗t)
w∗t (L
∗
t+L
∗
∗t)
Even though the production structure differs from GLR, the technology terms cancel in this
expression, so this result is identical to GLR.
Next, expressions for wt, w
∗
t , (Lt + L∗t) and (L
∗
t + L
∗
∗t) are obtained:
To get wt, home labor supply and home labor demand are equated.
Home labor supply was derived above from home household FOCs as Lst = (
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ.
Home labor demand was derived above from firm FOCs as Ldt = Y
W
t (
RP−ωt
Zt
+
RP−ω∗t
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
)
Since Lst = L
d
t , it is possible to write: (
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
RP−ωt
Zt
+
RP−ω∗t
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
)
Plug in expressions for RPt and RP∗t:
(
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
( θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
)−ω
Zt
+
( θ
θ−1
wt
Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
)−ω
Z1−γt Z
∗γ
t
)
(
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt [(
θ
θ−1)
−ωw−ωt Z
ω−1
t + (
θ
θ−1)
−ωw−ωt (Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t )
ω−1]
(
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
θ
θ−1)
−ωw−ωt [Z
ω−1
t + (Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t )
ω−1]
wϕ+ωt = C
ϕ
σ
t χ
ϕY Wt (
θ
θ−1)
−ω[Zω−1t + (Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t )
ω−1]
wt = C
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (Y Wt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1)
− ω
ϕ+ω [Zω−1t + (Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t )
ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
To get w∗t , equate foreign labor supply and foreign labor demand are equated.
Foreign labor supply could be derived in the same way as home labor supply from household
FOCs as L∗st = (
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ.
Foreign labor demand was derived above from firm FOCs as L∗dt = Y
W
t (
RP ∗−ωt
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
+
RP ∗−ω∗t
Z∗t
)
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Since L∗st = L
∗d
t , it is possible write: (
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
RP ∗−ωt
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
+
RP ∗−ω∗t
Z∗t
)
Plug in expressions for RP ∗t and RP
∗
∗t:
(
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
( θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
)−ω
Zγt Z
∗1−γ
t
+
( θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗
t
)−ω
Z∗t
)
(
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt [(
θ
θ−1)
−ωw∗−ωt (Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t )
∗ω−1 + ( θ
θ−1)
−ωw∗−ωt (Z∗t )
ω−1]
(
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
θ
θ−1)
−ωw∗−ωt [Z
∗ω−1
t + (Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t )
ω−1]
w∗ϕ+ωt = C
∗ϕ
σ
t χ
ϕY Wt (
θ
θ−1)
−ω[Z∗ω−1t + (Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t )
ω−1]
w∗t = C
∗ ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (Y Wt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1)
− ω
ϕ+ω [Z∗ω−1t + (Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t )
ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
To get (Lt + L∗t) i.e., total home labor supply LSt :
As derived above from home household FOC: Lst = (
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ
Plug in wt: L
s
t = (
C
− 1σ
t C
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (YWt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1 )
− ωϕ+ω [Zω−1t +(Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t )
ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
χ
)ϕ
To get (L∗t + L
∗
∗t)i.e., total foreign labor supply L
∗s
t :
From foreign household FOC: L∗st = (
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ
Plug in w∗t : L
∗s
t = (
C
∗− 1σ
t C
∗ ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (YWt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1 )
− ωϕ+ω [Z∗ω−1t +(Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t )
ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
χ
)ϕ
Then, yt
y∗t
= wt(Lt+L∗t)
w∗t (L
∗
t+L
∗
∗t)
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) (
Zω−1t +(Z
1−γ
t Z
∗γ
t )
ω−1
Z∗ω−1t +(Z
γ
t Z
∗1−γ
t )
ω−1 )
1+ϕ
ϕ+ω
When γ = 0, this expression reduces to yt
y∗t
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) ( Zt
Z∗t
)
(ω−1)(ϕ+1)
ϕ+ω which is the ”country-
specific technology” setup. It is equivalent to the result in GLR.
When γ = 1, this expression reduces to yt
y∗t
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) which is the ”firm-specific technol-
ogy” setup.
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This validates the point made in Section 2.2 about this specification being a ”mix” of the
”country-specific technology” and ”firm-specific technology” setups.
Next, this expression is log-linearized. Note the log-linearization uses the fact that in steady
state Z = Z∗ = 1.
dyt − dy∗t =
= −ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
dCt− (−ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ))dC∗t + 1+ϕϕ+ω{[(ω− 1)dZt + (ω− 1)((1− γ)dZt + γdZ∗t )](1 + 1)/(1 +
1)2 − [(ω − 1)dZ∗t + (ω − 1)(γdZt + (1− γ)dZ∗t )](1 + 1)/(1 + 1)2} =
= −ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
dCt−(−ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ))dC∗t + 1+ϕϕ+ω{ (ω−1)dZt2 + (ω−1)(1−γ)dZt2 + (ω−1)γdZ
∗
t
2
− (ω−1)dZ∗t
2
− (ω−1)γdZt
2
−
(ω−1)(1−γ)dZ∗t
2
}
ŷDt = −ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt + 1+ϕϕ+ω{ (ω−1)Ẑ
D
t
2
+
(ω−1)(1−γ)ẐDt
2
− (ω−1)γẐDt
2
} =
= −ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
ĈDt +
1+ϕ
ϕ+ω
ω−1
2
(ẐDt + (1− γ)ẐDt − γẐDt ) =
= −ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
ĈDt +
1+ϕ
ϕ+ω
ω−1
2
(ẐDt + Ẑ
D
t − γẐDt − γẐDt ) =
= −ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
ĈDt +
1+ϕ
ϕ+ω
ω−1
2
(2ẐDt − 2γẐDt ) =
= −ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
ĈDt +
1+ϕ
ϕ+ω
ω−1
2
2(ẐDt − γẐDt ) =
= −ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
ĈDt +
(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1− γ)ẐDt
When γ = 0, this expression reduces to ŷDt = −ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω ẐDt which is the
”country-specific technology” setup. It is equivalent to the result in GLR.
When γ = 1, this expression reduces to ŷDt = −ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt which is the ”firm-specific tech-
nology” setup.
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Appendix B: Steady-State Optimal Portfolio α
This Appendix shows derivations for Section 3.
B.1 Log-linearize NFA LOM
Start with NFA LOM derived in Section A.1: nfat+1 = R
D
t αt+Rtnfat+(1−a)(yDt −CDt −GDt )
Log-linearize it: dnfat+1 = dR
D
t α+R
Ddαt +dRtnfa+Rdnfat + (1−a)(dyDT −dCDt −dGDt )
Use RD = 0 and nfa = 0: dnfat+1 = dR
D
t α +Rdnfat + (1− a)(dyDt − dCDt − dGDt )
Divide by C. Note that C = 1−G due to y = C +G and assumption y = y∗ = L = L∗ = 1,
so 1 = C +G.
dnfat+1
C
=
dRDt α
1−G +
Rdnfat
C
+ (1− a)( dyDt
1−G − dC
D
t
C
− dGDt
1−G)
dnfat+1
C
=
dRDt αR
(1−G)R +
1
β
dnfat
C
+ (1− a)( dyDt y
(1−G)y − Ĉt − dG
D
t G
(1−G)G)
nf̂at+1 =
1
β
nf̂at +
α
β(1−G)R̂
D
t +
1−a
1−G ŷ
D
t − (1− a)ĈDt − (1−a)G1−G ĜDt
Define ξ̂t ≡ αβ(1−G)R̂Dt as in GLR.
nf̂at+1 =
1
β
nf̂at + ξ̂t +
1−a
1−G ŷ
D
t − (1− a)ĈDt − (1−a)G1−G ĜDt
Note that this expression is identical to GLR derivation.
The expression for relative GDP yt
y∗t
above is log-linearized as:
ŷDt = −ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ẐDt
Note that this expression is not identical to GLR because there is an additional term
(1− γ) in front of ẐD.
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Plug into the log-linearized NFA LOM:
nf̂at+1 =
1
β
nf̂at + ξ̂t +
1−a
1−G [−ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ẐDt ]− (1− a)ĈDt − (1−a)G1−G ĜDt =
= 1
β
nf̂at + ξ̂t − (1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))ĈDt + 1−a1−G (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ẐDt − (1−a)G1−G ĜDt
Note that this expression is not identical to GLR because there is an additional term
(1− γ) in front of ẐD.
B.2 Log-linearize Euler Equations for Consumption
Log-linearize Euler equation for consumption:
− 1
σ
Ĉt = − 1σEtĈt+1 + EtR̂t+1
Same for foreign: − 1
σ
Ĉ∗t = − 1σEtĈ∗t+1 + EtR̂t+1
Subtract the home and foreign equations:
− 1
σ
(Ĉt − Ĉ∗t ) = − 1σEt(Ĉt+1 − Ĉ∗t+1)
ĈDt = EtĈ
D
t+1
Note that this expression is identical to GLR.
B.3 Find Elasticities of ĈDt and nf̂at+1
The first step is to guess a solution. There are two variables of interest: ĈDt and nf̂at+1.
These variables are expected to depend on a state variable nf̂at and exogenous shocks Ẑ
D
t ,
ĜDt and ξ̂t.
ĈDt = ηCDanf̂at + ηCDZDẐ
D
t + ηCDGDĜ
D
t + ηCDξ ξ̂t
nf̂at+1 = ηaanf̂at + ηaZDẐ
D
t + ηaGDĜ
D
t + ηaξ ξ̂t
Use method of undetermined coefficients to solve for elasticities:
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Plug ĈDt into nf̂at+1:
nf̂at+1 =
1
β
nf̂at+ ξ̂t− (1−a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))(ηCDanf̂at+ηCDZDẐDt +ηCDGDĜDt +ηCDξ ξ̂t) +
1−a
1−G
(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1− γ)ZDt − (1−a)G1−G ĜDt
Match coefficient on nf̂at in this equation to the coefficient on nf̂at in nf̂at+1 equation. The
coefficient on nf̂at in nf̂at+1 equation, i.e., ηaa, is = 1 because of non-stationarity.
1
β
− (1− a)[1 + ϕ(ω−1)
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ) ]ηCda = 1
ηCda =
1−β
β
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))
To get ηaξ:
ηaξ = 1− (1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))ηCDξ
From above, is is possible to obtain ĈDt = ηCDanf̂at+ηCDGDĜ
D
t +ηCDξ ξ̂t which can be rolled
forward by 1 period to get:
EtĈ
D
t+1 = ηCDaEtnf̂at+1 + ηCDGDEtĜ
D
t+1 + ηCDξEtξ̂t+1 =
= ηCDa(ηaanf̂at + ηaGDĜ
D
t + ηaξ ξ̂t) + ηCDGD(φGĜ
D
t ) + 0
using EtĜ
D
t+1 = φGĜ
D
t and Etξ̂t+1 = 0
Match coefficients on ξ̂t:
ηCDξ = ηCDaηaξ
Plug into ηaξ:
ηaξ = 1− (1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))ηCDaηaξ =
= 1− (1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))(
1−β
β
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))ηaξ
1− (σ(1G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ) )(
1−β
β
σ(1G)(ω+ϕ)
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))ηaξ = ηaξ
1− 1−β
β
ηaξ = ηaξ
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ηaξ = β
To get ηCDξ:
ηCDξ = ηCDaηaξ =
1−β
β
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)β =
σ(1−β)(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)
To get ηCDZD and ηaZD :
ηaZD = −(1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))ηCDZD + 1−a1−G (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)
ηCDZD = ηCDaηaZD + ηCDZDφZ
ηCDZD − ηCDZDφZ = ηCDaηaZD =
= [1−β
β
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)) ][−(1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))ηCDZD + 1−a1−G (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)]
ηCDZD − ηCDZDφZ + (1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ) (1−β)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)β(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))ηCDZD =
= (1−a)(1−β)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−G)β(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))
(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1− γ)
ηCDZD(1− φZ + 1−ββ ) = (1−β)σ(1+ϕ)(ω−1)β(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))(1− γ)
ηCDZD =
σ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)
ηaZD = −(1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))ηCDZD + 1−a1−G (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ) =
= −(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ) ηCDZD +
1−a
1−G
(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1− γ) =
= −(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
σ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ) + 1−a1−G
(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1− γ) =
= −(1−a)(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−γ)
(1−G)(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ) +
(1−a)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−γ)
(1−G)(ϕ+ω) =
= −(1−a)(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−γ)+(1−a)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−γ)(1−βφZ)
(1−G)(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ) =
= (1−a)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−γ)(1−βφZ−1+β)
(1−G)(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ) =
= (1−a)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)β(1−φz)
(1−G)(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ) (1− γ)
To get ηCDGD and ηaGD :
151
ηaGD = −(1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))ηCDGD − (1−a)G1−G
ηCDGD = ηCDaηaGD + ηCDGDφG
ηCDGD − ηCDGDφG = ηCDaηaGD =
= [1−β
β
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1) ][−(1− a)(1 + ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ))ηCDGD − (1−a)G1−G ]
ηCDGD − ηCDGDφG + (1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ) (1−β)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)β(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))ηCDGD =
= − (1−a)(1−β)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)G
(1−G)β(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))
ηCDGD(1− φG + 1−ββ ) = −(1−β)σ(ω+ϕ)Gβ(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1))
ηCDGD = − σ(1−β)G(ω+ϕ)(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
ηaGD = −β(1−φG)G(1−a)(1−βφG)(1−G)
Note that the above elasticities are identical to GLR except for elasticities ηCDZD and ηaZD
that include additional (1− γ) terms.
B.4 Find Elasticities of v
First, v̂t is derived. The steps are identical to GLR but definitions of some variables differ
from GLR, so the derivations are done in detail to highlight the difference.
This is how it is done in GLR. Log-linearize Euler equations for home firm and foreign firm
shares. Starting with home firm shares:
C
− 1
σ
t vt = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1Rt+1} = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1(vt+1 + dt+1)}
dvt = βEtdvt+1 + βEtddt+1
Divide by v:
dvt
v
= βdEtvt+1
v
+ βdEtdt+1
v
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v̂t = βEtv̂t+1 + βEtd̂t+1
d
v
From Useful Properties, the following holds: dt =
1
θ
yt. Due to the assumption yt = 1, it
is possible to write: dt =
1
θ
which in steady state becomes d = 1
θ
. In steady state, Euler
equation becomes v = βv + βd which can be written as v = βv + β 1
θ
which can be written
as v(1− β) = β
θ
which can be written as v = β
θ(1−β) .
v̂t = βEtv̂t+1 + βEtd̂t+1
1
θ
β
(1−β)θ
v̂t = βEtv̂t+1 + Etd̂t+1(1− β)
Following the same calculations for foreign firm shares:
v̂∗t = βEtv̂
∗
t+1 + Etd̂
∗
t+1(1− β)
Subtracting calculations for home firm and foreign firm shares:
v̂Dt = Et[βv̂
D
t+1 + (1− β)d̂Dt+1] which is equation (43) on p.A-4 of GLR.
In this model, the first step is also starting with log-linearizing Euler equations for home
firm and foreign firm shares. Starting with home firm shares:
C
− 1
σ
t vt = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1(vt+1 + dt+1 + d∗t+1)}
dvt = βEtdvt+1 + βEtddt+1 + βEtdd∗t+1
Divide by v:
dvt
v
= βdEtvt+1
v
+ βdEtdt+1
v
+ βdEtd∗t+1
v
v̂t = βEtv̂t+1 + βEtd̂t+1
d
v
+ βd̂∗t+1 d∗v
From Useful Properties, the following holds: dt + d∗t = 1θyt. Due to the assumption yt = 1,
it is possible to write: dt + d∗t = 1θ . In steady state, Euler equation for home and foreign
shares becomes v = βv + βd + βd∗ which becomes v = βv + β 1θ which can be written as
v(1− β) = β
θ
which can be written as v = β
θ(1−β) .
153
v̂t = βEtv̂t+1+βEtd̂t+1
d
β
1−β
1
θ
+βEtd̂∗t+1 d∗β
1−β
1
θ
= βEtv̂t+1+(1−β)Etd̂t+1dθ+(1−β)Etd̂∗t+1d∗θ =
βEtv̂t+1+(1−β)Etd̂t+1dθ+(1−β)Etd̂∗t+1(1−dθ) which does not lead to a convenient format
as in GLR.
Therefore, I define total home firm profit as dt+1 = dt+1 + d∗t+1.
I can then write the Euler equation for home firm shares as: C
− 1
σ
t vt = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1Rt+1} =
βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1(vt+1 + dt+1)}
dvt = βEtdvt+1 + βEtddt+1
Divide by v:
dvt
v
= βdEtvt+1
v
+ βdEtdt+1
v
v̂t = βEtv̂t+1 + βEtd̂t+1
d
v
From Useful Properties, the following holds: dt + d∗t ≡ dt = 1θyt. Due to the assumption
yt = 1, it is possible to write: dt =
1
θ
which in steady state becomes d = 1
θ
. In steady state,
Euler equation becomes v = βv + βd which becomes v = βv + β 1
θ
which can be written as
v(1− β) = β
θ
which can be written as v = β
θ(1−β) .
v̂t = βEtv̂t+1 + βEtd̂t+1
1
θ
β
(1−β)θ
v̂t = βEtv̂t+1 + Etd̂t+1(1− β)
Following the same calculations for foreign firm shares:
v̂∗t = βEtv̂
∗
t+1 + Etd̂
∗
t+1(1− β) where d∗t is defined as d∗t + d∗∗t, i.e., total profit of the foreign
firm.
Subtracting calculations for home firm and foreign firm shares:
v̂Dt = Et[βv̂
D
t+1 + (1− β)d̂
D
t+1] where the log-linearized difference between total profits gener-
ated by home firm and total profits generated by foreign firm d̂
D
t+1 is defined as d̂t+1− d̂
∗
t+1 =
( ̂dt+1 + d∗t+1)− ( ̂d∗t+1 + d∗∗t+1). Note that this is similar to equation (43) on p.A-4 of GLR.
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Next, an expression for d̂
D
t+1 is obtained. An expression for ŷ
D
t was obtained above. Since
dt = dt + d∗t = 1θyt and d
∗
t = d
∗
t + d
∗
∗t =
1
θ
y∗t, it is possible to write dtd∗t
= dt+d∗t
d∗t+d
∗
∗t
=
1
θ
yt
1
θ
y∗t
which
means dt
d
∗
t
= yt
y∗t
.
Roll it forward by 1 period: dt+1
d
∗
t+1
≡ dt+1+d∗t+1
d∗t+1+d
∗
∗t+1
= yt+1
y∗t+1
.
Log-linearizing gives d̂
D
t+1 = ŷ
D
t+1.
It is then possible to write v̂Dt = Et[βv̂
D
t+1 + (1 − β)ŷDt+1] and using the expression for ŷDt
rolled forward by 1 period, i.e., ŷDt+1 = −ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt+1 + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ẐDt+1:
v̂Dt = Etβv̂
D
t+1 + Et(1− β)ŷDt+1
v̂Dt = Etβv̂
D
t+1 + Et(1− β)[−ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt+1 + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ẐDt+1]
v̂Dt = Etβv̂
D
t+1 − Et (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ) ĈDt+1 + Et (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ẐDt+1
Use EtĈ
D
t+1 = Ĉ
D
t and assumption Ẑ
D
t+1 = φZẐ
D
t + ε
ZD
t+1. Plug in:
v̂Dt = Etβv̂
D
t+1 − (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ) ĈDt + φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ẐDt
Use method of undetermined coefficients:
Guess the solution takes the form:
v̂Dt = ηvDanf̂at + ηvDZDẐ
D
t + ηvDGDĜ
D
t + ηvDξ ξ̂t
Roll it forward by 1 period:
v̂Dt+1 = ηvDanf̂at+1 + ηvDZDẐ
D
t+1 + ηvDGDĜ
D
t+1 + ηvDξ ξ̂t+1
Plug in expressions for v̂Dt and v̂
D
t+1 into:
v̂Dt = Etβv̂
D
t+1 − (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ) ĈDt + φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ZDt :
ηvDanf̂at + ηvDZDẐ
D
t + ηvDGDĜ
D
t + ηvDξ ξ̂t =
= βηvDanf̂at+1+βηvDZDẐ
D
t+1+βηvDGDĜ
D
t+1+βηvDξ ξ̂t+1− (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ) ĈDt + φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1−
γ)ZDt =
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= βηvDa(nf̂at + ηaZDẐ
D
t + ηaGDĜ
D
t + ηaξ ξ̂t) + βηvDZDφZẐ
D
t + βηvDGDφGĜ
D
t + 0−
− (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
(ηCDanf̂at + ηCDZDẐ
D
t + ηCDGDĜ
D
t + ηCDξ ξ̂t) +
φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1− γ)ZDt =
= βηvDanf̂at + βηvDa
β(1−φZ)(1−a)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)(1−G)(ω+ϕ) (1− γ)ẐDt − βηvDa
β(1−φG)G(1−a)
(1−βφG)(1−G) Ĝ
D
t + βηvDaβξ̂t +
+ βηvDZDφZẐ
D
t + βηvDGDφGĜ
D
t − (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ) 1−ββ σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)(1−a)(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)nf̂at −
− (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)ẐDt −
(1−β)ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
σ(1−β)G(ω+ϕ)
(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)Ĝ
D
t −
− (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
σ(1−β)(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1) ξ̂t +
φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1− γ)ZDt
To get ηvDa:
ηvDanf̂at − βηvDanf̂at = − (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ) 1−ββ σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)(1−a)[(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]nf̂at
ηvDanf̂at(1− β) = − (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)σ(ω+ϕ)β(1−a)[(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]nf̂at
ηvDanf̂at = − (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)σ(ω+ϕ)β(1−a)[(σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]nf̂at
ηvDa = − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
To get ηvDZD :
ηvDZDẐ
D
t = βηvDa
β(1−φZ)(1−a)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)(1−G)(ω+ϕ) (1− γ)ẐDt +
+βηvDZDφZẐ
D
t − (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ) σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1−γ)ẐDt +
φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1−γ)ZDt
ηvDZDẐ
D
t − βηvDZDφZẐDt =
= β( −ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)
β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)])
β(1−φZ)(1−a)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)(1−G)(ω+ϕ) (1− γ)ẐDt −
− (1−β)ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)ẐDt +
φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
(1− γ)ZDt
ηvDZDẐ
D
t (1− βφZ) =
= [β( −ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)
β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)])
β(1−φZ)(1−a)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)(1−G)(ω+ϕ) −
(1−β)ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] +
φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
]×
× (1− γ)ZDt =
= [ −ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)
σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)
β(1−φZ)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ) −
(1−β)ϕ(ω−1)
ω+ϕ
(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]+
φZ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
ϕ+ω
]×
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× (1− γ)ZDt =
= [ −ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)β(1−φZ)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] −
(1−β)ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] +
+ φz(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ](1− γ)ZDt =
= [ (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]{−ϕβ(1−φZ)(ω−1)−(1−β)ϕ(ω−1)+φZ(1−βφZ)[σ(1−
G)(ω + ϕ) + ϕ(ω − 1)]}](1− γ)ZDt =
= [ (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]{ϕ(ω− 1)βφZ −ϕ(ω− 1) +φZ(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ) +
ϕ(ω − 1)]}](1− γ)ZDt =
= [ (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]{ϕ(ω− 1)βφZ −ϕ(ω− 1) + φZ(1− βφZ)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ) +
φZ(1− βφZ)ϕ(ω − 1)}](1− γ)ZDt =
= [ (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]{ϕ(ω− 1)βφZ −ϕ(ω− 1) + φZ(1− βφZ)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ) +
φZϕ(ω − 1)− φZβφZϕ(ω − 1)}](1− γ)ZDt =
= [ (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]{ϕ(ω−1)βφZ(1−φZ)−ϕ(ω−1)(1−φZ)+φZ(1−βφZ)σ(1−
G)(ω + ϕ)}](1− γ)ZDt =
= [ (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]{−ϕ(ω − 1)(1− φZ)(1− βφZ) + φZ(1− βφZ)σ(1−G)(ω +
ϕ)}](1− γ)ZDt =
= [ (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]{(1−βφZ)[−ϕ(ω−1)(1−φZ)+φZσ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)]}](1−γ)ZDt
ηvDZD =
(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)[σφZ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)−ϕ(ω−1)(1−φZ)]
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ)
To get ηvDGD :
ηvDGDĜ
D
t = βηvDaηaGDĜ
D
t + βηvDGDφGĜ
D
t − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)σ(ω+ϕ) ηCDGDĜDt
ηvDGDĜ
D
t − βηvDGDφGĜDt = β ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] β(1−φG)G(1−a)(1−βφG)(1−G) ĜDt +
+ ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)
σ(ω+ϕ)
σ(1−β)G(ω+ϕ)
(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)Ĝ
D
t
ηvDGDĜ
D
t (1− βφG) = ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)G(β(1−φG)+(1−β))(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]ĜDt
ηvDGD =
Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)
(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
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To get ηvDξ:
ηvDξ ξ̂t = βηvDaηaξ ξ̂t − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)σ(ω+ϕ) ηCDξ ξ̂t =
= −β ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)
β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]βξ̂t − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)σ(ω+ϕ) σ(1−β)(1−G)(ω+ϕ)(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ξ̂t =
= −βϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)−ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−β)(1−G)
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ξ̂t
ηvDξ = − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
Note that the above elasticities are identical to GLR except for the elasticity ηvDZD that has
an additional term (1− γ).
B.5 Find Elasticities of d:
From above: ŷDt = −ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ZDt
Since ŷDt = d̂
D
t , it is possible to write d̂
D
t = −ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ĈDt + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ZDt
The solution for ĈDt above is: Ĉ
D
t = ηCDanf̂at + ηCDZDẐ
D
t + ηCDGDĜ
D
t + ηCDξ ξ̂t
Plugging this in:
d̂Dt = −ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)(ηCDanf̂at + ηCDZDẐDt + ηCDGDĜDt + ηCDξ ξ̂t) + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1− γ)ZDt =
= −ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ω+ϕ)
ηCDanf̂at− ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ηCDGDĜDt − ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ)ηCDξ ξ̂t+[−ϕ(ω−1)σ(ω+ϕ) ηCDZD + (1+ϕ)(ω−1)ϕ+ω (1−γ)]ẐDt
Use method of undetermined coefficients:
Guess the solution takes the form:
d̂Dt = ηdDanf̂at + ηdDZDẐ
D
t + ηdDGDĜ
D
t + ηdDξ ξ̂t
To get ηdDa:
ηdDanf̂at = − ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−β)(1−G)(ω+ϕ)σ(ω+ϕ)β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]nf̂at
ηdDa = − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] = ηvDa
To get ηdDZD :
ηdDZDẐ
D
t =
−ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−γ)
σ(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]Ẑ
D
t +
(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−γ)
ϕ+ω
ẐDt
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ηdDZD =
−ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−γ)+(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−γ)σ(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
σ(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] =
= (1+ϕ)(ω−1)[−ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)+(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]]
(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ) =
= (1+ϕ)(ω−1)[(1−βφZ)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+(1−βφZ)ϕ(ω−1)−ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)]
(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ) =
= (1+ϕ)(ω−1)[(1−βφZ)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)(1−βφZ−(1−β)]
(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ) =
= (1+ϕ)(ω−1)[(1−βφZ)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)β(1−φZ)]
(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ)
To get ηdDGD :
ηdDGDĜ
D
t = − Gϕ(ω−1)σ(1−β)(ω+ϕ)σ(ω+ϕ)(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]ĜDt
ηdDGD = − Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] = ηvDGD
To get ηdDξ:
ηdDξ ξ̂t = − ϕ(ω−1)σ(1−β)(1−G)(ω+ϕ)σ(ω+ϕ)(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ξ̂t
ηdDξ = − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] = ηvDξ
Note that the above elasticities are identical to GLR except for the elasticity ηdDZD that has
an additional term (1− γ).
B.6 Show that Excess Return R̂Dt is a Linear Function of Innovations
to Relative Productivity and Government Spending:
Recall: R̂Dt = −βv̂Dt − (1− β)d̂Dt + v̂Dt−1 = −[βv̂Dt + (1− β)d̂Dt ] + v̂Dt−1
Note that the following hold:
βηvDa + (1− β)ηdDa = ηvDa = − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
βηvDZD + (1− β)ηdDZD =
= β(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)[σφZ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)−ϕ(ω−1)(1−φZ)]
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ)+
+ (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)[(1−βφZ)σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)β(1−φZ)]
(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ) =
= (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)βσφZ(1−G)+(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)(1−G)(σ−σβφZ)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ) =
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= σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)
βηvDGD + (1− β)ηdDGD = ηvDGD = Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
βηvDξ + (1− β)ηdDξ = ηvDξ = − ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
Therefore:
R̂Dt = −ηvDanf̂at − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)ẐDt − ηvDGDĜDt − ηvDξ ξ̂t + v̂Dt−1
Roll forward by 1 period:
R̂Dt+1 = −ηvDanf̂at+1 − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)ẐDt+1 − ηvDGDĜDt+1 − ηvDξ ξ̂t+1 + v̂Dt
Plug in equation: v̂Dt = ηvDanf̂at + ηvDZDẐ
D
t + ηvDGDĜ
D
t + ηvDξ ξ̂t
R̂Dt+1 = −ηvDanf̂at+1− σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1−γ)ẐDt+1−ηvDGDĜDt+1−ηvDξ ξ̂t+1+ηvDanf̂at+
+ηvDZDẐ
D
t + ηvDGDĜ
D
t + ηvDξ ξ̂t =
= −ηvDanf̂at+1+ηvDanf̂at− σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1−γ)ẐDt+1+ηvDZDẐDt −ηvDGDĜDt+1+
+ηvDGDĜ
D
t − ηvDξ ξ̂t+1 + ηvDξ ξ̂t =
= −ηvDa(nf̂at+1 − nf̂at)− σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)ẐDt+1 − ηvDZDẐDt −
− ηvDGD(ĜDt+1 − ĜDt )− ηvDξ(ξ̂t+1 − ξ̂t)
Use nf̂at+1 = nf̂at + ηaZDẐ
D
t + ηaGDĜ
D
t + ηaξ ξ̂t
R̂Dt+1 = −ηvDa(nf̂at + ηaZDẐDt + ηaGDĜDt + ηaξ ξ̂t − nf̂at)−
− σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)ẐDt+1− ηvDZDẐDt − ηvDGD(ĜDt+1− ĜDt )− ηvDξ(ξ̂t+1− ξ̂t) =
= −ηvDa(ηaZDẐDt + ηaGDĜDt + ηaξ ξ̂t) − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1 − γ)ẐDt+1 − ηvDZDẐDt −
−ηvDGD(ĜDt+1 − ĜDt )− ηvDξ(ξ̂t+1 − ξ̂t)
Use ĜDt = φGĜ
D
t−1 + ε
GD
t and Ẑ
D
t = φZẐ
D
t−1 + ε
ZD
t
R̂Dt+1 = −ηvDa(ηaZDẐDt + ηaGDĜDt + ηaξ ξ̂t)− σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)εZ
D
t+1 −
− σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1−γ)φZẐDt +ηvDZDẐDt −ηvDGD [εG
D
t+1−(1−φG)ĜDt ]−ηvDξ(ξ̂t+1−ξ̂t)
Use the following:
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−ηvDaηaZD + ηvDZD − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)φZ =
= [− ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)
β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ][
(1−a)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)β(1−φz)
(1−G)(ω+ϕ)(1−βφZ) (1− γ)]−
− (1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)[σφZ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)−ϕ(ω−1)(1−φZ)]
(1−βφZ)(ω+ϕ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] (1− γ)−
σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)φZ = 0
−ηvDaηaGD + ηvDGD(1− φG) =
= [− ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)
β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ][−β(1−φG)G(1−a)(1−βφG)(1−G) ] +
Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)
(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− φG) = 0
−ηvDaηaξ + ηvDξ =
= [− ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)
β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ][β] +− ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] = 0
Then:
R̂Dt+1 = − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)εZ
D
t+1 − ηvDGDεGDt+1 − ηvDξ ξ̂t+1
Plug in elasticities:
R̂Dt+1 = − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)εZ
D
t+1 − Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]εG
D
t+1 +
+ ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ξ̂t+1
Since ξ̂t+1 ≡ αβ(1−G)R̂Dt+1, it is possible to write:
R̂Dt+1 =
= − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)εZ
D
t+1 − Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]εG
D
t+1 +
+ ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−G)
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
α
β(1−G)R̂
D
t+1 =
= − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)εZ
D
t+1 − Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]εG
D
t+1 +
+ ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]
α
β
R̂Dt+1
Combine R̂Dt+1 terms::
R̂Dt+1(1− ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)α(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]β ) = − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)εZ
D
t+1 −
− Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)
(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]ε
GD
t+1
R̂Dt+1
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]β−ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)α
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]β =
= − σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1− γ)εZ
D
t+1 − Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]εG
D
t+1
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R̂Dt+1
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]β−ϕ(ω−1)(1−β)α
(1−a)β = −σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ) (1−γ)εZ
D
t+1−Gϕ(ω−1)(1−β)(1−βφG) εG
D
t+1
This allows us to solve for R̂Dt+1 as:
R̂Dt+1 = ηRDεZDε
ZD
t+1 + ηRDεGDε
GD
t+1 where
ηRDεZD = − β(1−a)σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)}(1− γ)
ηRDεGD = − βGϕ(1−a)(1−β)(ω−1)(1−βφG){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)}
This result is identical to GLR except for the additional (1− γ) term in ηRDεZD .
B.7 2nd-Order Approximation of the Portfolio Part of the Model:
From household FOCs for :
C
− 1
σ
t = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1Rt+1} which can be written as: C
− 1σ
t
β
= Et{C−
1
σ
t+1Rt+1}
C
− 1
σ
t = βEt{C−
1
σ
t+1R
∗
t+1} which can be written as: C
− 1σ
t
β
= Et{C−
1
σ
t+1R
∗
t+1}
Equating these two expressions gives us: Et(C
− 1
σ
t+1Rt+1) = Et(C
− 1
σ
t+1R
∗
t+1) which can be written
as Et(C
− 1
σ
t+1Rt+1)− Et(C−
1
σ
t+1R
∗
t+1) = 0
The same derivation can be done for foreign: Et(C
∗− 1
σ
t+1 Rt+1) = Et(C
∗− 1
σ
t+1 R
∗
t+1) which can be
written as Et(C
∗− 1
σ
t+1 Rt+1)− Et(C∗−
1
σ
t+1 R
∗
t+1) = 0
Take second-order approximation to the home FOC and evaluate it at steady state:
Et(− 1σC
− 1
σ
−1
t+1 dCt+1Rt+1) + Et(C
− 1
σ
t+1dRt+1)− Et(− 1σC
− 1
σ
−1
t+1 dCt+1R
∗
t+1)− Et(C−
1
σ
t+1dR
∗
t+1) +
+ 1
2
[− 1
σ
(− 1
σ
− 1)C−
1
σ
−1−1
t+1 d
2Ct+1Rt+1 + C
− 1
σ
t+10 + 2(− 1σ )C
− 1
σ
−1
t+1 dCt+1dRt+1]−
− 1
2
[− 1
σ
(− 1
σ
− 1)C−
1
σ
−1−1
t+1 d
2Ct+1R
∗
t+1 − C−
1
σ
t+10− 2(− 1σ )C
− 1
σ
−1
t+1 dCt+1dR
∗
t+1] =
= Et(− 1σC−
1
σ
−1dCt+1 1β ) + Et(C
− 1
σ dRt+1)− Et(− 1σC−
1
σ
−1dCt+1 1β )− Et(C−
1
σ dR∗t+1) +
+ 1
2
[− 1
σ
(− 1
σ
− 1)C− 1σ−1−1d2Ct+1 1β + 2(− 1σ )C−
1
σ
−1dCt+1dRt+1]−
− 1
2
[− 1
σ
(− 1
σ
− 1)C− 1σ−1−1d2Ct+1 1β + 2(− 1σ )C−
1
σ
−1dCt+1dR∗t+1] =
162
= Et(C
− 1
σ dRt+1)−Et(C− 1σ dR∗t+1)+ 12 [2(− 1σ )C−
1
σ
−1dCt+1dRt+1]− 12 [2(− 1σ )C−
1
σ
−1dCt+1dR∗t+1]
= Et(C
− 1
σ dRt+1)− Et(C− 1σ dR∗t+1) + [− 1σC−
1
σ
−1dCt+1dRt+1]− [− 1σC−
1
σ
−1dCt+1dR∗t+1]
Divide by C−
1
σ and R.
R̂t+1 − R̂∗t+1 + (− 1σ Ĉt+1R̂t+1)− (− 1σ Ĉt+1R̂∗t+1) = 0
Same derivation for the foreign country gives:
R̂t+1 − R̂∗t+1 + (− 1σ Ĉ∗t+1R̂t+1)− (− 1σ Ĉ∗t+1R̂∗t+1) = 0
Subtract expressions for the home and foreign countries:
R̂t+1−R̂∗t+1+(− 1σ Ĉt+1R̂t+1)−(− 1σ Ĉt+1R̂∗t+1)−[R̂t+1−R̂∗t+1+(− 1σ Ĉ∗t+1R̂t+1)−(− 1σ Ĉ∗t+1R̂∗t+1)] =
0
(− 1
σ
Ĉt+1R̂t+1)− (− 1σ Ĉt+1R̂∗t+1)− [(− 1σ Ĉ∗t+1R̂t+1)− (− 1σ Ĉ∗t+1R̂∗t+1)] = 0
Ĉt+1R̂t+1 − Ĉt+1R̂∗t+1 − [Ĉ∗t+1R̂t+1 − Ĉ∗t+1R̂∗t+1] = 0
Et(Ĉt+1R̂
D
t+1)− Et(Ĉ∗t+1R̂Dt+1) = 0
Et(Ĉ
D
t+1R̂
D
t+1) = 0
This results is the same as in GLR.
B.8 Solve for Steady-State Portfolio α:
Plug in expressions for ĈDt+1 from Section B.3 and R̂
D
t+1 from Section B.6:
Et{(ηCDanf̂at+1 + ηCDZDẐDt+1 + ηCDGDĜDt+1 + ηCDξ ξ̂t+1)(ηRDεZD εZ
D
t+1 + ηRDεGD ε
GD
t+1)} = 0
Et{[(ηCDa(nf̂at + ηaZDẐDt + ηaGDĜDt + ηaξ ξ̂t) + ηCDZDφZẐDt + ηCDZDεZDt+1 + ηCDGDφGĜDt +
+ ηCDGDε
GD
t+1 + ηCDξ
α
β(1−G)ηRDεGDεGDt+1
](ηRDεZDε
ZD
t+1 + ηRDεGDε
GD
t+1)} = 0
Et{ηCDZDεZDt+1(ηRDεZD εZ
D
t+1)+ηCDGDε
GD
t+1(ηRDεGD ε
GD
t+1)+ηCDξ
α
β(1−G)(ηRDεZD ε
ZD
t+1+ηRDεGD ε
GD
t+1)
2}
= 0
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ηCDZDηRDεZDσ
2
εZD + ηCDGDηRDεGDσ
2
εGD +
α
β(1−G)ηCDξη
2
RDεZD
σ2εZD +
α
β(1−G)ηCDξη
2
RDεGD
σ2εGD
= 0
Plug in elasticities to solve for steady-state portfolio α:
[ σ(1−β)(1+ϕ)(ω−1)
(1−βφZ)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)](1−γ)][−
β(1−a)σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)}(1−γ)]σ2εZD+
+[− σ(1−β)G(ω+ϕ)
(1−βφG)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)] ][−
βGϕ(1−a)(1−β)(ω−1)
(1−βφG){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} ]σ
2
εGD +
+ α
β(1−G) [
σ(1−β)(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1) ][− β(1−a)σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφZ){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)}(1− γ)]
[− β(1−a)σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)}(1− γ)]σ2εZD +
+ α
β(1−G) [
σ(1−β)(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1) ][− βGϕ(1−a)(1−β)(ω−1)(1−βφG){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} ]
[− βGϕ(1−a)(1−β)(ω−1)
(1−βφG){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} ]σ
2
εGD = 0
[ 1+ϕ
1−βφZ (1− γ)][−
σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
1−βφZ (1− γ)]σ2εZD + [
G(ω+ϕ)
1−βφG ][
Gϕ
1−βφG ]σ
2
εGD +
+ α
β(1−G) [
(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
1−a ][
σ(1+ϕ)(1−G)
1−βφZ (1−γ)][
β(1−a)σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)}(1−γ)]σ2εZD
+ α
β(1−G) [
(1−G)(ω+ϕ)
1−a ][
Gϕ
1−βφG ][
βGϕ(1−a)(1−β)(ω−1)
(1−βφG){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} ]σ
2
εGD = 0
[ 1+ϕ
1−βφZ (1− γ)][−
σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
1−βφZ (1− γ)]σ2εZD + [
G(ω+ϕ)
1−βφG ][
Gϕ
1−βφG ]σ
2
εGD +
+ α(ω + ϕ)[σ(1+ϕ)(1−G)
1−βφZ (1− γ)][
σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)
(1−βφZ){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)}(1− γ)]σ2εZD +
+ α(ω + ϕ)[ Gϕ
1−βφG ][
Gϕ(1−β)(ω−1)
(1−βφG){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} ]σ
2
εGD = 0
−(1+ϕ)(1−γ)σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−γ)σ2
εZD
(1−βφZ)(1−βφZ) +
G(ω+ϕ)Gϕσ2
εGD
(1−βφG)(1−βφG) +
+
α(ω+ϕ)σ(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−γ)σ(1−β)(ω−1)(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−γ)σ2
εZD
(1−βφZ)(1−βφZ){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} +
+
α(ω+ϕ)GϕGϕ(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εGD
(1−βφG)(1−βφG){β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} = 0
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−(1+ϕ)2(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1−βφZ)2 +
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕσ2
εGD
(1−βφG)2 +
+
α(ω+ϕ)σ2(1+ϕ)2(1−G)2(1−γ)2(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εZD
(1−βφZ)2{β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} +
+
α(ω+ϕ)G2ϕ2(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εGD
(1−βφG)2{β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} = 0
α(ω+ϕ)σ2(1+ϕ)2(1−G)2(1−γ)2(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εZD
(1−βφZ)2{β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} +
+
α(ω+ϕ)G2ϕ2(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εGD
(1−βφG)2{β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} =
(1+ϕ)2(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1−βφZ)2 −
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕσ2
εGD
(1−βφG)2
α(ω+ϕ)σ2(1+ϕ)2(1−G)2(1−γ)2(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εZD
(1−βφG)2+α(ω+ϕ)G2ϕ2(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εGD
(1−βφZ)2
(1−βφZ)2(1−βφG)2{β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} =
=
(1+ϕ)2(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1−βφG)2−G2(ω+ϕ)ϕσ2
εGD
(1−βφZ)2
(1−βφZ)2(1−βφG)2
α(ω+ϕ)σ2(1+ϕ)2(1−G)2(1−γ)2(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εZD
(1−βφG)2+α(ω+ϕ)G2ϕ2(1−β)(ω−1)σ2
εGD
(1−βφZ)2
β(1−a)[σ(1−G)(ω+ϕ)+ϕ(ω−1)]−αϕ(ω−1)(1−β) =
= (1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2εZD(1− βφG)2 −G2(ω + ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1− βφZ)2
α(ω + ϕ)σ2(1 + ϕ)2(1 − G)2(1 − γ)2(1 − β)(ω − 1)σ2
εZD
(1 − βφG)2 + α(ω + ϕ)G2ϕ2(1 − β)(ω −
1)σ2
εGD
(1− βφZ)2 =
= {(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 −G2(ω + ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1− βφZ)2}{β(1− a)[σ(1−
G)(ω + ϕ) + ϕ(ω − 1)]− αϕ(ω − 1)(1− β)}
α(ω + ϕ)σ2(1 + ϕ)2(1−G)2(1− γ)2(1− β)(ω − 1)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 +
+ α(ω + ϕ)G2ϕ2(1− β)(ω − 1)σ2
εGD
(1− βφZ)2 +
+{(1+ϕ)2(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1−βφG)2−G2(ω+ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1−βφZ)2}{αϕ(ω−1)(1−β)} =
= {(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 −G2(ω + ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1− βφZ)2}{β(1− a)[σ(1−
G)(ω + ϕ) + ϕ(ω − 1)]}
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α(1− β)[(ω + ϕ)σ2(1 + ϕ)2(1−G)2(1− γ)2(ω − 1)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 +
+ (ω + ϕ)G2ϕ2(ω − 1)σ2
εGD
(1− βφZ)2 +
+ {(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 −G2(ω + ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1− βφZ)2}ϕ(ω − 1)] =
= {(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 −G2(ω + ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1− βφZ)2}β(1− a)[σ(1−
G)(ω + ϕ) + ϕ(ω − 1)]
α(1− β)[(ω + ϕ)σ2(1 + ϕ)2(1−G)2(1− γ)2(ω − 1)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 +
+ (1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2ϕ(ω − 1)] =
= {(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 −G2(ω + ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1− βφZ)2}β(1− a)[σ(1−
G)(ω + ϕ) + ϕ(ω − 1)]
α(1− β)[(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2(ω − 1)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2σ(1−G)][(ω + ϕ)σ(1−G) + ϕ(ω − 1)] =
= {(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 −G2(ω + ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1− βφZ)2}β(1− a)[σ(1−
G)(ω + ϕ) + ϕ(ω − 1)]
α(1− β)[(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2(ω − 1)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2σ(1−G)] =
= {(1 + ϕ)2(1− γ)2σ(ω − 1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1− βφG)2 −G2(ω + ϕ)ϕσ2εGD(1− βφZ)2}β(1− a)
α(1− β) = {(1+ϕ)
2(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1−βφG)2−G2(ω+ϕ)ϕσ2
εGD
(1−βφZ)2}β(1−a)
(1+ϕ)2(1−γ)2(ω−1)σ2
εZD
(1−βφG)2σ(1−G)
α = β(1−a)
1−β
(1+ϕ)2(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1−G)σ2
εZD
(1−βφG)2−G2(ω+ϕ)ϕσ2
εGD
(1−βφZ)2
(1+ϕ)2(1−γ)2(ω−1)σ2
εZD
(1−βφG)2σ(1−G)
α = β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
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Compared to the GLR optimal portfolio α = β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
], there is
an additional term (1− γ) in the denominator. As γ increases from 0 towards 1, the steady-
state portfolio α decreases, i.e., portfolio held by home household contains more home equity.
Appendix C: ”Country-Specific Technology” Setup Leads
to the Same Result as the GLR ”Exporter-Only” Setup
This Appendix shows that the ”country-specific technology” setup leads to the same result
as the GLR ”exporter-only” setup. The ”country-specific technology” subjects the firms to
the technologies of the countries in which they operate. This setup is represented by setting
γ = 0 in Table 1. The home firm z still produces according to yt(z) = ZtLt(z) in the home
country, but it now produces y∗t (z) according to y
∗
t (z) = Z
∗
t L
∗
t (z) in the foreign country.
Similarly, the foreign firm z∗ still produces y∗∗t(z
∗) according to y∗∗t(z
∗) = Z∗t L
∗
∗t(z
∗) in the
foreign country, but it now produces y∗t(z∗) according to y∗t(z∗) = ZtL∗t(z∗) in the home
country. Table 2 summarizes this setup.
C.1 Households
Since the household part of the model is unaffected by changing the assumption on firm pro-
duction structure, the derivations in Appendix A.1 remain the same. However, the deriva-
tions for the firm part of the model in Appendix A.2 differ.
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C.2 Firms
C.2.1 Derivation of prices:
Derivation of price of good produced by home firm z:
min wtLt(z) + w
∗
tL
∗
t (z)−mct(ZtLt(z) + Z∗t L∗t (z)− Yt(z))
∂`
∂Lt(z)
= wt −mctZt = 0
wt
Zt
= mct = RPt
θ−1
θ
RPt =
θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
which is the price charged in home country. This is identical to Appendix
A.2.1.
∂`
∂L∗t (z)
= w∗t −mctZ∗t = 0
w∗t
Z∗t
= mct = RP
∗
t
θ−1
θ
RP ∗t =
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗t
which is the price charged in foreign country. This differs from Appendix A.2.1.
Derivation of price of good produced by foreign firm z∗:
min wtL∗t(z∗) + w∗tL
∗
∗t(z
∗)−mc∗t(ZtL∗t(z∗) + Z∗t L∗∗t(z∗)− Y ∗t (z∗))
∂`
∂L∗t(z∗) = wt −mc∗tZt = 0
wt
Zt
= mc∗t = RP∗t θ−1θ
RP∗t = θθ−1
wt
Zt
which is the price charged in home country. This differs from Appendix A.2.1.
∂`
∂L∗∗t(z∗)
= w∗t −mc∗tZ∗t = 0
w∗t
Z∗t
= mc∗t = RP ∗∗t
θ−1
θ
RP ∗∗t =
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗t
which is the price charged in foreign country. This is identical to Appendix
A.2.1.
C.2.2 Derivation of optimum labor demands:
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Note that indexation of labor by z and z∗ showing whether the labor is hired by home firm
z or foreign firm z∗ is dropped to simplify the notation.
Derivation of optimal labor demand by home firm z in home country:
Production function is given as Y st = ZtLt
Demand for output was derived from household optimization as: Y dt = RP
−ω
t Y
W
t .
Since Y st = Y
d
t , it is possible to write ZtLt = RP
−ω
t Y
W
t .
From this, Lt =
RP−ωt Y
W
t
Zt
follows. This is identical to Appendix A.2.2.
Derivation of optimal labor demand by foreign firm z∗ in home country:
Production function is given as Y s∗t = ZtL∗t
Demand for output was derived from household optimization as: Y d∗t = RP
−ω
∗t Y Wt
Since Y s∗t = Y
d
∗t, it is possible to write ZtL∗t = RP
−ω
∗t Y Wt .
From this, L∗t =
RP−ω∗t Y
W
t
Zt
follows. This differs from Appendix A.2.2.
Derivation of total optimal labor demand in home country:
Ldt = Lt + L∗t =
RP−ωt Y
W
t
Zt
+
RP−ω∗t Y
W
t
Zt
= Y Wt (
RP−ωt +RP
−ω
∗t
Zt
) which differs from differs from
Appendix A.2.2.
Derivation of optimal labor demand by home firm z in foreign country:
Production function is given as Y ∗st = Z
∗
t L
∗
t
Demand for output was derived from household optimization as: Y ∗dt = RP
∗−ω
t Y
W
t
Since Y ∗st = Y
∗d
t , it is possible to write Z
∗
t L
∗
t = RP
∗−ω
t Y
W
t .
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From this, L∗t =
RP ∗−ωt Y
W
t
Z∗t
follows. This differs from Appendix A.2.2.
Derivation of optimal labor demand by foreign firm z∗ in foreign country:
Production function is given as Y ∗s∗t = Z
∗
t L
∗
∗t
Demand for output was derived from household optimization as: Y ∗d∗t = RP
∗−ω
∗t Y Wt
Since Y ∗s∗t = Y
∗d
∗t , it is possible to write Z
∗
t L
∗
∗t = RP
∗−ω
∗t Y Wt .
From this, L∗∗t =
RP ∗−ω∗t Y
W
t
Z∗t
follows. This is identical to Appendix A.2.2.
Derivation of total optimal labor demand in foreign country:
L∗dt = L
∗
t + L
∗
∗t =
RP ∗−ωt Y
W
t
Z∗t
+
RP ∗−ω∗t Y
W
t
Z∗t
= Y Wt (
RP ∗−ωt +RP
∗−ω
∗t
Z∗t
) which differs from Appendix
A.2.2.
Note that these expressions are similar to GLR where aggregate per capita labor demands
in home and foreign countries are Lt =
RP−ωt y
W
t
Zt
and L∗t =
RP ∗−ωt y
W
t
Z∗t
, respectively. The only
difference is that the above expressions contain two prices.
C.3 Useful Properties
C.3.1 To get yt
y∗t
:
Derivation of home GDP yt, i.e., output produced by home and foreign firms in
the home country:
yt = RPtZtLt +RP∗tZtL∗t = θθ−1
wt
Zt
ZtLt +
θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
ZtL∗t = θθ−1(wtLt + wtL∗t)
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Derivation of foreign GDP y∗t , i.e., output produced by home and foreign firms
in the foreign country:
y∗t = RP
∗
t Z
∗
t L
∗
t +RP
∗
∗tZ
∗
t L
∗
∗t =
θ
θ−1
wt
Z∗t
Z∗t L
∗
t +
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗t
Z∗t L
∗
∗t =
θ
θ−1(w
∗
tL
∗
t + w
∗
tL
∗
∗t)
Expression for yt
y∗t
:
yt
y∗t
= RPtZtLt+RP∗tZtL∗t
RP ∗t Z
∗
t L
∗
t+RP
∗
∗tZ
∗
t L
∗
∗t
=
θ
θ−1 (wtLt+wtL∗t)
θ
θ−1 (w
∗
tL
∗
t+w
∗
tL
∗
∗t)
= wt(Lt+L∗t)
w∗t (L
∗
t+L
∗
∗t)
As explained in Appendix A.3, even though the production structure differs from GLR, the
technology terms cancel in this expression, so this result is identical to GLR.
Next, expressions for wt, w
∗
t , (Lt + L∗t) and (L
∗
t + L
∗
∗t) are obtained:
To get wt, home labor supply and home labor demand are equated.
Home labor supply was derived above from home household FOCs as Lst = (
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ.
Home labor demand was derived above from firm FOCs as Ldt = Y
W
t (
RP−ωt +RP
−ω
∗t
Zt
)
Since Lst = L
d
t , it is possible to write: (
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
RP−ωt +RP
−ω
∗t
Zt
)
Plug in expressions for RPt and RP∗t:
(
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
( θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
)−ω
Zt
+
( θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
)−ω
Zt
)
(
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt [(
θ
θ−1)
−ωw−ωt Z
ω−1
t + (
θ
θ−1)
−ωw−ωt Z
ω−1
t ]
wϕ+ωt = C
ϕ
σ
t χ
ϕ2Y Wt (
θ
θ−1)
−ωZω−1t
wt = C
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (2Y Wt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1)
− ω
ϕ+ωZ
ω−1
ϕ+ω
t
To get w∗t , equate foreign labor supply and foreign labor demand are equated.
Foreign labor supply could be derived in the same way as home labor supply from household
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FOCs as L∗st = (
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ.
Foreign labor demand was derived above from firm FOCs as L∗dt = Y
W
t (
RP ∗−ωt +RP
∗−ω
∗t
Z∗t
)
Since L∗st = L
∗d
t , it is possible to write: (
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
RP ∗−ωt +RP
∗−ω
∗t
Z∗t
)
Plug in expressions for RP ∗t and RP
∗
∗t:
(
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt (
( θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗
t
)−ω
Z∗t
+
( θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗
t
)−ω
Z∗t
)
(
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ = Y Wt [(
θ
θ−1)
−ωw∗−ωt Z
∗ω−1
t + (
θ
θ−1)
−ωw∗−ωt Z
∗ω−1
t ]
w∗ϕ+ωt = C
∗ϕ
σ
t χ
ϕ2Y Wt (
θ
θ−1)
−ωZ∗ω−1t
w∗t = C
∗ ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (2Y Wt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1)
− ω
ϕ+ωZ
∗ ω−1
ϕ+ω
t
To get (Lt + L∗t) i.e., total home labor supply LSt :
As derived above from home household FOC: Lst = (
C
− 1σ
t wt
χ
)ϕ
Plug in wt: L
s
t = (
C
− 1σ
t C
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (2YWt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1 )
− ωϕ+ω Z
ω−1
ϕ+ω
t
χ
)ϕ
To get (L∗t + L
∗
∗t)i.e., total foreign labor supply L
∗s
t :
From foreign household FOC: L∗st = (
C
∗− 1σ
t w
∗
t
χ
)ϕ
Plug in w∗t : L
∗s
t = (
C
∗− 1σ
t C
∗ ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (2YWt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1 )
− ωϕ+ω Z
∗ ω−1ϕ+ω
t
χ
)ϕ
Then, yt
y∗t
= wt(Lt+L∗t)
w∗t (L
∗
t+L
∗
∗t)
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
−ϕ(ω−1)
σ(ϕ+ω) ( Zt
Z∗t
)
(ω−1)(ϕ+1)
ϕ+ω
As opposed to Appendix A.3, this result is identical to GLR derivation. Applying the
”country-specific technology” to firm production gives the same result for relative GDPs yt
y∗t
as the GLR setup with ”exporter-only” firms using technology of their respective countries.
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Following from this result, the steady-state portfolio α will be identical to the GLR steady-
state portfolio α = β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
].
This is a very useful result because it allows modeling the GLR ”exporter-only” setup as
the ”country-specific technology” MNC setup. It is then possible to see see how the optimal
portfolio changes as the production structure moves from ”exporter-only” setup in GLR to
”MNC-only” setup by showing how the optimal portfolio changes as the production structure
moves from the ”country-specific technology” setup to the ”firm-specific technology” setup.
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Appendix D: Derivative of α with Respect to γ
This Appendix shows the derivative of α with respect to γ and the role played by the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, ϕ.
α = β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
∂α
∂γ
= −β(1−a)
1−β
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
(−2)(1− γ)−2−1(−1) =
= −β(1−a)
1−β
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
2(1−γ)−3 = −2β(1−a)
1−β
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
This expression is negative for parameter values assumed by GLR. This means that an in-
crease in γ leads to a decrease in α, i.e., home household foreign equity decreases and home
equity increases.
Next, the role of ϕ is analyzed in more detail. When ϕ increases, the above expression for
∂α
∂γ
becomes more negative. This means that increasing ϕ magnifies the effect of γ on α.
Conversely, a decrease in ϕ leads to a decrease in the effect of γ on α. When ϕ reaches 0,
the effect of γ on α disappears, i.e., firm production structure becomes irrelevant when labor
supply becomes inelastic. This can be seen by taking a derivative of ∂α
∂γ
with respect to ϕ.
∂ ∂α
∂γ
∂ϕ
=
[−2β(1−a)G2(ω+2ϕ)(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
][(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
[(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]2
−
[−2β(1−a)G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
][(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)2(1+ϕ)(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
[(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]2
=
=
[−(ω+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)2+(ω+ϕ)ϕ2(1+ϕ)][2β(1−a)G2(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
(1+ϕ)4[(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]2
=
=
[−(ω+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)+(ω+ϕ)ϕ2][2β(1−a)G2(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
(1+ϕ)3[(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]2
=
=
[ϕ(ω−2)−ω][2β(1−a)G2(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
(1+ϕ)3[(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]2
=
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=
[ϕ(ω−2)−ω][2β(1−a)G2(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
]
(1+ϕ)3[(1−β)(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
For GLR calibration values ω = 2 and ϕ = 4, this expression is negative which means an
increase in ϕ leads to a decrease in the value of ∂α
∂γ
. Since ∂α
∂γ
is negative, the absolute value
of ∂α
∂γ
increases. This means that the effect of γ on α becomes larger with increasing ϕ.
Note that G has a similar effect on the relationship between γ and α. As G increases, the
effect of γ on α is magnified.
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Appendix E: Steady-State Equity Holdings x, x∗, x∗ & x∗∗
This Appendix shows how γ affects steady-state equity holdings x, x∗, x∗ and x∗∗. The
derivations are identical to GLR except for the last steps where the expression for steady-
state portfolio α is substituted. Also, derivatives of x, x∗, x∗ & x∗∗ with respect to γ are shown.
x∗, i.e., home household holdings of foreign firm shares:
In the symmetric steady state, v = v∗ = β
(1−β)θ as derived in Appendix B.4 and α ≡ v∗x∗
as defined in Section 2.1. Therefore, x∗ = α
v∗ =
αθ(1−β)
β
. Substituting the expression for
steady-state portfolio α derived in Appendix B.8 gives:
x∗ = θ(1−β)
β
β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
] =
= (1− a)θ[1− G
2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
As γ increases from 0 towards 1, x∗ decreases which means the home household holds fewer
foreign firm shares.
x∗∗, i.e., foreign household holdings of foreign firm shares:
Using equity market clearing condition ax∗ + (1 − a)x∗∗ = 1 − a, it is possible to write
x∗∗ =
1−a−ax∗
1−a =
1−a−aαθ(1−β)
β
1−a . Substituting the expression for α gives:
x∗∗ =
1−a−a θ(1−β)
β
β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ )2σ2εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
1−a =
=
1−a−aθ(1−a)[1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ )2σ2εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
1−a =
= 1− aθ[1− G
2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
As γ increases from 0 towards 1, x∗∗ increases which means the foreign household holds more
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foreign firm shares.
x∗, i.e., foreign household holdings of home firm shares:
Using the definition of net foreign assets from Appendix A.1 nfa ≡ v∗x∗− 1−a
a
vx∗ combined
with the fact that nfa = 0 in steady state, it is possible to write v∗x∗ = 1−a
a
vx∗. Since
α ≡ v∗x∗, α = 1−a
a
vx∗. Then, x∗ = aα(1−a)v =
aθ(1−β)α
(1−a)β . Substituting the expression for α
gives:
x∗ =
aθ(1−β)
(1−a)β
β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
] =
= aθ[1− G
2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
As γ increases from 0 towards 1, x∗ decreases which means the foreign household holds fewer
home firm shares.
x, i.e., home household holdings of home firm shares:
Using equity market clearing condition ax + (1 − a)x∗ = a introduced in Appendix A.1, it
is possible to write x = a−(1−a)x∗
a
=
a−(1−a)aθ(1−β)α
(1−a)β
a
=
a−aθ(1−β)α
β
a
. Substituting the expression
for α gives:
x =
a−aθ(1−β)
β
β(1−a)
1−β [1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ )2σ2εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
a
=
=
a−aθ(1−a)[1−
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ )2σ2εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
]
a
= 1− θ(1− a)[1− G
2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)2σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
].
As γ increases from 0 towards 1, x increases which means the home household holds more
home firm shares.
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These results show that the conclusion derived in Appendix B.8 and discussed in Section
3.2, i.e., steady-state portfolio α becoming more home-biased as γ increases, extends to the
steady-state equity holdings x, x∗, x∗ & x∗∗. The home household will hold more home firm
equity and less foreign firm equity whereas the foreign household will hold more foreign firm
equity and less home firm equity.
Derivatives of x, x∗, x∗ & x∗∗ with respect to γ:
∂x
∂γ
= θ(1− a) G
2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
(−2)(1− γ)−2−1(−1) =
= θ(1− a)2 G
2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
∂x∗
∂γ
= −θ(1− a)2 G
2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
∂x∗
∂γ
= −aθ2 G
2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
∂x∗∗
∂γ
= aθ2
G2(ω+ϕ)ϕ(1−βφZ)2σ2
εGD
(1−γ)3σ(ω−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−G)(1−βφG)2σ2
εZD
The effect of ϕ on ∂x
∂γ
, ∂x
∗
∂γ
, ∂x∗
∂γ
and ∂x
∗∗
∂γ
is consistent with the effect of ϕ on ∂α
∂γ
explained in
Appendix D.
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Appendix F: Terms of Trade TOTt
This Appendix shows derivations of terms of trade TOTt.
In GLR, TOTt ≡ RP
H
t
RPFt
.
In this paper, TOTt =
PriceOfGoodsMadeByForeignF irmInHomeCountry
PriceOfGoodsMadeByHomeFirmInForeignCountry
= RPt∗
RP t∗ =
θ
θ−1
wt
Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
θ
θ−1
w∗
t
Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
=
C
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t
χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (YWt )
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1 )
− ωϕ+ω [Zω−1
t
+(Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
C
∗ ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t
χ
ϕ
ϕ+ω (YW
t
)
1
ϕ+ω ( θ
θ−1 )
− ωϕ+ω [Z∗ω−1
t
+(Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
=
=
C
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t
[Zω−1
t
+(Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
C
∗ ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
t
[Z∗ω−1
t
+(Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
= ( Ct
C∗t
)
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω)
[Zω−1
t
+(Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
Z
1−γ
t
Z
∗γ
t
[Z∗ω−1
t
+(Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
)ω−1]
1
ϕ+ω
Z
γ
t
Z
∗1−γ
t
When γ = 0, the expression reduces to the GLR expression TOTt = (
Ct
C∗t
)
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω) ( Zt
Z∗t
)
−(1+ϕ)
ϕ+ω .
When additionally ϕ = 0 and ω = 1, TOTt =
Z∗t
Zt
which means the terms of trade move
one-for-one with productivity differential. As GLR explain, this is the main mechanism for
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) result that states the terms of trade adjust directly proportionately
to relative productivity.
When γ = 1, the expression reduces to TOTt = (
Ct
C∗t
)
ϕ
σ(ϕ+ω) Zt
Z∗t
. When additionally ϕ = 0,
TOTt =
Zt
Z∗t
, i.e., the terms of trade again move one-for-one with the productivity differential.
This result holds regardless of the value of ω.
Note that these are ”shadow TOT” because even γ = 0 is a ”no trade” scenario since
this model does not feature any trade in goods.
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